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Abstract 
 
 
 
RENEWING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
 
This thesis explores how capital flows are linked to economic development and 
proposes an alternative pathway to enhancing livelihoods in the marginal spaces of 
the global economy, drawing on examples from North America and the Pacific. 
Mainstream theories of development are largely based on European and North 
American examples, and argue for a progression of developmental stages from 
agriculture to industry to services, based on a flow of capital from core to 
periphery. Such theories are not place-specific, and do not reflect the particular 
conditions of remote and marginal places.  
 In the peripheral spaces of the global economy, investment opportunities 
may be limited. An alternative practice is to invest outside the region of capital 
generation, through the mechanism of a trust fund. I argue that local development 
can be achieved through investing in global financial markets, in core countries, 
rather than at the site of capital generation. In this way, local development is not 
limited to the marginal place where the benefits are to be felt; peripheral capital 
instead flows into the core to seek out the best investment opportunities. The local 
development process becomes differently spatialized by engaging global financial 
markets. 
 Capital generated in the periphery often comes in temporary streams, or 
windfalls, and benefits decline when the resource is depleted. Such non-renewable 
resources can be transformed into renewable fiscal ones when capital generated 
i 
ii 
from resource extraction is invested in financial markets through a trust fund. To 
make non-renewable resources renewable, they can be converted from a physical 
form into a financial form, thus extending the benefits of capital into perpetuity. 
 This thesis suggests that trust funds may serve as an alternative 
development mechanism in certain peripheral spaces of the global economy. Trust 
funds receive a share of resource revenues and increase them through investment. 
States can establish trust funds as an instrument of government policy, with all 
citizens as beneficiaries. Trust funds allow for re-spatializing the nature of 
investment as well as for sustaining it over time.  
 My analysis is based on the examination of six case studies. Two of these 
are peripheral economies in North America: the state of Alaska in the United 
States, and the province of Alberta in Canada. Both Alaska and Alberta established 
trust funds to manage their petroleum revenues. The four remaining cases are 
independent Pacific island nations: Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Each of 
these island nations established a trust fund to manage windfall resource revenues. 
The performance of these six trust funds has varied, largely reflecting policy 
choices. I develop a set of six criteria for the management of a successful fund. 
 In this thesis, I ask development practitioners to reimagine the economic 
spaces of marginal economies and the relationship between core and periphery. I 
argue for a separation of the sites of capital generation and capital investment, and 
for transforming non-renewable windfall resources into renewable fiscal ones.  
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Rethinking development 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1776, Adam Smith suggested that economic growth, and the betterment of 
society, depended on capital accumulation. Individuals accumulate capital, leading 
to both an augmentation of personal fortunes and to the improvement of society as 
a whole. Capital was the key: capital could be invested to finance new industries 
and expand the economy. Capital derived from what individuals put aside, ‘either 
regularly or annually, or upon some extraordinary occasion’ (Smith, 1999 [1776], 
I, 441). Thus economic development was at its foundation the work of individuals 
and small collectives.  
 The capitalist economic system had already expanded beyond Europe when 
Smith published The Wealth of Nations, and European capital had already reached 
the capitalist periphery. Europe ‘developed’ due to its ability to import raw 
materials from overseas, add value to them through manufacturing, and market 
those manufactures in the core and the periphery.1 This process led to the 
emergence of thriving financial markets in the core states, in which capital could 
be invested, loaned out, and circulated through the economy. 
 The analytical focus of development today is on those peripheral regions 
                                                     
1 The core/periphery model is widely used in all branches of science, including the economics of 
development (Borgatti and Everett, 1999; Krugman, 1996). Borgatti and Everett (1999) formalise 
the core/periphery model based on networks and links. 
1 
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that have not accumulated sufficient capital, and have therefore insufficiently 
enjoyed the fruits of economic growth. How are these regions to be ‘developed’? 
Since at least the end of World War II, a veritable army of development analysts 
has considered this question. The answers generated tend to point in a single 
direction: capital must flow from the wealthy core to the impoverished periphery, 
so that new industries may flourish and peripheral economies expand. This 
outbound capital would be generated by the financial markets of the core 
economies. 
 Core states invest the bulk of their wealth in their own economies, or in 
other core economies. Most global capital flows are within developed countries 
(Gibson-Graham, 1996, 127). This is because peripheral economies, especially the 
most peripheral, offer relatively few opportunities for profitable investment. Yet 
peripheral states are continually advised, by global financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, to create the conditions necessary to attract core capital and to invest 
their own capital locally: they are advised to create local infrastructure and 
industries and to replicate the development histories and trajectories of the core. 
But what if peripheral states could invest their national wealth, not locally, but in 
the financial markets of the core states? Would this generate greater wealth than 
local investment? Would it lead to a betterment of society as suggested by Adam 
Smith? This thesis considers these questions and suggests a way in which 
peripheral states could invest in core economies and renew and expand the wealth 
of marginal places.  
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1.1  The nature of development 
Development is a word with many meanings.2 In the context of places on the 
margins of the global capitalist economy, it is often seen as a process by which 
these places will arrive at the same standards of living as the ‘developed’ societies 
of Europe, America, and Japan. Fifty years of development studies scholarship has 
explored the processes by which societies change their living standards and 
improve the wellbeing of their populations. The mainstream3 of this scholarship 
has concluded that the world’s capital distribution is uneven, and that a 
redistribution of the world’s wealth, through investment and trade, will benefit all 
societies (Henderson et al., 2001). The mainstream sees the solution to the 
‘problem’ of ‘development’ as capital flow from richer to poorer societies, evening 
out the distribution of wealth and opportunity, and bringing the living standards of 
developing societies into line with developed ones. As geographer Carl O. Sauer 
critically noted, we have ‘universalize[d] our culture’, and that today we define 
‘underdeveloped’ parts of the world as ‘those that have not yet been fitted into our 
pattern, which is one of “growth” or “progress” in measurable satisfactions, a 
mystique of numbers’ (1967, 61-62). 
 A minority of development analysts has taken a different approach. One 
                                                     
2 I avoid giving a precise definition of development, given the multiplicity of meanings that the 
word can take. As Postan notes, ‘such comprehensive words … must over-simplify the reality they 
purport to epitomize’, yet ‘without generalized terms representing entire groups of phenomena not 
only history but all intelligent discourse would be impossible’ (1961, xiv). To most mainstream 
theorists, development is imagined as a process by which economies grow, whereas to alternative 
theorists development is viewed as an exploitative process. In general, I use the term here to refer to 
a practice by which individual and societal well-being is improved through the sustainability and 
self-reliance of the local economy and in an increase in freedom (Sen, 1999).  
3 By mainstream I mean those conceptions and models by which development is imagined by the 
majority of policy-makers and the institutions that employ them, including supranational 
organisations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank; departments and 
ministries of finance and development in most countries; independent development consultants; and 
academic economists. 
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group, the dependency theorists (and their close relations), reject the notion of 
capital flows from richer to poorer as a foundation of development. Dependency 
theorists, such as André Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, argue that 
flows of investment and trade between core and peripheral states always benefit 
the core. Investment and trade are therefore merely a form of exploitation, in which 
capital is actually extracted from developing countries. Initial capital, from the 
developed world, finances resource extraction activities that ultimately leave the 
poor countries poorer. These theorists argue that engagement with global capital is 
therefore no solution to development, and that developing states are better off 
cutting their ties to global capital, and relying on their own resources and 
traditional livelihoods. The ‘anti-development’ school is even more radical. These 
theorists, such as Gustavo Esteva and (in some respects) Arturo Escobar, 
problematise the entire concept of development, arguing instead for avoiding 
engagement with global capital. The anti-development theorists’ epistemological 
position also leads to a focus on local alternative economies and ignores state-led 
development.  
 Mainstream development models argue for capital flows from developed to 
developing societies as the path to development, assuming that the basic 
institutions of society—such as secure property rights and impartial enforcement of 
contracts—are in place. Mainstream theorists suggest that their models are 
universal, and they ignore the specifics of different places. Dependency theorists 
and anti-development theorists argue for a withdrawal from engagement with 
global capital. In this thesis I suggest a third path. I argue that, paradoxically, 
capital flows from developing to developed countries may be a development 
strategy that could benefit certain kinds of states. This reverse flow, in which 
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capital generated from the developing countries’ own resources is invested in 
global financial markets through the mechanism of a trust fund, allows small and 
resource dependent states to engage with globalization to their own advantage.  
 
2.  GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
Development theories and models since the emergence of ‘development studies’ in 
the 1940s have tended to take a global or universalist approach to development, 
conceiving of development as a process with equal applicability in all places and at 
all times. Development is imagined as a constant, global process that plays out in 
the same way every time. Theories and models developed in and for one location 
may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to all other locations. Thus has modernity 
annihilated space.4 
 
2.1  Modernist and neoliberal theories 
Mainstream development theory, in its modernist and neoliberal forms, is premised 
on the flow of capital from developed to developing countries. Mainstream models 
are founded on an ideological position that requires the developed countries to 
assist developing ones, offering themselves as potential models of success. The 
reasons for this are largely based on economic advantage, though they are often 
couched in terms of altruism. Mainstream models assume a single linear path to 
development, from Rostow’s (1960) ‘stages of growth’ conception to the more 
recent trend towards promoting the service sector in developing societies. The 
direct flow of capital into the periphery is promoted by a loose coalition of 
                                                     
4 There is an extremely extensive critical literature on both mainstream and alternative forms of 
economic development. For thorough reviews of this literature see Arndt, 1987; Brohman, 1996; 
Hart, 2001, 2002; Forbes, 1984; and Peet with Hartwick, 1999. 
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development agencies, multinational corporations, and international banks as the 
solution to economic growth in developing countries. 
As Brohman notes, ‘the neoliberal development model is based on a 
neoclassical reading of the economic history of the industrialized capitalist world’ 
(1996, 31). This includes such elements as private market-led growth, private 
investment based on profit motives, relatively low wages, gradual industrialisation, 
and technological advancement based on innovation diffusion and increased 
globalisation (Brohman, 1996, 31). Once certain conditions are set in place in 
peripheral regions, investment will be attracted to them and initiate the process 
described above. The whole model is based on the trickling down of ‘benefits’ 
from developed, industrialised states to those in some earlier ‘stage’ of 
development. External capital is necessary to offset perceived local capital 
shortages, so the core invests in the periphery and thereby transforms it; the core 
enlarges and the periphery diminishes. Within the mainstream model, regional 
incomes will converge over time and regional economic disparities will disappear 
(Martin and Sunley, 1998). The extinction of the periphery is the telos of 
mainstream development models. 
 Mainstream development models suggest that certain conditions are 
necessary to attract external capital and—and retain domestic savings—to initiate 
the process of development diffusion. These include policy actions sometimes 
bundled under the rubric of ‘good governance’, including fiscal discipline 
(reducing budget deficits), tax reform, financial liberalization (market-based 
interest rates), competitive exchange rates, elimination of barriers to direct foreign 
investment, privatization, deregulation, legally secure property rights, and 
openness and transparency of government practice (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; 
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Peet with Hartwick, 1999, 52). Within a global economy, geographical location 
becomes less important and a place’s regulatory environment becomes paramount 
(Hudson, 1998). 
Though the trickling down of development benefits may have social 
aspects, in that benefits trickle from the individual rich to the individual poor, 
development is nevertheless imagined as a spatial concept: development spreads 
geographically from the richer countries of North America, Europe, and East Asia 
to the poorer countries of the developing world; development is thus something 
that diffuses (Berry, 1972). The experiences of North America, Europe, and East 
Asia are both the hearth regions of development and models of what development 
can and should be. According to these models, the periphery will only develop 
when it embraces the historical economic imaginings and practices of the 
developed world. 
 
2.2  Alternative and critical theories 
Alternative and critical theories of development may be loosely lumped into three 
broad categories: dependency and neomarxist models, anti-development critiques, 
and post-development critiques. The first two of these suggest that mainstream 
models of development are ultimately harmful and bring few benefits to peripheral 
regions. Post-development theorists instead argue for new ways of imagining the 
development process. 
 
Dependency 
Dependency theory, like the Marxist and neomarxist models of development from 
which it springs, denies the possibilities of development. Dependency theory 
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developed out of and as a reaction to modernization models. Rejecting the ‘stages 
of growth’ progression and the necessity of external capital, dependency theorists 
suggested that the flow of capital from core to periphery was at best an exploitative 
colonial process, increasing the dependency of the periphery on the core. The core 
provided both raw materials and markets for manufactured goods, but the real 
valued-added took place in the core, with its industrialized manufacturing sector. 
Peripheral states become locked in this position, unable to break free and ‘develop’ 
on their own. Peripheral states are then unable to directly manage their own 
economies, and they are forced to adopt policies that benefit the core (Orlove, 
1977). The inability of the periphery to truly develop with external capital led 
some dependency theorists, such as André Gunder Frank, to propose socialist 
revolution as the only alternative to exploitation by the core (Frank, 1969).  
 
Anti-development 
The critical movement commonly known as anti-development is premised on the 
idea that ‘development’ is at root a discourse of power. In this critique, global 
development institutions (such as the World Bank) exercise power not because 
they are a source of capital but because they define development discourse and 
how development is imagined. This position leads anti-development theorists to 
reject the entire development enterprise as tainted by core-based financial 
institutions. Gustavo Esteva famously stated that the entire development project 
‘stinks’ (Esteva, 1987), pointing out, among other things, the corruption, 
environmental degradation, and the damage to individual and collective livelihoods 
that (some) development projects engendered. A more moderate, but still critical, 
position is that of Arturo Escobar (1995), who sees the core-based development 
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project as a ‘global hegemonic imagination’ (Peet with Hartwick, 1999, 145) that 
runs roughshod over traditional societies and their ways of life. As Escobar notes:  
 
Development was—and continues to be for the most part—a top-down, 
ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as 
abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down the charts of 
‘progress’ (1995, 44). 
 
Yet Escobar’s work, like others in the anti-development camp, and while making 
some good points, tends to lump all development theories together, does not 
recognize difference within development approaches, and confuses rampant 
capitalism with modernity. The anti-development school makes almost no 
reference to place, and calls for a retreat from the global and an embrace of 
alternative economies that ignores the possibilities of state-led development 
(Corbridge, 1998; Curry, 2003; Hart, 2001). Finally, anti-development cannot itself 
escape from the discourse of development, and is forced to analyse it using the 
same terms as other theories. 
 
Post-development 
Somewhat allied with the anti-development perspective is that of post-
development. But while anti-development theorists have little faith in the 
possibilities of development, those in the post-development school see light at the 
end of the tunnel. Post-development theorists agree with many of the critiques of 
development levelled by scholars such as Escobar (and in some respects Escobar 
himself holds a post-development position), but they differ in viewing 
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development as a lost cause. Instead, post-development scholars attempt to 
reimagine development and unhinge it from the mainstream. This position is 
perhaps best expressed by J.K. Gibson-Graham in a recent paper: 
 
The challenge of post-development is not to give up on development, not to see all 
development practice—past, present and future, in wealthy and poor countries—as 
tainted, failed, retrograde, as though there were something necessarily problematic 
and destructive about deliberate attempts to increase social well-being through 
economic intervention; as though there were a space of purity beyond or outside 
development that we could access through renunciation (Gibson-Graham, 2004). 
 
Thus post-development theorists imagine a potential development that is divorced 
from both its mainstream capitalist underpinnings and its dependence on 
replicating ‘First World’ development history through industrialization based on 
direct foreign investment. This imagining of development recognizes that 
alternative, non-capitalist economic practices also form part of the conceptual 
space of development (Gibson-Graham, 1996). 
 In sum, mainstream models of development have been challenged in a 
variety of ways. Dependency and neomarxist theories have stood mainstream 
models on their heads, arguing that capital flowing from developed to developing 
countries solidifies a position of dependence and exploitation. Anti-development 
theorists reject the entire development project (but provide few practical 
alternatives), whereas post-development theorists point in new directions. In its 
analysis of development based on capital flows from periphery to core, this thesis 
fits partially within the post-development school. 
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2.3  The geography of finance 
Geographers have increasingly focused on the spatial circumstances of finance. 
Geographer Andrew Leyshon (1995; 1997; 1998) has identified three general 
theoretical approaches to the geography of finance. The first is a political economy 
approach to understanding the spatiality of finance, the second is an 
anthropological approach to the concept of money, while the third approach 
suggests alternatives to the hegemonic imagination of the global economy.  
The centrepiece of the political economy approach is explaining how 
globalization further separates the wealthy from the impoverished in both 
intranational and international contexts. In his 1995 article, Leyshon divides the 
political economy approach into three subcategories. One of these is the 
geopolitical economy of money, which explores financial hegemony, the financial 
bases of state and elite group power, shifts in power away from state interests and 
towards transnational interests of social elites, the ‘transnational business class’, 
and the blurring of state-economy boundaries. Geographers identified with this 
subcategory include Stuart Corbridge and John Agnew. Another subcategory is the 
geoeconomics of finance, identified with geographers such as Gordon L. Clark. 
This subcategory is concerned with such issues as globalization and the ‘end of 
geography’, the denationalization of currencies (such as the Euro), and the rise of 
‘pension fund capitalism’ and the privatization of welfare, in which private funds 
begin to replace public programs. A third subcategory is the geography of financial 
exclusion, associated with such geographers as Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, 
which examines housing markets and ‘negative equity’, the growth of 
indebtedness, and national landscapes of exclusion. The political economy 
approach to the geography of finance appears to be the dominant one at present. 
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In his 1997 and 1998 articles, Leyshon continues his explication of the 
geography of finance and considers two other approaches. The anthropological 
approach to money is concerned with such questions as why global financial 
centres like New York, London, and Tokyo have persisted in the face of 
globalization, and with exploring the role of information in the spatial movement 
of capital. Some of Nigel Thrift’s work fits into this approach. The last approach, 
which is concerned with exploring alternatives to hegemonic imaginings of the 
global economy and global capitalism, is associated with J.K Gibson-Graham. This 
approach seeks to destabilize understandings of capitalism as a dominant and all-
encompassing system by examining such metaphors as the ‘economic body’ and 
the ways in which it may be penetrated and by identifying non-capitalist 
alternatives, both extant and potential. 
The work of the geographers analysed in Leyshon’s series of articles is 
largely (though not entirely) concerned with the developed world—and especially 
with North America, Europe, East Asia, and Australia—or with creating new 
theoretical positions in the face of globalization. The work of geographers of 
finance has focused its attention on flows of capital within and between advanced, 
industrial, developed states. In this sense the geography of finance is a field largely 
separate from the geography of development. How places on the periphery of the 
global system might engage with that system to their own advantage is a question 
significantly absent from most of the concerns of the geography of finance.5 
 
 
                                                     
5 Although some geographers, such as Gordon Clark, have noted that the lack of financial 
integration between rich and poor countries is a threat to development (Clark, 2004a). 
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Offshore banking 
One aspect of the geography of finance that is concerned with development in 
peripheral places is its analysis of offshore banking (see, e.g., Hampton and 
Christensen, 2002; Hudson, 1998). Offshore banks offer tax advantages to 
individuals and corporations by allowing wealth to be deposited or nominally 
carried on the books of banks, trusts, and shell corporations domiciled in the 
‘offshore’ country, typically a small state and usually an island (e.g., Bahamas, 
Cayman Islands, Tonga, Marshall Islands). The sovereignty of these small states 
allows them to develop their own tax policies and regulations. Typically there are 
no taxes in these places. Instead, there is a small fee for setting up and maintaining 
an offshore bank, trust, or corporation. These fees may be significant enough to 
account for an important share of national income, and a panoply of small states 
world wide has thus adopted offshore banking as a development device. 
 Offshore banking is an example of a direct flow of capital from developed 
to developing countries. The capital remains the property of the foreign investor, 
and the earnings from this capital, as well as the capital itself, do not trickle into 
the offshore banking state. The capital is fictitious in the sense that it is not 
invested in local development projects; the capital is only nominally within the 
offshore banking state. The only economic effects on offshore banking states are 
fees assessed by the offshore state, as well as a relatively low level of multiplier 
effects. A further disadvantage of this development strategy for small states is that 
tax haven status often incurs the disapproval, and even the wrath, of the developed 
countries, who feel that they are being cheated of rightful tax revenues. Sanctions 
may even be taken against offshore banking states, and external regulation is 
tightening (Read, 2004). Offshore banking is therefore a precarious and risky 
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development strategy, especially as to remain competitive in the industry (and even 
more so for new entrants) the offshore state must make even greater concessions in 
order to attract capital. 
An important aspect of offshore banking is that its sites are not spatially 
differentiated: Samoa, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Liechtenstein, and Bahrain are 
all virtually equivalent. Space no longer matters, because core capital does not care 
where it goes as long as the destination meets the twin conditions of secrecy (the 
ability to hide capital) and limited or no tax liability. Regulatory environment is 
more important than location (Hudson, 1998). 
The geographic analysis of offshore banking and capital flight focuses on 
capital that has its source in core countries, not marginal ones. The primary 
analytical concern is with capital flight from core to periphery, the loss of tax bases 
in core countries, and the impacts on the development of the offshore banking 
countries. In a sense, offshore banking is the opposite of the cases considered in 
this thesis. In offshore banking, core capital flows to the periphery, takes advantage 
of those marginal spaces (or outlaw spaces) in the global economy, then returns 
with profit to the core.  
 
Money as mercury 
Geographer Gordon Clark, in a very interesting recent paper on the geography of 
global finance, proposes a new metaphor for monetary flows: ‘money flows like 
mercury’ (Clark, 2004a). This insight supports my reimagining of the ways that 
capital flows can contribute to economic development. The characteristics of 
money/mercury are that it: 1) runs together at speed; 2) forms in pools; 3) re-forms 
in pools if disturbed; 4) follows the channels in an apparently smooth surface; and 
Chapter 1: Rethinking development 15
5) is toxic if poorly managed (Clark, 2004a, 12). Within neoliberal development 
ideology, capital flows from core to periphery are the solution to regional 
economic inequality. In this thesis I contend that reversing the flow of capital, from 
periphery to core, is an alternative economic development strategy. Clark’s 
metaphor of money as mercury is helpful here, as it suggests that capital pools in 
peripheral locations may be harmful, especially in small economies. A 
development perspective arguing, as I do, for the removal or relocation of capital 
from peripheral places, is consistent with Clark’s mercury metaphor. Peripheral 
places can remove this harmful substance (money/mercury) from the local 
environment by sending it abroad to do its work of separating gold from ore.6 
 
2.4  The uncertainty of global development 
Geographers, economists, and other analysts have struggled to understand the 
nature of development and the causes of the unequal distribution of wealth. They 
have also sought policies designed to sustain wealth and to distribute it more 
evenly. The concepts of core (or centre) and periphery (or margins) are useful in 
the analysis of development and have been accepted by scholars and practitioners 
of all theoretical stripes (Borgatti and Everett, 1999; Krugman, 1996; Potter, 2001).  
They have been used both in analysing economic unevenness between and within 
countries (Henderson et al., 2001).  
 Core regions are those highly industrial or post-industrial regions that are 
economically advantaged: their citizens are on average better fed, better housed, 
and better educated than the world as a whole. These regions are closely linked 
                                                     
6 It is also interesting to note that the most important mercury mines, such as Almadén, New 
Almadén, and Huancavélica, were located in the periphery and the mercury itself was removed and 
often transported to core regions. 
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both to each other and to the periphery. The core region might be defined as 
including (when viewed on a polar map projection) the geographically proximate 
and ‘central’ regions of North America, Europe, and East Asia (with a few outliers 
such as Australia and New Zealand). Industrial activity continues to concentrate in 
this core, despite higher wages than in the periphery, because of agglomeration 
benefits (Krugman and Venables, 1995).  
This thesis is concerned with the development of ‘remote’ regions, which 
have been simply defined as those with ‘few opportunities for profitable 
investment’ (Leven, 1986). Their continued existence, despite transformations in 
technology and economic globalization, poses significant questions for the future. 
As Henderson et al. (2001, 100) note, ‘one of the most difficult questions is: what 
to do with lagging regions, often remote and perhaps sparsely populated?’ 
Unfortunately they do not answer this question. They do, however, note that 
‘development must … take the form either of mitigating the disadvantages of being 
outside existing centres, or of the creation of new centres of activity’ (Henderson et 
al., 2001, 85).7 In this thesis I focus on a way in which the disadvantages of 
remoteness can be mitigated. 
 
3.  LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 
If, as Ray Hudson argues, ‘successful’ local development is in large part dependent 
on local economic and social conditions, then it is important to understand how 
these local conditions are linked to the process of development (Hudson, 1999). By 
‘local development’ I mean analytical attempts to construct a place-specific model, 
                                                     
7 They also observe that ‘… new centres of activity can develop, but the process is not one of steady 
convergence of all locations. Instead, it is rapid development of a few locations, leaving others 
essentially unaffected’ (Henderson et al., 2001, 86). Thus, there will always be remote regions. 
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theory, or explanation of development processes, distinguished from global 
development by the focus on the local rather than the global. Local development 
analysts argue that no explanation or theory of development can hold true at all 
times and in all places. What is needed instead are theories of development that 
have purchase only in particular contexts, but which more accurately reflect the 
conditions of place. I consider here three such theoretical attempts: the analysis of 
small states as constituting a distinct development ‘region’, the MIRAB model 
developed for Oceania, and a northern model of development applied to Arctic and 
Subarctic regions. 
 
3.1  Development in small states 
Is ‘smallness’ a factor in development? Are small states an analytical category, and 
do they share enough in common to make comparisons among them? Are 
processes of development in small states different from those in larger ones? While 
there is a substantial body of literature on small states, not all scholars agree about 
the answers to these basic questions, and small states are imagined in a variety of 
ways. 
 A basic point of disagreement in the small states literature is the definition 
of smallness. Some scholars do not define smallness or provide an ambiguous 
definition of it (e.g., Armstrong, et al., 19988; Bertram, 2004; Briguglio, 1995; 
Laplagne, et al., 2001; Milner and Westaway, 1993; Read, 2004). Several of these 
authors also make no distinction between ‘small’ states and ‘micro’ states. In some 
cases these authors assume that the reader will understand that most island 
countries are small. 
                                                     
8 Though these authors do consider states with a population under 3 million as ‘microstates’. 
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 Other authors use different variables in defining smallness. These may 
include territorial size of the state, its population, and the size of its economy or 
national income as measured by GDP or GNP (Streeten, 1993). Of these variables, 
population is used by most scholars as the key point in defining smallness. The 
question then is: what size population is defined as small? Definitions vary: 
Streeten (1993) defines ‘small’ as below 10 million people, Armstrong and Read 
(2004) use 5 million, Crowards (2002) uses 2.7 million,9 and Baldacchino (1993) 
and Easterly and Kraay (2000) use 1 million. Several authors also perceive 
different kinds of smallness; for example, Streeten (1993), who, as noted above, 
considers a state with fewer than 10 million people ‘small’, considers those with 
fewer than 5 million as ‘very small’, while Crowards, who considers populations 
below 2.7 million as ‘small’, considers those below 0.5 million as ‘micro’. Finally, 
some authors, such as Liou and Ding (2002), point out that all definitions of 
smallness are arbitrary and have no theoretical basis. Although definitions vary, 
and theoretical significance is questionable, a large number of scholars use the 
analytical category of ‘small state’, and most recognize that definitions of 
smallness may be fluid and changing: using a population figure is merely an entry 
point. Smallness is something that one knows when one sees it. 
 If one accepts ‘small state’ as an analytical category, the next question is: 
what significance does smallness have on a national economy? Most scholars of 
smallness suggest that small states differ from larger ones, and that economic 
development could well be a different process. Baldacchino (1993), for example, 
goes so far as to say that mainstream development theories don’t apply to small 
                                                     
9 This unusual number derives from a cluster in a regression analysis. Crowards is also the only 
author to construct an index of smallness, combining population, land area, and income. 
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states, but because of colonial histories these states nevertheless cling to 
universalist models of development. Overton (1993), in a review article focussing 
on Oceania, notes that universalist models (modernization, dependency, and 
gender studies) are often applied to the Pacific, but that these models do not 
necessarily work in that context.  
 How, then, do small states differ from larger ones? Or, rather, how does 
their smallness make them different? Small states, by definition, have smaller 
populations, and this gives them a relatively limited labour and skilled 
management pool. Small size may also prevent economic diversification and 
economies of scale, limit the presence of natural resources and capital, and 
increase the likelihood of poverty (Liou and Ding, 2002). The remoteness of many 
small states adds to transportation costs, and small states are more vulnerable to 
natural disasters as well as economic ones (Barker, 2000; Briguglio, 1995). Small 
states are typically more open, with much more external movement of both capital 
and people. Out-migration is often common and encouraged (James, 1993; 
Overton, 1993). Small states are often dependent on outside capital, in the form of 
remittances, foreign aid, and overseas jobs in order to sustain and develop their 
economies (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1998). Yet clearly there are important 
differences in the development trajectories of, for example, Singapore and Fiji. 
 The smallness of a state may affect its development potential. James (1993) 
notes that development of the formal economic sector is something that most small 
states have not yet achieved, and that development will be attained through 
investment, improved production, and trade. Milner and Westaway (1993) and 
Read (2004) find that smallness is not an obstacle to growth and prosperity, and 
that growth and smallness are not correlated. Baldacchino (1993) suggests that 
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small states tend to outperform large ones, as they depend on trade and are outward 
or globally oriented. And Bertram (2004) suggests that the GDP of small states 
reflects that of their patrons. While Paul Streeten (1993), founder of the journal 
World Development, notes that small states are different from large ones, Easterly 
and Kraay, of the World Bank, argue that small states are no different from larger 
ones, and that they therefore should receive the same policy advice. For them, 
development may be universalist and globalized: ‘the lessons of growth experience 
from all countries seem to be applicable to small states’ (2000, 2024). 
 Though there is an increasingly large body of work on the development 
nature of small states, there is no clear consensus on what constitutes a small state 
and on what significance smallness may have on development potential and 
prospects. Most work on small states, with a few exceptions, has been concerned 
with explaining the performance of small states or on establishing smallness as an 
analytical category, and there has been little on specific policy advice for small 
states. One notable exception is Baldacchino (1993, 43), who observes that ‘the 
central economic concern for microstates with respect to the outside world is the 
active preservation or, better still, the enhancement of their status and desirability 
as rentier states’. This statement is important in the consideration of the trust funds 
discussed in this thesis, economic instruments that are themselves enhanced by a 
smaller, rather than larger, number of beneficiaries.10 
 
 
                                                     
10 The literature on smallness referred to here is mainly global in focus, with some exceptions, such 
as Overton (1993), who looks only at Oceania. Three of the four Oceanic states considered in this 
thesis, namely Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu, are so small as to have dropped out of the analysis of 
many small-state scholars, mainly due to lack of comparable data. 
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3.2  The ‘MIRAB model’ in Oceania 
Scholars of Oceania have identified distinctive features of the region that limit the 
applicability of globalist models in understanding development in Pacific islands 
(Hau‘ofa, 1993, 1998; Overton, 1993, 1999; Ward, 1995). The ‘MIRAB model’11 of 
development was an attempt to bring greater place specificity to development 
theory, in this case to the microstates of Oceania, to which models developed for 
continental countries did not seem to apply. The MIRAB model was developed in 
the 1980s by two New Zealanders, economist Geoffrey Bertram and geographer 
Ray Watters (Bertram, 1986; Bertram and Watters, 1985, 1986; see also Bertram, 
1999; and Poirine, 1998). The model was an attempt to explain the relatively 
successful economic performance of small Pacific states, based on their higher 
than expected rates of economic growth and their GNP per capita. Bertram and 
Watters argued that, given their extreme isolation, poor soils and agricultural base, 
limited natural resources, and other factors, Pacific island countries should be 
among the poorest in the world. Statistically, however, these countries 
outperformed much of Africa and Asia (in terms of levels of GNP and growth), 
and their standards of living are higher than what classical, modernization, and 
dependency models predict (Bertram, 1999, 106). Why was this so? Bertram and 
Watters suggested that the cause lay in the Pacific countries’ ability to exploit 
globalisation, through migration (MI), remittances (R), foreign aid (A), and 
bureaucracy (B)—hence the term MIRAB. Pacific islanders would migrate to other 
countries (notably Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) and would remit 
a share of their earnings to families back home in the islands. Pacific island states 
                                                     
11 The ‘MIRAB model’ is really a description of Pacific island economies, rather than a true model or 
analytical framework. I use the term ‘model’ here, however, as that is how it is used in much of the 
literature. 
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were also able to use their geographic position to derive aid from Australia, New 
Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, among others. Finally, island 
governments (bureaucracies) were the main source of formal employment. These 
factors together gave the Pacific island states a relatively high and sustainable 
standard of living. 
 The viability of MIRAB economies is based on reimagining the economic 
spaces of Pacific island states. Bertram (1993) suggests that Pacific islanders 
resident overseas constitute part of the economic space of island economies. As 
Bertram notes, mainstream imaginings of development argue that to be sustainable 
development must be ‘underpinned by productive activity within the territorial 
boundaries of the island economy itself’ (Bertram 1993, 248). His alternative 
interpretation of development is that it can be sustainable: 
 
so long as the indigenous people, wherever they reside, retain a set of entitlements 
sufficient to support material welfare standards over the foreseeable future, while 
preserving or enhancing their collective identity and the natural environment of their 
home territory (Bertram, 1993, 248). 
 
The majority of island-born Cook Islanders, Tokelauans, and Niueans (all New 
Zealand-affiliated territories) now live in New Zealand, with about 90% of 
Niueans resident in New Zealand. Thus, as Bertram (1993, 254) notes, ‘the modern 
sector of the Niuean economy … lies in New Zealand’ and that ‘Samoa’s modern 
sector lies in Auckland and Los Angeles’. Flows between the island territories and 
islanders resident overseas are continual, with remittances flowing to the islands 
(often in exchange for island produce or symbolic goods, representations of island 
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identity) and continual short-term population movements between the islands and 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. 
The MIRAB model has been criticised by some scholars, largely because it 
assumes that the remittances and donor aid components are constant and 
sustainable.12 Some analysts claim that a ‘remittance decay’ function reduces the 
rate of remittances as migrants remain longer in their destination countries 
(Connell, 1980, 1987; James, 1991; Campbell, 1992). Supporters of the decay 
hypothesis suggest that migrants become less connected to their home countries 
and that the transfer of capital also declines; remittances are therefore an 
unsustainable source of national income. More recent research, however, has 
largely refuted the remittance decay hypothesis. For example, Brown (1997, 1998), 
in his study of Tongan and Samoan migrants and remittances to their home 
countries, found that the remittance decay hypothesis has no validity. Poirine 
(1997) and Simati and Gibson (2001) have also refuted the remittance decay 
hypothesis. These scholars argue that, contrary to earlier theories, remittances are 
largely motivated by economic incentives such as investment and asset 
accumulation in the home country, under ‘implicit loan’ arrangements, rather than 
by largely altruistic motives. Nevertheless, many mainstream analysts still see 
remittances and donor aid13 as unsustainable and as creating dependent 
relationships with outside sources of national income. 
 What becomes clear from Bertram and Watters’s MIRAB analysis is that 
                                                     
12 Poirine (1998) provides the best overview of the arguments against MIRAB; he then goes on to 
critique and ultimately reject these arguments. 
13 Decay in donor aid is more difficult to assess, as aid levels fluctuate with particular projects. 
Between 1985-89 and 1990-95 donor aid as a percentage of GNP declined in some Pacific countries 
(Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu) but increased in others (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Solomon 
Islands) (Duncan et al., 1999, 9). 
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‘conventional notions of what constitutes economic development cannot be applied 
mechanistically to the very small island economies of the Pacific’ (Bertram 1993, 
257). Island states currently depend on the export of their population, and the 
return of economic gains from the employment of those islanders resident 
overseas. Bertram and Watters liken this process to the transnational corporation, 
which has a nominal home (a head office in a major financial centre) but operates 
worldwide and whose operations support the home office but are distributed 
globally. These ‘transnational corporations of kin’ (Bertram and Watters, 1985, 
511; Bertram, 1993, 254-57) allocate financial and labour resources worldwide, 
and, as Bertram (1993) notes, the goal is not to maximise incomes in the island 
territory alone, but to maximise the overall welfare of the islander population 
(which he equates with ‘shareholder equity’). Thus ‘development’ is imagined as 
‘enhancement of the international collective net worth of islander groups’ 
(Bertram, 1993, 254), rather than as increased productivity or growth in the island 
state itself. 
 Bertram further notes that capitalism has only a small role in island society 
(Bertram, 1986, 809-10). Therefore, promotion of capitalist forms of economy is 
not necessarily a solution to problems of development. Instead, Bertram argues 
(1986, 1993) that the key is to make rent incomes secure: ‘what matters is whether 
the entitlement of island communities to rent incomes remains sustainable’ 
(Bertram, 1993, 257). He notes that, given prevailing circumstances, continued rent 
flows are more critical to island survival than the formation of productive forms of 
industry: 
 
It is continued rent entitlements that are required to render current living standards 
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sustainable. The promotion of productive activity within the territory of these 
micro states finds its rationale not in its direct contribution to real income, so 
much as in its role in defining and reinforcing the roles of individuals within 
indigenous society and culture (Bertram, 1993, 253). 
 
Mainstream development models fall down in the context of microstates, in which 
productive industry is important mainly for sustaining culture: Bertram argues that 
‘there are viable paths to modernity and welfare that do not rely upon a repetition 
of the European large-country model of industrialisation and primitive 
accumulation’ (1993, 248). Economic sustainability will depend on the ability of 
microstates to sustain rents over the long term. For many microstates this means 
continued reliance on remittances and aid. But investing rents in financial markets 
can also provide a means of sustaining the flow of rents over time. 
 The MIRAB model is important as a place-specific conception of 
development. It was designed to describe development conditions in Oceania, 
particularly in atoll microstates. In many ways it does account for the performance 
of Pacific island economies (Poirine, 1998). However, it still remains very much 
within the notion of capital flows from developed to developing countries as the 
way to engage globalisation, and even MIRAB advocates cannot assume that donor 
aid will continue at present levels. The ‘model’ thus only partially serves as a set of 
policy guidelines for development in small Pacific states. It does, however, 
recognize that sustaining rents is the key to the long-term viability of small island 
states, and that engaging with globalisation is perhaps one way to do this. As 
Bertram (1999, 107) notes, ‘Pacific islander populations became globalised long 
before most of the rest of the non-OECD world’.  
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3.3  Northern theories of development 
While there is no equivalent to the MIRAB model in the context of North America, 
some scholars have attempted to analyse regional development in the remote 
regions of the continent, with particular reference to Alaska. The objective of these 
scholars is to assess whether Arctic regions might require a distinctive theory of 
development, or whether they are better treated and understood within a broader 
category of ‘remote regions’ that also includes non-Northern regions.14 In doing so 
they continue within a North American tradition of analysis of frontier regions, 
which began in a general sense with Frederick Jackson Turner (1893) and 
developed into theories of frontier development with the work of Harold Innis 
(1930, 1940), Walter Prescott Webb (1952), Mel Watkins (1963), and Douglass 
North (1966), among others. The ‘staples theory’ developed by these scholars 
explored the role of natural resource exports as engines of economic growth. 
 Geographer David Sugden of the University of Edinburgh was one of the 
first scholars to analyse frontier formation in the polar regions (Sugden, 1982). 
Basing his analysis on the concepts of core and periphery, he examined how 
intrusive waves of economic development were superimposed on traditional 
indigenous economic systems. This process is in general similar to the history of 
the frontier in temperate North America, but, unlike in temperate regions, polar 
frontiers never permanently advanced and never really ‘closed’. The pattern of 
frontier history in temperate North America was gradual settlement from East to 
                                                     
14 In the analysis of North American regional development, ‘North’ and ‘Northern regions’ refer to 
Arctic and Sub-Arctic regions, typically defined as Alaska in the United States, and the territories 
of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut in Canada, plus the northern or Sub-Arctic parts of 
seven of the ten Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, 
Québec, and Newfoundland). 
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West, pushing the frontier of settlement further west until all the intervening space 
was filled and the frontier ceased to exist. In the Arctic, however, non-indigenous 
settlement was never permanent, at least in large numbers. Rather, waves of 
settlement accompanying resource extractive projects were of short duration, and 
retreated when the resource was exhausted or no longer exploited. So, for example, 
when furs were an important industry, settlers moved in and established 
communities, but these often were abandoned when the fur market declined. The 
same was true of gold in the Klondike and Yukon river regions of Canada and 
Alaska: large numbers of settlers arrived in these areas to mine gold, but retreated 
when the resource was exhausted, leaving no large permanent settlements in the 
former goldfields. Thus each natural resource had its own, temporary frontier and 
settlement zone, but these shifted due to market factors, solidifying the polar 
regions’ status as remote regions. 
 The most original work on the North American ‘North’ as a remote region 
is that of University of Alaska economist Matthew Berman (1992). Berman 
suggests that the North can be defined as that portion of the continent that will 
never be developed, in the sense that long-term economic growth will never be 
achieved. Four northern attributes—an export-oriented transportation system, a 
resource-dependent market economy, the low biological productivity of land and 
the consequent limitations on agriculture, and the extreme variability of the market 
economy—limit the potential for development in this region, and Berman argues 
that this is what distinguishes it from other, non-Northern, remote regions. These 
attributes in combination inhibit the development of both agricultural and 
industrial sectors, meaning that the North will never have a diversified economy in 
which primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary sectors are all present. Berman 
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notes that these attributes can be mitigated by public investment (in infrastructure, 
for example) but that both agriculture and industrial activities will have to be 
subsidised during the economic downturns that characterise the Northern economy. 
 Berman illustrates his argument by comparing 22 remote regions from all 
over the globe in terms of their road-rail networks, distance from a major urban 
centre, population density, road and rail density, exports as a percentage of gross 
product, agricultural productivity per unit area, and measures of variability of real 
GDP. These seven factors are combined to create an index of remoteness. 
Berman’s findings suggest that the seven regions geographically located in the Far 
North (such as Alaska, the Canadian Territories, Greenland, and the Finnmark 
province of Norway) also comprise the regions that show the highest levels of 
remoteness. Some of the other places considered, including Alberta and Fiji15 
indicate moderate levels of remoteness, but are still classified as remote regions. 
 Berman’s work suggests that there are varying degrees of remoteness, with 
those considered as ‘most remote’ having the least probability of developing (in 
terms of economic growth). But, like the MIRAB theorists, Berman does not 
necessarily see this as a disadvantage. He suggests that, rather than attempting to 
recreate non-Northern economic conditions and practices in the North, policy 
should be directed towards adapting to the North’s distinctive and extreme 
remoteness and helping residents lead meaningful and productive lives given these 
constraints. Berman’s conclusions point out that subsidizing agriculture, 
infrastructure, and import substitution are a ‘waste of money’; that diversifying 
                                                     
15 Fiji was the only Pacific island country included in Berman’s study. Though Fiji is 
geographically remote from large urban centres, it has the highest population density of all the 
included regions as well as a developed road-rail network and high agricultural productivity. Had 
Berman included smaller Pacific island countries, such as Tuvalu or Nauru, among his cases, these 
countries would have indicated high levels of remoteness, closer to those of Northern regions. 
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opportunities for households is more productive than diversifying the industrial 
base; and that, as resource rents are ‘unstable and transitory’, Northern residents 
should avoid becoming dependent on them (Berman, 1992). His overall 
conclusions suggest that recreating industrial society in the North will not succeed, 
and that traditional, localized, and alternative approaches to development are a 
more appropriate response to Northern conditions. In a sense, Berman’s work does 
for the North what the MIRAB advocates have done for Oceania: it has proposed 
place-specific development responses to conditions of extreme remoteness. 
 
4.  REVERSING THE FLOW AND RENEWING THE WEALTH 
In this thesis I argue for a reassessment of how capital flows are linked to 
economic development in marginal places. I suggest that the use of trust funds can 
reverse the flow of capital for the benefit of developing states. Typically, domestic 
resources are invested locally. But what if investment opportunities in the country 
are all high risk and low return? An alternative is to invest outside the country.16 
This policy is taken for granted in developed countries, in which capital is always 
seeking out the highest returns. American, European, and East Asian capital has 
flowed into the rest of the world, seeking new investment opportunities. Yet 
developing countries are told that they should invest locally.  
 Two sub-themes emerge within this analysis. The first is that of the 
spatiality of investment and how marginal places can pursue a global investment 
policy. ‘Local’ development suggests that capital generation and development 
                                                     
16 Investing outside the country of capital origin is not new, of course. For example, Queen 
Elizabeth I of England invested a substantial portion of the booty obtained from Sir Francis Drake’s 
privateering voyages in the Ottoman Empire through the Levant Company, rather than in England 
itself. And individuals—in what is known as ‘capital flight’—invest outside the source region of 
capital. These point are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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investment take place at the same site. My analysis suggests that ‘local’ 
development—in the periphery—can take place when investment is made in global 
financial markets, themselves based in core countries, rather than at the site of 
capital generation. In this way, local development is not limited to the remote or 
marginal place where the benefits are to be felt. Instead, peripheral capital flows 
into the core to seek out the best investment opportunities. The local development 
process becomes differently spatialised by engaging global financial markets. 
 The second sub-theme is that of sustainability. Resource benefits often 
come in temporary streams, and decline or are removed when the resource is 
depleted. How is a sustainable economy built on non-renewable resources, which 
are inherently finite? Non-renewable resources can be transformed into renewable 
fiscal ones when the capital generated from resource extraction is invested in 
financial markets. This is consistent with Adam Smith’s contention that 
development springs from savings and the accumulation of capital. To make non-
renewable resources renewable, they can be converted from a physical form into a 
financial form, thus extending the benefits of capital into perpetuity. A trust fund is 
one mechanism to do this. 
 This thesis examines how reversing the flow of capital can benefit 
developing countries and regions. I look at six cases where trust funds have been 
established as a mechanism to reverse the flow of capital. These trust funds invest 
capital generated in developing countries or marginal regions within developed 
states in global financial markets, generating new capital for the originating state. 
Trust funds are an example of state-led development that invests in the non-local 
private sector through global financial markets. Assuming the continuation of 
global financial markets, trust fund investments provide a sustainable and self-
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reliant source of income for places on the margins. They engage the global to 
develop the local. I explore the paradoxes of state-led development in the periphery 
through investment in the private sector of the core and suggest that trust funds 
reduce the risk, and enhance the profits, of peripheral states’ investment by 
respatialising the field of investment to include the entire world, and that this 
process leads to a sustainable stream of economic benefits that return to source and 
enhance the livelihoods of peripheral residents. Through the mechanism of a trust 
fund, peripheral states can cast their bread upon the global financial waters, and 
watch it return to them after many days with interest. 
 Four of the six cases considered here are Pacific island countries: Nauru, 
Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Tonga. These are among the most marginalized independent 
states on earth, in terms of their distance from larger neighbours and markets, and 
in terms of their own resource base and potential. The two other cases, Alaska and 
Alberta, are marginal spaces within developed countries and within the global 
economy, as they are largely producers of raw materials with limited input into 
global capital movements. Each of these six places has set up a trust fund to 
manage and invest non-renewable resource revenues.17 
 Mainstream and alternative development models imagine the core as either 
the source of beneficial capital or as an exploitative and neo-colonialist force. In 
my analysis, I view the core rather as a fertile field for investment, through a kind 
of reverse colonialism in which Albertans, Alaskans, and Pacific islanders profit 
from their investments in London, New York, and Sydney, rather than the other 
                                                     
17 The establishment of trust funds does not guarantee development. The funds must be properly 
managed and fund policy is important. Some funds have performed well, and some have not. The 
cases selected here illustrate both successful and unsuccessful funds. The conditions for success are 
described in Chapter 7. 
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way around. If the periphery will never become core, then the periphery must adapt 
to remaining the periphery and take advantage of its position within a global 
economy. Trust funds provide a means by which these marginal spaces in the 
global economy can both ‘jump stages’ and ‘jump scale’. By jumping stages, 
developing states can avoid the usual path of movement from agriculture, to 
manufacturing, to services, and then to information-based economies. By jumping 
scale, developing states can move from the local economy to direct engagement 
with the global economy. 
 
5.  OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, examines resource management policies, focusing on 
trust funds and discussing their legal basis, the obligations that fund trustees have 
when investing trust assets, the different kinds of funds and the ways that fund 
capital is invested, and the different ways in which fund earnings may be 
distributed. Chapter 3 presents a brief methodological basis for the analysis of the 
six case studies, and also comments on issues concerned with gathering data. 
Chapter 4 looks at the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund in Canada. The 
Alberta government used this fund in an attempt to transform the province from a 
peripheral to a core region, and the fund’s investment policies and investment 
geographies reflected this. Chapter 5 looks at the example of the Alaska Permanent 
Fund in the United States. Unlike in Alberta, Alaska’s fund was used by the state 
to counteract Alaska’s peripheral position in the global economy by saving 
revenues and channelling fund earnings directly to fund beneficiaries in the form 
of dividends. Alaska’s investment policies thus differed substantially from those 
pursued in Alberta. Chapter 6 turns to the four Pacific island cases (Kiribati, 
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Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu) and describes their patterns of success and failure, and 
how these small isolated states have made global financial markets work for them 
(or not) through offshore investing. Chapter 7 explores the factors that account for 
the relative success of a trust fund and compares and contrasts the policies and 
actions of the six funds. The last chapter, Chapter 8, looks at the applicability of 
the trust fund model in other places, noting its effectiveness as a development tool. 
2 
 
Trust funds and windfall revenues 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Non-renewable resource revenues form the economic basis of many economies. 
These resource dependent economies often occupy the marginal spaces of the 
global economy, and their prospects for development depend on the ability of the 
state to capture, retain, and invest the revenues derived from resource extraction, 
sale, and export. Likewise, small island states may depend on a (potentially non-
renewable) flow of capital from foreign aid donors and on remittances from non-
resident nationals, or on ‘sovereignty resources’, such as sale of passports or tax 
haven status, that often earn the disapprobation of core countries. Non-renewable 
natural resources, sovereignty resources, and flows of aid and remittances are all 
forms of windfall resources, for which sustainability is inherently uncertain. A 
windfall ‘is something that comes free and unexpected and of good import’ (Webb, 
1951, 180).1 Such revenue streams are unstable and potentially unreliable 
foundations on which to build a self-reliant and sustainable economy that provides 
a high level of benefits to residents. 
 The paradoxical failure of states highly endowed with valuable mineral and 
petroleum resources to develop at the same rate as poorly endowed states is known 
                                                     
1 The term originates in the wood that fell from trees after storms, and which could be freely 
collected and used by tenant farmers (Webb, 1951). 
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as the ‘resource curse’. Proponents of this argument suggest that the large revenue 
flows from natural resources leads to lower growth rates because the conflict over 
the distribution of the revenues leads to poor policies and investment decisions 
(Auty, 1993; Auty and Mikesell, 1998, Karl, 1997, Ascher, 1999). Rapid growth in 
the non-renewable resource sector encourages rent-seeking, misallocation of 
resource rents, and even corruption. The resource curse thesis is invoked to explain 
the poor performance of such richly endowed countries as Zambia, Bolivia, and 
Papua New Guinea when compared to the rapid economic growth of poorly 
endowed countries such as Switzerland, Singapore, and Japan. Though the 
resource curse thesis has been challenged, it is important in highlighting policy 
choices as the critical dimension in economic growth. Resources themselves are 
not necessarily a ‘curse’: development depends on the kinds of policy choices 
made about how to exploit the resources and about how to invest and distribute the 
revenues that they generate. Resource curse theorists argue that natural resources 
as the foundation of an economy predispose and prejudice policy makers to make 
decisions that ultimately work against long-range economic development (Karl, 
1997). 
 Can the resource curse be lifted? Can natural resources help stimulate 
development? What policy choices are optimal? Windfall resource revenues 
typically flow into a state’s consolidated revenues fund, the same ‘account’ into 
which all revenues (such as taxes) are deposited. Once in consolidated revenues, 
resource revenues become indistinguishable from other revenue sources. As such, 
their inherent unsustainability is often overlooked or forgotten. The finite and 
volatile nature of these resources is frequently only acknowledged when resource 
revenues start to decline and policy makers scramble to find funds to cover their 
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budget deficits. 
 An alternative to the practice of depositing revenues into consolidated 
funds is to pursue a financial investment policy in which revenues are instead 
invested in global financial markets through the use of trust funds. Trust funds are 
a mechanism by which revenue streams from non-renewable natural resources are 
diverted into consolidated revenue and transformed into renewable fiscal 
resources. A trust fund can save a portion of natural resource revenues and invest 
these to generate earnings while preserving the original fund capital. If earnings (or 
some portion of them) are reinvested into the trust fund, then the fund will continue 
to grow, even after resource revenues have stopped flowing in. The trust fund 
becomes a renewable resource, similar, for example, to a fishery, in which fund 
capital is analogous to the fishery’s breeding stock and the fund earnings 
analogous to the harvestable part of the resource. If sustainably managed, trust 
funds, like fisheries, will continue to generate a sustainable harvestable yield in 
perpetuity. 
 This chapter examines trust funds as a resource revenue management 
policy, looking in particular at the relationship between trust funds and the more 
general legal institution of the trust, at the benefits of trust funds compared to 
direct deposit policies, at the different kinds of trust funds that can be created, and 
at different policies for distributing fund earnings. Each of these issues re-emerges 
in the case study chapters that follow. In those chapters, different trust funds are 
used to illustrate different trust fund features. Later, Chapter 7 compares the case 
studies and elaborates on the close relationship between the failure to adhere to the 
obligations of trustees and failure in fund performance. 
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2.  DIRECT USE OF WINDFALL REVENUES 
2.1  Rentier policies 
A rentier approach to resource revenue management is a non-interventionist policy 
in which resource revenues are directly deposited into consolidated revenues (the 
state’s ‘general fund’). The resource revenues become one of many revenue 
sources used by the state to finance its activities, along with taxes, levies, duties, 
and so on. But resource revenues, unlike taxation, are non-recurring. Substantial, 
non-recurring revenues are a catalyst for development during a limited period of 
time, but simultaneously have the potential to increase resource dependence, cause 
inflation, and distort the economy. 
 Direct use of resource revenues through the general fund allows the state to 
reduce taxation, to increase spending, or both. Reduced taxation may stimulate 
consumer spending, but it can also lead to the state’s dependence on resource 
revenues and unwillingness to reintroduce taxation when resource revenues 
decline. Many national states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Venezuela) have used resource 
revenues to finance infrastructure development in order to diversify the economy 
and reduce dependence on non-renewable resources. Many of these states 
emphasised short-term goals, such as employment generated through infrastructure 
construction, rather than focusing on the long-term effects of changes in the 
structure of non-renewable resource revenues. Short-term goals such as these are 
often driven by political considerations and the desire of political leaders to remain 
in power, and have failed to achieve expected development outcomes (Amuzegar, 
1999; Karl, 1997). 
 
Chapter 2: Trust funds and windfall revenues  38 
2.2  Problems of direct use 
Direct use of resource revenues is often problematic, especially if the use of 
resource revenues has the effect of fiscal expansion at a time when the economy is 
in full (or nearly full) employment. Windfall wealth enables the state to expand 
and increase its activities. As the state expands and penetrates further into society, 
demand for products and services grows, leading to inflation. The demands for 
increased wages and social services spiral upwards until the capacity of the state 
and economy to meet them is exhausted. The economy is then liable to collapse, or 
revert to a ‘bust’ period. One need only look at the example of Norway or other 
petroleum exporting states which, seen in retrospect, heavily overextended 
themselves through increased spending, often also financed to a significant degree 
by external capital (and credit) (Hannesson, 2001). Small, dependent economies 
such as the Pacific island states or resource-dependent regions of North America 
are even more likely to feel the effects of collapse if economic capacity is 
exhausted (in the case of resource-dependent economies). 
 
Rent-seeking 
Different kinds of resources determine different social structures and production 
arrangements and thus have an effect on the political system (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979). In some cases, uncontrolled entry of resource rents into the economy could 
lead to rent-seeking and the emergence of a resource elite that would seek to 
advance its own interests against those of other social groups. Rent-seeking is 
defined as any activity that attempts to improve a person or group’s well-being by 
escaping the forces of competition in the market place (Colander, 1984). Disparate 
interest groups compete for a share of economic rents, usually through the political 
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system. When the magnitude of economic rents is large, the incentives for rent-
seeking behaviour increase. Any group will engage in rent-seeking behaviour if the 
perceived gains exceed the costs of rent-seeking.  
The disadvantage of rent-seeking is that it does not create new wealth, but 
only redistributes existing wealth within the economy (to the group that seeks it). 
This redistribution may lead to negative sum transfers such as inflation, 
inefficiency, wasted resources, and higher taxes. Gary Anders (1988) has argued 
that the policies followed by the state of Alaska following petroleum discoveries 
encouraged rent-seeking, exacerbating the cyclical behaviour of the economy and 
limiting the potential for economic growth. Similar situations could develop 
elsewhere. For example, an emergent resource elite could hold a large share of the 
economy’s wealth, and the political system would become biased towards its 
interests at the expense of other groups. This problem would be especially acute in 
small and relatively new states such as those in the Pacific, which are still 
undergoing the process of state-building. Because of their colonial histories, the 
governments of new states often have little impact on state development and 
resource extraction, factors that now lead to difficulty for the state in penetrating 
society. Many former colonies have jurisdiction, but weak authority over their 
territory, a characteristic that reinforces the development of a resource elite. A 
weak state is much more open to penetration and exploitation by foreign firms. 
 
Dutch Disease 
Development of a single resource sector can lead to a phenomenon known as 
Dutch Disease (Corden and Neary, 1982). This concept was originally applied to 
the effects of petroleum development on the economy of the Netherlands, but has 
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also been applied to other mineral and petroleum based economies. Under such a 
situation, one sector of a state’s economy undergoes a rapid development or boom, 
while other sectors fall into (relative) decline. The main effects of the boom are 
resource movement and spending effects. Through resource movement, resources 
(such as labour) are drawn from other industries to the booming sector by the 
higher prices paid in this sector, leading to a series of adjustments in the economy, 
including through the real exchange rate. Labour becomes divided into a high wage 
group connected to the booming sector, and an increasingly marginalised unskilled 
sector facing unemployment. Moreover, resources such as minerals and petroleum 
produce few forward and backward linkages, and often fail to encourage the 
development of other economic sectors. The spending effect occurs when higher 
real income leads to higher spending and higher prices (Corden and Neary, 1982). 
The relative importance of these two effects depends on the extent to which the 
booming sector uses factors of production from elsewhere in the economy. 
 The arguments presented above suggest that direct use of resource rents 
from resource booms could lead to economic problems. In sum, large amounts of 
unprecedented economic rents entering a small economy in a weak state lead to 
damaging effects in the economy and an increase in social expectations that 
ultimately cannot be met. Thus the resource boom quickly turns to bust. The way 
to avoid this problem is by controlling the entry of rents into the economy. The 
following section discusses some ways of doing this. 
 
3.  INDIRECT USE OF WINDFALL REVENUES 
3.1  Financial investment policy 
An alternative to the direct use of resource revenues is a financial investment 
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policy by which resource rents are isolated, and their entry into the economy 
strictly controlled. By slowing the entry of economic rents, the distorting effects of 
windfall revenues are avoided. One vehicle for the achievement of this is a trust 
fund, which acts as a filter to slow down the rate of entry of economic rents. 
 
Global engagement  
The advantages of a financial investment policy are numerous. First, it is likely to 
be beneficial for small states to further open up to international capital markets in 
order to better diversify risk. Easterly and Kraay (2000) argue that, controlling for 
location, small states have higher per capita GDP than other states, statistically 
similar per capita GDP growth rates to other states, but greater volatility of annual 
growth rates. They explain the last finding to be due in part to small states’ greater 
volatility of terms of trade shocks. In turn, the greater terms of trade shocks are due 
to the greater openness, which has a positive net payoff for growth. Further 
opening up to international capital markets may decrease the volatility of terms of 
trade shocks through diversification while also increasing growth. The need for 
such diversification will probably intensify with the seemingly inevitable reduction 
in the availability of concessionary flows in the coming years. 
 
Intergenerational equity 
A second advantage of a financial investment policy is the intergenerational 
distribution of natural resource entitlements. Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) consider 
exhaustible natural resources (allowing for irreversible degradation of renewable 
resources) with amenity value, where amenity value stands for the various services 
that the resource can supply indefinitely (e.g., sustainable supply of the gene pool). 
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Gerlagh and Keyzer compare a ‘zero extraction’ policy (enforced conservation that 
avoids environmental degradation) and a ‘grand-fathering’ policy (endowment of 
the present generation with all resources) with a trust fund policy (where future 
generations receive claims from the natural resources). Of the three policies, only 
the trust fund policy ensured efficiency and protection of welfare for all 
generations. 
 
Protection of capital 
A third advantage of a financial investment policy is the increase in transparency 
of the resource revenue investment and the protection of capital from direct 
expenditure by the government. Resource revenues represent a public good, which 
stimulates interest group competition for access to those revenues. As state 
revenues increase, interest groups seek to use those revenues for their own 
projects. Politically dominant groups can often manipulate the political system to 
their advantage, leading to their further dominance. By directing resource revenues 
into financial investment, interest group competition can be reduced, as available 
revenues to compete over are reduced. A further advantage is that financial 
investment provides a means of increasing public savings, and such an increase has 
been linked with an increase in economic growth (Krieckhaus, 2002, 1698). 
 
3.2  Trust funds 
Trust funds provide an effective means of intervening in an economy in order to 
achieve certain objectives and benefits. In a general sense, a trust fund is a pool of 
investment capital that is kept separate and distinct from a state’s consolidated 
revenues account (also known as the general fund). The trust funds considered here 
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have a special purpose and their capital, or corpus, often derives from natural 
resource revenues, particularly from windfall revenues. Trust funds as examined in 
this thesis are national and sub-national state institutions. They are similar in a very 
general way to pension funds and other capital pools that are also termed trust 
funds (e.g., the environmental ‘superfund’ in the United States).  
 Natural resource trust funds have not been well explored. Pension funds 
and other trust funds, however, have been the subject of recent studies. Gordon L. 
Clark, of the University of Oxford, has written a series of articles, culminating in a 
book, on the pension fund industry in Europe and the Anglo-American world 
(Clark, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000b). Clark’s work examines the 
private pension fund industry and is primarily concerned with two factors. The first 
is how the private pension fund industry has come to replace, in many respects, the 
government’s role in providing the retirement benefits of citizens, as the state has 
retreated from the provision of public goods. Clark notes how private pension 
funds have grown enormously during the past five decades and are now among the 
largest pools of capital anywhere, with a great influence on national economies. 
Clark’s second concern is with the nature of fund trustees’ decision-making. Here 
he is interested in demonstrating why convention dominates investment choice, 
and why fund trustees and managers are so reluctant to explore alternative 
investment products. Clark’s work does not directly relate to natural resource trust 
funds, but his arguments do help to explain the factors underlying trust fund 
investment allocation, a topic that is explored in this thesis in Chapter 7. 
 A recent work by Eric M. Patashnik (2000) examines trust funds 
administered by the United States government. He focuses in particular on trust 
funds for social security, Medicare, highways, airports, and the environmental 
Chapter 2: Trust funds and windfall revenues  44 
superfund. Despite their large size, these funds have been little examined. The 
funds examined by Patashnik are similar to the natural resource trust funds 
considered here in that they are government funds and are restricted to a special 
purpose. But Patashnik’s work is more concerned with, as he calls it, the ‘politics 
of commitment’, and why politicians have created trust funds for some programs, 
such as medical care and state highways, but not for others. Like Clark, his 
principal focus is on the micropolitics of decision-making among the politicians 
who created the funds and the trustees and managers who run them. 
 Trust funds are explored in greater detail later in this chapter. Before 
proceeding to an examination of the nature and structure of natural resource trust 
funds and their objectives and benefits, it is first necessary to examine the legal 
basis of the ‘trust’, the principle upon which the trust fund is based. 
 
4.  TRUSTS 
Trust funds as an economic instrument are based on the legal institution of the 
‘trust’. The rules governing trust funds are essentially the same as those governing 
trusts, especially with respect to the obligations of trustees and their duty to act in 
the interest of the beneficiaries. This section gives some background to the legal 
institution of the trust with particular emphasis on the obligations of trustees.  
 
4.1  Historical origins of trusts 
Although trust-like concepts, in which property is held by one person on behalf of 
another, were known in Roman law, the modern institution of the trust has its 
origins in English mediaeval legal practice. The modern trust derives most directly 
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from the mediaeval concept of the ‘feoffor’.2 This institution conveyed a legal 
estate in land to a ‘feoffee to uses’ (equivalent to the modern ‘trustee’), who held 
the title on behalf of a ‘cestui que use’ (equivalent to the modern ‘beneficiary’). 
The feoffor developed as an institution that allowed a knight to depart for the 
crusades while retaining title to his estates as well as provision for the welfare of 
his family in his absence. The feoffee to uses acted as a guardian to the estates, but 
held a kind of legal title to it, allowing him (the feoffee to uses) to administer the 
property and make necessary decisions and changes regarding its use. 
The feoffor also had other uses. For example, it was used to avoid the 
payment of feudal taxes on the death of an estate owner by conveying title to 
subsequent feoffees, a practice still current with modern estates under living trusts 
and other mechanisms. Estates could thus avoid payment of taxes when the owner 
died, as the property could be held in trust for the heirs. Feoffors could also be 
used in devising property to someone other than the eldest son of the estate owner, 
as required under mediaeval law. The estate could be put in trust and held by the 
feoffee to uses and then devised to a designated third party, to someone other than 
the heir apparent (Hepburn 2001, 261). A further function of the mediaeval feoffor 
was the practice of holding property on behalf of religious institutions. The 
Statutes of Mortmain (AD 1279 and 1290) prohibited the transfer of property to the 
                                                     
2 This term, and related ones, has a complex etymology, but derives from the Latin pecus (cattle) 
through Old German Vieh, which was Latinised as feodum and became fief among the Gallo-
Romans and in English. In Provençal the word became feu, from which derives our word feudal. 
These words were therefore associated with moveable property, and later with real property. The 
word trust probably derives from the Old High German gitriuwi (faithful), which itself probably 
derives from the Sanskrit dāru (tree), from which also comes the English word true. It is interesting 
to note that words like fee, fief, and feudal derive from words meaning cattle, while trust and true 
derive from the root tree. Our ancestors considered cattle as their main source of property, and trees 
as something true and faithful. See Bloch (1961 [1939], Vol I, Chap 12) for a discussion of some of 
this etymology. 
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‘dead hand’ of religious institutions, because, unlike living persons, they were not 
taxed. Transferring property to a feoffor to uses on behalf of the religious 
institution was a way of getting around these statutes. 
The Statute of Uses (AD 1535) revoked some, but not all, of these practices. 
Specifically, the statute allowed for tax liability in the relationship of ‘first use’, 
i.e., the relationship between the settlor (the one who donated the property and set 
up the feoffor) but allowed the continuance of ‘second uses’, the relationship 
between the feoffee to uses and the beneficiary. It is this ‘second use’ relationship 
that is the basis of the modern concept of trust that emerged around the seventeenth 
century and continues in modified form to the present (Hayton, 2001; Hepburn, 
2001; Sheridan, 1993). 
 
4.2  The nature of the trust 
The trust is, along with the corporation (limited liability company), one of the most 
important institutions in modern English common law (Sheridan 1993, 1). The 
trust is a diverse and flexible institution, and ‘the key attributes of trusts can be 
employed in whatever ways the ingenious mind of man can devise’ (Hayton, 1993, 
18). The essential characteristic of a trust is the separation between legal and 
equitable interest (Hepburn, 2001, 259). Unlike a corporation, the trust is not a 
legal person, and cannot be sued. Trusts are typically used for managing 
investments, while corporations are typically used for trade. The trust had become 
an important modern institution because it is a convenient method for a small 
number of persons to hold property on behalf of many others (Sheridan, 1993, 1). 
 The modern trust is a standard institution in all Commonwealth countries, 
the United States, and much of Europe. Given its multiple forms, the trust is 
Chapter 2: Trust funds and windfall revenues  47 
difficult to define. All trusts, however, share certain features and reflect certain 
relationships. L.A. Sheridan defines a trust as: 
 
…a relationship which arises wherever a person (called the trustee) is compelled in 
equity to hold property, whether real or personal, and whether by legal or equitable 
title, for the benefit of some persons (of whom he may be one and who are termed 
beneficiaries) or for some object permitted by law, in such a way that the real 
benefit of the property accrues, not to the trustees, but to the beneficiaries or other 
objects of the trust (Sheridan 1993, 3). 
 
The trust is therefore a relationship in which one person holds property on behalf 
of another. Typically the law of trusts ‘is concerned with the utilisation and 
preservation of wealth’ (Hayton, 2001, 1). Much of trust law is concerned with 
preserving family wealth, but there are many other purposes. 
 
4.3  Obligations of trustees 
Modern legal practice in Commonwealth countries and the United States, as well 
as in other places, clearly spells out the obligations of trustees with respect to the 
property that they hold in trust for others. A.R. Mellows, in The trustees handbook 
(3rd edition, 1975, 60) summarises these obligations in two points: 
 
 The trustee(s) must do the best he or she reasonably can for the 
beneficiary, within the limits of the law; 
 The trustee(s) must treat all beneficiaries equally and fairly, and not 
place one beneficiary in a better position at the expense of the others. 
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Mellows points out that these are only the most general obligations of trustees and 
that they are especially important when applied to investments. The trustees must 
balance the twin goals of high return and low risk and also take into account the 
interests of all beneficiaries. This has important considerations with respect to 
permanent and long-term trust funds, in which many of the beneficiaries are yet 
unborn. Investments that generate high returns in the present, but sacrifice long-
term stability or income generation, would contravene this principle. 
 Samantha Hepburn (2001, 335-352) provides a more elaborate discussion 
of the obligations of trustees. She specifies ten obligations for trustees, each of 
which has a bearing on the trust funds considered in the following chapters. These 
ten obligations, or duties, are: 
 
 To avoid conflict of interest and to account for any profits; 
 To act with reasonable prudence; 
 To act in the interests of the beneficiaries; 
 To act impartially; 
 To keep funds separate (from the trustees’ own funds); 
 To act gratuitously; 
 To invest in authorised securities; 
 To not purchase trust property; 
 To keep accounts; 
 To allow beneficiaries access to trust documents. 
 
Several of these obligations may need explaining. The first five, the obligations to 
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avoid conflict of interest, to act prudently, to act in the interests of beneficiaries, to 
act impartially, and to keep funds separate, are all fairly straightforward. These 
first five obligations are also closely related to Mellows’s two more general 
obligations. Trustees are required to avoid any conflict of interest between their 
own business or financial affairs and those incumbent upon them as trustees, and to 
keep the beneficiaries’ funds separate from their own. They are further required to 
act in the best interests of the beneficiaries and to do so without favouring some 
beneficiaries over others. The property or funds held in trust must be managed 
prudently and thus avoid speculative investments. The first five obligations suggest 
a clear distinction between an individual trustee and his or her property, and the 
beneficiary and his or her property, emphasizing the concept of individually-held 
property. The obligations also assume a consensus surrounding the concept of 
prudence—a concept continuing the individualist notion, as the trustee is obligated 
to display the same prudence in investment for others as he or she would for his or 
her own property. 
 The remaining five obligations are perhaps more subtle. The duty to act 
gratuitously refers to the rule that trustees cannot receive any profit from the funds 
held in trust (Hepburn, 2001, 343). The exception to this is where the trust 
specifically allows for remuneration or where there is an agreement between the 
beneficiaries and the trustees. The obligation to invest in authorised securities 
requires the trustees to follow the instructions provided by the trust instrument, 
statute, or the courts (Hepburn, 2001, 344). For example, the Alaska Permanent 
Fund was originally prohibited from investing in non-United States equity 
securities. This provision was later removed by a referendum in which Alaskan 
residents, as the beneficiaries, authorised trust fund investments in overseas 
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equities. Trustees are obligated to not purchase trust property. This would give 
them an unfair advantage, as trustees could use their position to influence the 
transaction. Trustees must also keep proper accounts and make these available to 
the beneficiaries. They must also make other, non-financial, documents available if 
these relate to the trust.  
 Most of the ten obligations of trustees reflect a Eurocentric bias; 
unsurprisingly so, as the trust is a European institution. Ideas of private property, 
which remains private even in the absence of the owner, are embedded in the trust. 
So too are notions of profit (in the sense that trusts can generate profits, but that 
trustees themselves cannot profit from the trust), concepts of prudence (European 
understandings of what a ‘prudent’ person would invest in), and impartiality (no 
favouritism towards family or one’s kin or peer groups). Moreover, securities 
(bonds and shares) are European ways of creating and holding value, and they are 
implicit in the ways in which trusts invest. Investments of this type also require the 
keeping of accounts, to reflect changes in the value of securities within a market 
for them. The Eurocentric nature of the trust should be borne in mind when 
contemplating the use of this institution in non-European settings, especially those 
in Oceania where European economic culture only lightly overlays traditional 
Oceanic economic imaginings and practices.  
As will be seen in the following chapters, the performance of trust funds, in 
terms of their ability to provide for the welfare of the beneficiaries, is directly 
related to the trustees’ ability to adhere to these ten obligations. The trustees’ 
adherence to their obligations under the law of trusts is the greatest factor in 
accounting for the performance of the six trust funds considered here. Chapter 7 
explores the relationship between the obligations of trustees and the practices of 
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each of the six trust funds, and develops six criteria, closely related to trustees’ 
obligations, that are responsible for the fiscal and spatial effects of each fund.  
 
5.  TRUST FUNDS 
5.1  Legal principles 
A trust fund is essentially the entity that holds the assets of a trust. In a trust 
relationship, title to trust assets is held by the trustees, who must act on the behalf 
of the beneficiaries. As noted previously, trustees are obliged to follow not only the 
basic legal principles governing trusts but also any stipulations in the trust 
instrument. The trust typically has three functions: administration, benefit 
adjudication, and asset management (Clark, 2004b, 6).  
 The trust fund consists ‘not only of the original assets and those 
subsequently added, but also of those assets from time to time representing the 
original or added assets’ (D Hayton, et al., Principles of European Trust Law, 
1999, Kluwer Law International, cited in Hayton, 2001, 5). Thus fund earnings that 
are redeposited into the trust fund are governed by the same principles as the 
original capital. The principles are applied across the board no matter the asset 
type. 
 Trust fund beneficiaries are of course different and will have different 
opinions as to what constitutes safe and secure investments. Trustees must attempt 
to balance these perspectives and to take into account the views of different classes 
of beneficiaries. As Hayton notes: 
 
The interests of the beneficiaries are paramount and the trustees must do their best 
to hold the balance fairly between those beneficiaries … interested in income and 
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those beneficiaries … interested in capital. Indeed, the trustees have a paternalistic 
function of protecting each beneficiary against himself (Hayton, 2001, 6). 
 
While at the same time taking differing perspectives into account, the trustees must 
also uphold the fiduciary principles of prudent management. In order to play it 
safe, trustees have most commonly adopted a conservative investment approach 
(Clark 1997, 1998b). Hayton describes the situation in the United Kingdom, where 
the Trustee Act authorises certain investment classes as ‘safe’, thus controlling the 
behaviour of trustees: 
 
Since the beneficiaries’ interests are paramount the trustees cannot (in the absence 
of authorisation in the trust instrument) invest trust moneys as they might invest 
their own: they have to play ‘safe’ and invest only in investments authorised under 
the Trustee Act 2000 [UK]. (Hayton, 2001, 6). 
 
While important in maintaining prudence in investment management and 
restricting speculation, such policies may limit the ability of trust funds to invest in 
alternative sectors such as venture capital. This is a controversial area, as it is 
difficult to balance prudence with more exploratory and innovative investments.  
 
5.2  Definitions 
In a general sense, a trust fund refers to a sum of money held by one person or 
entity (the ‘trustee’) on behalf of others (the ‘beneficiaries’), based on the 
principles discussed in the previous sections. In this discussion, I will use the term 
‘trust fund’ to designate moneys held in trust by a government (trustee) on behalf 
of the nation’s legal residents (beneficiaries) (Duncan et al., 1995). Trust funds are 
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distinct state managed accounts and typically have a distinct source of income, a 
distinct management policy, and a distinct use for fund capital and earnings. The 
following features are common:  
 
 Distinct capital source, not deriving from consolidated revenue; 
 The capital is protected from direct expenditure by the government; 
 The capital is held in trust for beneficiaries, with the state acting as 
trustee; 
 The fund is designated with some special purpose, or serves some 
function apart from general state expenditures; 
 The earnings derived from fund investments may also have some special 
purpose, in line with the purpose of the fund (Poole et al., 1992, 199). 
 
Trust funds are generally permanent and self-sustaining. Fund capital is 
invested and may increase through the reinvestment of fund earnings, which also 
protects the real value of the fund against inflation, and through additional 
deposits. Fund capital is typically preserved while earnings are redeposited, 
transferred to consolidated revenue, or used for some other purpose (or a 
combination of these). The fund functions as a renewable resource, providing a 
steady stream of financial revenues without depleting fund capital. If fund capital 
is invested offshore, the earnings may provide a new source of foreign exchange 
and investment capital for the investing country. 
In many cases, fund capital, or principal, is derived through the export sale 
of the state’s natural resources. A portion of the state’s natural resource revenues 
are deposited into the fund, while the remainder enter the general fund and can be 
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spent directly. The capital increases through both deposits and investment income. 
The original capital can be preserved while the earnings can be used to finance the 
state’s budget or to finance extraordinary development initiatives. In this way the 
fund capital is never depleted, but instead acts as a renewable resource. Fund 
earnings can eventually replace income generated through resource extraction if 
the resource is depleted, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1  Relationship between resource and trust fund income 
The solid line represents income from resource extraction, while the dotted line represents income 
from trust fund earnings. At some point income from trust fund earnings will surpass that from 
resource extraction. 
 
5.3  Trust fund types 
Trust funds can be divided into two basic types based on their objectives and 
investment of capital (as opposed to the distribution of earnings).  
 
Savings funds 
The first type of fund emphasises savings, and may be considered a pure trust fund. 
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The objectives of a savings fund are security of principal, avoidance of risk, and 
continuous generation of income. Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is the 
fundamental guide for such investments. Fund trustees and managers will operate 
under the Prudent Investor Rule, and will attempt to maximise income and 
minimise risk, given the degree of risk adversity. The Prudent Investor Rule, a 
basic tenet of fiduciary law, decrees that investments be made with the degree of 
judgement and caution exercised by prudent persons in managing their own affairs, 
i.e., not for speculation but for investment. Investments will be selected based on 
financial criteria only. The geographic locality of the investment is irrelevant: the 
fund will invest where potential returns are the greatest and the risk lowest. 
Usually this means investing outside the local economy, in order to diversify risk 
or if less risky investments are available elsewhere. Local employment and other 
direct benefits must be sacrificed for stability, diversification, and guaranteed 
return. 
 
Development funds 
A second type of fund emphasizes development. Fund managers will consider 
social criteria when investing, and investments will be made within the region to 
provide employment and direct local benefits. Risks will be higher, and potential 
returns lower, but the possibility of achieving direct local impacts is much greater. 
Building infrastructure and diversifying the economy are often objectives of 
development oriented funds. These funds emphasize direct development, 
employment generation, local investments, and economic diversification. 
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5.4  Benefits of trust funds 
The advantages of trust funds over a direct use policy are the following: 
 
 Savings: Save resource revenues that would otherwise be spent and 
misallocated into immediate direct consumption; 
 Equity: Extend benefits of resource revenues over many generations or 
in perpetuity; 
 Income: Provide an additional source of budgetary income for the state; 
 Investment capital: Provide an additional or alternative source of 
investment capital; 
 Intervention: Be used to intervene in the economy to achieve state 
objectives, such as diversification or stabilisation; 
 Macro management: Externalise windfall effects and prevent distortions 
arising in the economy. 
 
Savings 
Windfall revenues, such as those that accrue from non-renewable natural resources 
during a short period of time, are notorious for being misallocated into wasteful 
and consumptive projects (Barro, 2002). State behaviour in this instance is 
remarkably like that of lottery winners, who have likewise received a windfall 
either in a single lump sum or in a series of payments over a limited period of time. 
Studies of lottery winners have indicated that they tend to misallocate their 
winnings by investing in immediate consumption, often investing in assets that 
depreciate rapidly and require ongoing maintenance costs, such as automobiles 
(Imbens et al., 1999). Though winners of large amounts increase their short-term 
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savings, they tend not to increase their long-term, retirement savings.  
 Another aspect of lottery winnings is that of how states themselves have 
managed their proceeds from state-run lotteries. As state lottery revenues are not 
generally perceived as a natural resource, and as they involve social and moral 
issues that most natural resources do not, they tend to be invested in special 
projects. Revenues from lotteries administered by the government of New Zealand 
(‘Lotto’ and ‘Instant Kiwi’) have been largely used to finance cultural activities 
and the arts, and remain largely at the discretion of the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
Recent surveys have indicated that New Zealanders would prefer that more 
lotteries revenues be directed towards general welfare and that the discretionary 
powers of the Minister be reduced (Christoffel, 1990; New Zealand Lottery Grants 
Board, 1990). This suggests that the beneficiaries of the distribution would prefer 
tighter control over the spending of lottery proceeds, and more restraint on the part 
of those who act as trustees for the revenues. 
 
Equity 
That future generations are entitled to a share of non-renewable resource revenues 
is the basic principle underlying a trust fund. Funds isolate revenues from 
immediate government spending and, depending on their structure, can help to 
avoid interest group competition. The trust fund capital can be constitutionally 
protected to prevent its misappropriation by governments or interest groups. The 
state of Alaska, for example, requires a public referendum to amend the state’s 
constitution before Permanent Fund moneys can be spent. The legislature has 
discretion over investment earnings, but the constitution requires that an amount 
sufficient to offset inflation be redeposited into fund capital. The constitutional 
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amendment creating the Permanent Fund also governs how the capital should be 
invested, requiring low risk, long-term appreciation, and a guaranteed return. The 
handling of investment responsibility by major investment firms, limits on foreign 
investments, a thorough audit, and extensive public relations and awareness have 
helped the Alaska fund avoid the problems of rent-seeking. On the other hand, the 
province of Alberta has no such constitutional protection: the fund is managed 
directly by the provincial cabinet and has occasionally succumbed to interest group 
pressure, especially during election campaigns. 
 
Income 
Trust funds can also provide an additional source of income for the state. When 
resource revenues are deposited into a state’s general fund, they vanish into a 
larger pool of capital which is then expended through the state’s budget. If 
resource revenues are separated into a trust fund, the fund can be invested so as to 
produce earnings of its own. These earnings are distinguished in that they are 
directly attributable to the resource revenues themselves (an important 
consideration in demonstrating to the state’s residents that revenues have been used 
wisely). Fund earnings are generated through the investments of the fund capital, 
or corpus. Typical investments include equities, fixed-income investments such as 
bonds, and real property. 
Trust fund income might usefully be compared to the practices of the 
individual investor. Typically, an individual will maintain a cheque account, in 
which the individual’s income is deposited and from which payments for expenses 
are made. An individual will also typically maintain a separate account, either a 
savings account or a unit trust (or a combination of the two), the purpose of which 
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is partially to save and partially to generate new income. A state’s trust fund will 
also generate new income, which can then either be deposited into the state’s 
consolidated revenue fund or maintained for some separate purpose. The trust 
funds considered in later chapters have all generated a significant share of the 
state’s total revenues. In the case of Alaska, trust fund earnings are greater than 
income received from petroleum revenues themselves. Alaska’s trust fund has 
become the principal source of income for the state. 
 
Investment capital 
Trust funds may also provide new sources of investment capital. As noted above, 
funds will invest their capital to generate new earnings. Capital is typically 
invested in income-generating assets, such as equities, fixed-income assets, and 
real property, but may also be invested in capital projects and infrastructure and in 
alternative investment products. Clark (1997) has noted the reluctance of fund 
trustees to allocate assets to alternative investment products, based largely on 
conservative investment views as well as on incomplete information. Clark 
identifies four types of alternative investment products. The first is a modified 
mutual fund, in which assets are bundled into a single investment, often with some 
special purpose. For example, Clark notes how one Massachusetts mutual fund was 
made appealing to fund trustees because its investments are concentrated in assets 
that are deemed to be sensitive to the interests of organised labour (Clark 1997, 
1304-05). A second alternative investment product is the secured investment trust. 
Secured investment trusts are similar to mutual funds, but invest largely in urban 
infrastructure, construction, and development securities (Clark, 1997, 1305). They 
may often invest in low and middle-income housing. A third type of alternative 
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investments through pension fund investment innovations, which do not draw as 
heavily on existing investment firms. Instead, these innovations might allow a 
number of pension funds to join forces and create a largely internal investment 
bank to handle investments, thus minimising costs and increasing financial returns. 
A fourth form of alternative investment is venture capital, in which trust funds take 
equity positions in new and emerging companies, usually those associated with 
high risk but potentially high returns (such as in the biotechnology sector). Clark 
notes how each of these four alternative investments can not only lead to higher 
returns for fund managers, but can also achieve social good through investing in 
such things as low income housing and in newly emerging technology firms, areas 
that traditional funds and other financial vehicles typically shy away from. 
 
Intervention 
A trust fund may constitute a significantly large pool of investment capital, and 
may thus have a great deal of influence in a small economy. A fund may, for 
example, receive a higher proportion of windfall revenues during economic ‘boom’ 
periods, and reduce the inflow during ‘busts’, instead allocating fund income to 
social expenditures, such as health and education, during recessionary periods 
when revenue flows into consolidated revenues are lower than budgeted. Such a 
practice helps stabilise the budgetary process and increases the reliability of 
budgetary information. Some trust funds, for example, allow drawdowns of fund 
principal under certain limited conditions, when other state revenues are lower than 
expected. The trust fund can thus make up for shortfalls in state income, either 
through the distribution of fund earnings or through fund capital. Funds can also 
help to stabilise commodity prices, as the fund could subsidise producers when 
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world prices are low, and tax producers at a higher rate (through a windfall tax) 
when prices are high. Figure 2.2 illustrates in a general conceptual sense how a 
fund may transfer revenues from boom to bust periods. 
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Figure 2.2  Stabilizing revenues during boom and bust periods 
The curve reflects boom and bust income periods, while the arrowed lines indicate 
potential transfers of income from boom to bust periods. 
 
As noted earlier, trust funds can invest in more than just portfolio 
investments. In doing so, they can encourage (or discourage) economic 
diversification. Through venture capital and infrastructural investments, trust funds 
can help stimulate new industries. Alberta’s fund invested its assets so as to 
diversify the province’s economy away from the oil sector, by encouraging, and 
financing, such activities as petrochemicals production and oil tar sands recovery, 
and in financing medical research and the medical industry, including major 
research hospitals. 
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Macro management 
The use of a fund can also moderate economic cycles, as the fund can save at a 
higher rate during periods of prosperity and inject these saved rents into the 
economy during periods of recession. Natural resource prices are subject to large 
price fluctuations based on world demand. Therefore, a peripheral economy can 
experience a massive amount of resource revenue windfalls during periods of high 
demand and high prices. In most cases the economy is unable to absorb these rents 
(without distortionary effects) and the surplus is wasted. By depositing a portion of 
these windfall revenues into a trust fund, the problems of absorption can be 
avoided: the economic rents become sterilised and, if the fund invests outside the 
local economy, become externalised. These externalised rents can be slowly 
reintroduced into the economy at a controlled pace during periods of stagnation 
and recession. 
A sample trust fund is shown in Figure 2.3. The model illustrates the flow 
of money through the trust fund and shows three alternatives for the use of fund 
earnings. The fund trustees can of course combine these alternatives. 
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(Individual 
Disbursement) 
General Fund 
(Consolidated 
Revenues 
Collective Goods 
(Capital Projects) 
Earnings 
Trust Fund 
Other Revenues 
State’s Share of 
Resource Revenues 
Corporate Profits 
Natural 
Resource 
Figure 2.3  Trust fund model 
Showing potential revenue sources and earnings disbursement options. 
 
6.  DISTRIBUTING BENEFITS 
Trust fund earnings can be distributed in various ways (Figure 2.3). One possible 
distribution policy is to transfer them to consolidated revenue. Trust fund earnings 
then become another source of government revenue, possibly replacing revenues 
from the resource itself over time, or lowering the tax burden for residents. A 
second possible use for trust fund earnings is the provision of collective goods, 
generally in the form of infrastructure. Under this form, benefits may not accrue to 
each beneficiary equally. Alberta’s fund is an example of the use of trust fund 
earnings to finance infrastructure and capital projects. A third form of distribution 
is through the transfer of fund earnings directly to the beneficiaries in the form of 
dividends. Individual disbursement, used in Alaska in the United States, creates 
multiplier effects in the economy, as most individual dividend payments recirculate 
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and stimulate local demand for goods and services. Individual disbursement also 
ensures greater equity, in that each beneficiary receives an equal share of the 
disbursement. A combination of these distributional policies is also possible, 
depending on the amount of earnings to be distributed.  
 
6.1  Transfers to consolidated revenue 
A trust fund that transfers its earnings to consolidated revenue is a stabilisation 
fund. If earnings are deposited automatically or annually, the fund serves as an 
additional, but recurring, source of state income. The fund can also be managed so 
that deposits only take place during periods of recession, when state income falls 
below a certain level, or when the state budget is in deficit. The exact terms will be 
worked out by the state and by fund managers.  
 
6.2  Collective goods 
A second distributional possibility is the provision of collective goods, typically in 
the form of infrastructural projects. Through this form of distribution, trust fund 
earnings can finance special projects for which capital might otherwise be lacking. 
Collective goods might include the construction or retrofitting of transportation 
systems such as roads, rail lines, and port facilities, or could include the provision 
of collective services such as education and health care. 
Another method of providing collective goods is an arrangement by which 
earnings are allocated to community associations, which then spend the money 
based on community needs. The community acts as an entity midway between the 
state and the individual. Small communities can use this income to provide new 
community infrastructure and other items that would not normally be covered by 
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the state. The James Bay Cree in Canada have used this approach in the 
management of their land claim compensation fund. Each community has a seat on 
the fund board, and the board reviews all community requests to avoid project 
duplication. Similarly, fund earnings could be used to support grants and loans to 
entrepreneurs in the form of venture capital.  
 
6.3  Dividends 
Trust fund earnings may also be channelled into the economy via individuals. Fund 
earnings are divided and paid out as dividends to each beneficiary (usually to each 
local resident). This system allows each resident to make his or her own 
investment decisions, removing state control over earnings investment. Proponents 
argue that dividends have a positive multiplier effect, encourage spending in small 
economies, and are the most equitable form of earnings distribution. Moreover, 
dividends override interest group conflicts and provide a means for residents to 
check on the fiscal management of the fund. But dividends have the disadvantage 
of removing fiscal resources from the state’s hands and reduce state assets, and can 
also lead to dependence on the annual payment.  
Alaska has incorporated a dividend program in its state trust fund since 
1982. O’Brien and Olson (1990) note that, at least in the case of Alaska, dividend 
payments reduce fiscal illusion and enhance fiscal responsibility. Furthermore, 
dividends may be considered as a form of Universal Basic Income (UBI), in which 
the state guarantees a minimal income to each resident. Such a policy is designed 
to maximize each resident’s freedom within the otherwise constraining bonds of 
capitalism (van Parijs, 1995, 2000, 2001). The effects of dividend payments as a 
means of earnings dispersal are explored in greater depth in Chapter 5. 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
The direct use of resource revenues can be problematic. This is especially true in 
small, underdeveloped economies that form the marginal spaces of global capital, 
such as Pacific island states or the resource hinterlands of North America. 
Resource revenues tend to arrive in uneven streams, based on production levels 
and world prices. Rentier and interventionist policies address this issue differently. 
Rentier, or non-interventionist, policy regimes must ride out the often substantial 
swings in resource prices and production levels. States pursuing such policies must 
find alternative means of finance (such as taxation) during periods of low resource 
prices or production. Political leaders are often unwilling to raise taxes or to 
reimpose abolished taxes, leading to increased budget shortfalls. States pursuing 
more interventionist policies can manage resource revenue flows and distribute 
resource benefits over time. Such a policy assumes that policy administrators are 
acting prudently and in the best interests of the state and its citizen-beneficiaries. 
 What is the fiscal instrument most suited to managing resource revenues in 
small, peripheral economies? Trust funds may be the answer. A fund has the 
advantages of extending resource benefits (across time and space), providing a 
sustainable source of income, and externalising resource rents through investment. 
A fund also removes resource rents from direct political control. Depending on the 
use of fund earnings, the fund can pay annual dividends to residents and provide a 
Universal Basic Income; provide collective benefits, often in the form of 
infrastructure and social services, in the region; or save all earnings to finance or 
stabilise state activity in future, when the resources are depleted. Trust funds can 
transform a non-renewable windfall resource into a renewable fiscal resource.  
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 While trust funds can provide the development benefits noted above, it is 
their application within specific geographies and histories that influences whether 
these potential capacities are realised. The following chapters consider six trust 
funds in six states, exploring their origins, management and investment policies, 
and the impacts they have had on trust beneficiaries. These chapters track the 
specificities of the six trust funds and situate them in their geographical place to 
see how and why some or none of these capacities have been exercised. These six 
cases illustrate the varying capabilities of trust funds to extend benefits both 
spatially and temporally. The nature and direction of capital flows plays a major 
role in the ability of these funds to achieve development goals within the context of 
each place. 
 
3 
 
Comparing six cases 
A note on method 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis considers six cases where trust funds have been established. Two of the 
cases, Alberta and Alaska, represent sub-national states, or resource hinterlands, 
within developed countries. The other four cases, the Pacific island countries of 
Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu, represent small island developing countries. 
While at first it may seem unusual to compare North American resource 
hinterlands with Oceanic states, each of these places is a marginal space within the 
global economy and a part of the capitalist periphery. This marginal position with 
respect to global capital has prompted each place to set up a trust fund as a 
response to its peripheral position. By comparing such places, we will find that 
trust funds are one possible mechanism for stimulating local development by 
investing locally-generated capital in the core. These six cases illustrate the diverse 
places in which trust funds might be useful. 
 
1.1  Trust funds in other places 
Trust funds have also been used as a response to perceived marginality in other 
places. Other national states, including Kuwait, Oman, Botswana, and Norway, 
68 
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have also set up state-managed trust funds, as have sub-national states such as 
Montana, Wyoming, and New Mexico in the United States. Moreover, indigenous 
groups such as the James Bay Cree and the Inuit of Northern Québec (both in 
Canada) have used trust funds as a mechanism for managing their land claims 
settlement compensation payments, again as a response to a marginal position 
within global capitalism. In each of these cases trust funds were a response to an 
increase in revenues from a windfall resource: in the national states mentioned 
above this was oil (or diamonds in the case of Botswana), in the sub-national states 
coal, and in the indigenous cases cash compensation payments from a national 
government as part of a treaty settlement.  
The establishment of a trust fund is a singular, but not exceptional, 
response to the conditions of a relatively small economy, a relatively small 
population, the introduction of a stream of windfall resource revenues, a perceived 
position of global economic marginality, and (in most cases) a visionary individual 
with the political will to set up a fund. In some cases, such as Kuwait and Oman, 
windfall revenues arrived so rapidly and in such large amounts that governments 
could simply not spend the money fast enough, and it accumulated in a fund.1 
 
1.2  Selection of cases 
As discussed in Chapter 1, mainstream development scholars have analysed 
processes of development as applying to all places at all times, without any place 
specificity. The work on MIRAB economies and northern development scholars, 
discussed in the first chapter, has pointed the way towards more place-specific 
                                                     
1 See Stauffer (1988) and Davis et al. (2001). Kuwait’s fund is thought to have been largely 
exhausted in paying its obligations to the United States as a result of the first Gulf War. 
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analyses. These two regions, Oceania and the Arctic/Subarctic, have been 
identified by scholars as extremely marginal places with an exceptionally limited 
development potential, deserving both special analytical concern and the need for 
alternative development models. Berman (1992), in particular, considers Oceania 
and Northern regions to be the most ‘remote’ on earth. Trust funds have been 
established in these regions as a means of compensating for this limited 
development potential. I have therefore drawn my cases from these two regions.2 
Selection of these cases was also based on several more specific factors. 
Trusts and trust funds, as historically British legal institutions, are likely to flourish 
in areas where English Common Law has been established. The six cases selected 
are all in locations of former British colonial legal influence. Alberta and Alaska 
have the largest sub-national trust funds in North America, and represent two 
different investment and managerial philosophies. Each was formed as a common 
reaction to an increase in oil revenues in the 1970s. The four Pacific trust funds 
were established at different times and in response to different resource booms, yet 
each is both a reaction to a position of perceived marginality and an attempt to 
manage a small, open economy with limited investment options. Given the 
limitations of a thesis, it was impossible to include all existing trust funds in this 
analysis. My selection of cases was in part guided by the need to include the most 
appropriate cases and by access to available information. My previous tenure as a 
Research Associate of the Arctic Institute of North America in Calgary, Alberta, 
prompted my early interest in North American trust funds, and I was able to carry 
                                                     
2 Regions which, interestingly enough, have received relatively little attention from development 
scholars (and geographers in particular), who have tended to focus on Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia. 
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out much field research in Alberta and Alaska at this time. The carrying out of 
thesis research under the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the 
Australian National University guided me towards an examination of Pacific island 
funds, especially so as these funds were under-researched.  
 
1.3  Comparing cases 
Compared to other branches of social science, geographers have been less 
exercised with the application of methodological concerns and constraints on their 
analyses. Political scientists and sociologists, on the other hand, have entire 
methodological subfields within their disciplines. This situation perhaps reflects 
political and sociological concerns with causal inference, and the need to 
demonstrate causal relationships (e.g., the causes of revolution, or the causes of 
alcoholism). Geographers, on the other hand, have been less centrally concerned 
with causal relationships and more concerned with examining historical 
contingency. As such, our discipline lacks a strong governing paradigm.3 
Geographers have, however, recently developed an extensive interest in qualitative 
methodology, especially ethnographic methods such as interviewing and discourse 
analysis (Baxter and Eyles, 1999; Clark, 1998d; Crang, 2003; Lees, 2004). 
 Within social science there are three general methods of analysis: case 
study analysis, comparative analysis, and statistical analysis (Lijphart, 1971). Case 
study analysis tends to focus on the detailed examination of a single case, while 
statistical analysis focuses on the universe of cases, or at least on a very large 
                                                     
3 As reflected in the continual debate over what geography is, what its goals and methods are, and 
how it relates to other science and social science disciplines. The rejection of environmental 
determinism and regional analysis have not been replaced by any central paradigm (see Johnston, 
1987). 
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number of cases. Comparative analysis lies somewhere between these extremes, 
exploring a small number (‘small N’) of carefully selected cases (Ragin, 1987).4 
According to Skocpol and Somers (1980), the comparative method has three 
general goals. One of these is the explanation of covariation among cases for the 
purpose of causal analysis. Another is the parallel demonstration of theory, or 
demonstrating that a particular concept or model sheds light on the cases. Yet 
another purpose (and the one employed here) is the contrast of contexts, pointing 
out the differences between cases and establishing how a similar process plays out 
differently in each context. 
As Collier notes: 
 
Comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis. It sharpens our power of 
description, and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus 
suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases. Comparison … can contribute 
to the inductive discovery of new hypotheses and to theory-building (1993, 105). 
 
The decision to analyse only a few cases is influenced by the phenomena to be 
studied, and often the researcher must focus on small number of cases because few 
instances of the analysed phenomena exist (Collier, 1993). The selected cases 
become analytically equivalent and the researcher explores the parallel processes 
of change operating in different settings. 
 Each method of analysis has its strengths and weaknesses. Case studies, for 
                                                     
4 Within the field of development studies, economists have tended to use statistical methods, 
whereas anthropologists have tended to use case studies. The discipline of geography seems well 
positioned to use the comparative method given its links to both economics and anthropology, and 
its position somewhere ‘between’ them. 
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example, allow for an extensive and ‘deep’ analysis of a single case, but the 
theoretical insights generated are often limited in their applicability to other cases. 
Case studies may usefully confirm a theory, or marginally weaken it, or assess 
deviance from accepted theories, but they may have difficulty in building new 
models or explanations (Lijphart, 1971). Statistical methods, on the other hand, can 
compare the universe of cases and assess different explanations through statistical 
control, but such methods tend to ignore historical contingency and the particular 
features of each case. This search for universal models often ignores the details of 
place. 
 Comparative research can combine the benefits of the case study and 
statistical methods and eliminate many of their weaknesses (Ragin, 1987). Small-N 
research allows for a greater capacity to build explanations that may apply to other 
cases, yet it can incorporate historical contingency. Selecting extreme cases (those 
that widely differ in their effects or outcomes) can be especially valuable and 
insightful (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). Yet problems can occur. One of the most 
slippery issues in comparative analysis is selection bias, in which the researcher 
selects cases with similar outcomes (no variance in the dependent variable) and 
ignores cases with divergent ones. This bias often truncates the number of cases, 
ignoring either extreme cases or those in the middle. But a careful selection of 
cases, including both middle and extreme cases (in terms of the outcome to be 
explained) can compensate for the inherent bias in selecting cases. Moreover, some 
comparative studies have produced important findings despite selection bias 
(Rogowski, 1995).  
 Sociologist Michael Burawoy (1989) notes that the comparative method 
can manifest itself in both the traditional method of induction, in which the 
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researcher seeks a common pattern among diverse cases, and in scientific research 
programmes, in which the researcher explores the unique features that lead each 
case to its outcome. Burawoy notes that the advantage of the latter is its 
incorporation of historical contingency. The method of induction, on the other 
hand, assumes that facts are uncontroversial and ‘that they converge toward one 
unique theory’ (Burawoy, 1989, 763). The method of induction also tends to 
assume that the researcher is situated outside the conceptual space that is being 
researched. 
In general, an expansion of the ‘contrast space’ (Garfinkel, 1981) can 
improve the reliability of comparative findings. This ‘most different’ systems 
design allows the researcher to trace common elements from a diversity of cases 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970). For example, in this thesis I include unsuccessful 
trust funds (negative cases) to explain why some funds succeed in providing 
benefits and some do not (varying outcomes). Finally, ‘the most fruitful approach 
is eclectic’ (Collier, 1993, 105) and ‘too much methodological self-consciousness 
is an obstacle to good science’ (Burawoy, 1989, 761). 
This thesis is less concerned with explaining causality than in 
demonstrating an alternative means of achieving economic development in 
marginal places.5 The preceding two chapters have outlined the general models of 
development holding currency today and have pointed out their limitations when 
applied to Oceania, the Arctic/Subarctic, and to marginal places in general. Two 
place-specific models were also discussed, each attempting to analyse development 
                                                     
5 I do, however, explore how trust funds can provide benefits to their beneficiaries, and I analyze 
six criteria for success, demonstrating the factors that lead to a fund that can assist the process of 
development. 
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potential from within a single region. In this thesis I hope to illuminate how trust 
funds, by reversing the flow of capital, can provide an alternative development 
strategy. 
 
2.  RESEARCH TECHNIQUES AND CONSTRAINTS 
Michael Burawoy (1998) distinguishes between research methods (such as case 
studies or the comparative method), research techniques (such as interviewing or 
discourse analysis), and models or theories that guide research. In general I am 
guided by Burawoy’s conception of ‘reflexive science’, in which the researcher is 
not considered as being situated outside of the conceptual space being researched. 
The construction of models is less important in reflexive science, because models 
are separate from the thing modelled (Burawoy, 1998, 10). Instead of insulating the 
research subject from its object, reflexive science ‘elevate[s] dialogue as its 
defining principle and intersubjectivity between participant and observer as its 
premise’ (Burawoy, 1998, 14). Burawoy’s call for intersubjectivity is paralleled in 
geographical research by Clark’s (1998d) call for ‘close dialogue’ rather than 
‘theory-enslaved’ stylised facts. Clark notes that one advantage that economic 
geographers have over economists is their ‘fine-grained, substantive appreciation 
of diversity, combined with empirical methods of analysis like case studies’ (1998, 
75). 
 In what Burawoy (1998) calls the ‘extended case method’, the researcher 
attempts to trace the source of small differences to external forces, and the cases 
are not viewed as instances of some general law (as in the method of induction). 
Rather than trying to establish the universal laws of which the selected cases are 
mere illustrations, the extended case method researcher is more interested in 
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reading each case in the context of what was going on at and in a particular place 
and time. The trust funds that I analyse in the following chapters are therefore not 
the manifestation of some general law of trust funds, but rather individualized 
responses to contextual factors in each of the six places examined. Each fund is a 
unique response to certain spatial and temporal conditions. An economic 
geography study reflects more on practice and instance, rather than on 
determinative claims (Lee, 2002). 
 My research is based on the analysis of textual documents, including 
archival sources and contemporary financial reports, on semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews with a variety of individuals, and on the application of the 
hypothesis of reversing capital flows as a strategy for economic development. I 
triangulate these sources of knowledge to produce an overall understanding of how 
trust funds may contribute to development. This process rejects an objectivist 
textual strategy, in which economic processes are ascribed to one underlying logic 
(Hughes, 1999).  
 Several researchers have commented on the interview process as a way to 
incorporate a diversity of voices in analysis (Hughes, 1999). Ward and Jones 
(1999) note how accessibility and positionality are shaped by the politically time-
specific entry of the researcher into the field (they give examples of interviews 
conducted before and after important elections). Timing was also important in my 
own work. My North American interviews were largely conducted in the late 
1980s, when the Alaska and Alberta funds were a little over a decade old. Key 
individuals (some now deceased) were able to comment on the origins of these 
funds as something relatively fresh in their minds. I was able to follow up on more 
recent information through a number of later interviews with other individuals. 
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In the Pacific island cases, my visits to Kiribati and Tuvalu coincided with 
the desire of these countries to get on the world stage, whereas visits to Nauru and 
Tonga coincided with their desire to get off it.6 Positionality as a particular kind of 
‘outsider’ doing research can also have advantages, especially in the interviewing 
of foreign elites (Herod, 1999). Herod’s study describes the advantages he gained 
as a British researcher at an American university conducting research in the 
Caribbean. In my own Pacific research, I found that hailing from the Australian 
National University as a postgraduate student had distinct advantages, as the 
university is well regarded in the Pacific (and many government officials in Pacific 
island states have done postgraduate work there). Although I am an American, I 
was treated as an Australian: as someone familiar with the Pacific and sharing a 
[British] Commonwealth background.7 Furthermore, as a geographer, I may have 
been perceived as less ‘threatening’ to elites, compared to economists, who may be 
associated with international organisations such as the World Bank. These 
positional factors can help the researcher gain the confidence and trust of 
interviewees.8  
The following subsections highlight some of the particular issues pertaining 
to the investigation of each case. 
 
                                                     
6 Kiribati and Tuvalu are particularly interested in drawing attention to their campaign regarding 
the importance of global climate change on the viability of atoll states (Connell and Lea, 1992). 
Likewise Nauru and Tonga wish to divert attention away from recent financial scandals. I also 
found, as Ward and Jones (1999) observe, that the openness of interviewees may be due to the lack 
of previous researchers investigating the same topic. 
7 For example, my knowledge of and interest in rugby and Australian Rules football were assumed, 
and I was consequently invited to several social gatherings based on these sports. 
8 As an example, after several days of interviewing government officials in Tuvalu, I was later left 
entirely alone for several hours in the Prime Minister’s office building while all office staff, from 
the Prime Minister down to the typists, attended a meeting in a building some distance away. I was 
told to look at whatever documents held my interest during this time. 
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2.1  Alberta 
Alberta, one of the prairie provinces of Canada, established the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund in 1976. The fund is administered through the Alberta 
Treasury, located in Edmonton, the provincial capital. I resided in Calgary, 
Alberta, from 1986 to 1989, and during this time I began to conduct research on 
Alberta’s fund. I was able to make many visits to Edmonton as well as gather 
information on the public record in Calgary. I was able to access treasury records 
in Edmonton and also relied on the fund’s own published reports (mainly 
financial). This primary material was supplemented by secondary published 
sources such as newspaper reports and academic studies (see references). Albertan 
financial data, like that of Alaska, is reliable. Annual reports are presented in two 
parts, with one part aimed towards a public readership and a second part at 
auditors. 
 As a provincial resident, I was exposed to public perceptions of the fund, 
which I supplemented by unstructured interviews with key individuals. These 
included a series of interviews with Peter Lougheed, the former Premier of Alberta 
and the fund’s conceptual father; Dick Johnston, the then Alberta Treasurer and the 
direct manager of the fund; Roger Gibbins, a professor of political science 
specialising in Alberta politics; and Alan Warrack, former Vice-President of the 
University of Alberta and a former minister in the Alberta provincial cabinet (the 
interviews with Alan Warrack took place at later dates, in 1994 and 2000). As in 
Alaska, the Alberta government was open and forthright in allowing access to the 
fund’s records, which, however, were not as extensive because the fund’s origin 
was not a substantial topic of public debate (see Chapter 4). 
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2.2  Alaska 
Alaska, the northernmost state of the United States, established the Alaska 
Permanent Fund in 1976. Fund offices are located in Juneau, the state capital. As 
noted earlier, I conducted much fieldwork relating to Alaska’s fund in the late 
1980s, when I resided in Canada and was researching northern development issues. 
During this period I made several visits to Juneau (as well as to other parts of 
Alaska) to access Alaska Permanent Fund archives as well as the state legislature’s 
archives. These files contained a wealth of documents concerning Alaska political 
economy and the origins and development of the trust fund, especially in the form 
of legislative memoranda and letters. This material was supplemented by published 
sources, both primary sources such as the fund’s financial and analytical reports, 
and the secondary sources mentioned in Chapter 5, including newspaper records 
and academic studies.  
Alaskan financial data is highly reliable, as financial matters are part of an 
open process and are audited by external private firms. It is important, however, to 
read such data within the social setting in which they were prepared and also to 
appreciate the rhetorical organisation of the discourse (Lees, 2004). For example, 
the Permanent Fund’s annual reports contain two sections, one of which is directed 
at the general public and another at accountants (the latter required under U.S. 
law). The first part contains summaries and colourful graphs, and highlights key 
issues. The 2003 annual report emblazoned the word ‘accountability’ on its cover 
and used such keywords as ‘leadership’, ‘responsibility’, and ‘honesty’ as rubrics 
in the report’s first section. These terms were undoubtedly selected to reassure 
Alaskans that their fund was well managed, despite recent accounting scandals at 
several prominent American corporations. The financial section, on the other hand, 
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consists entirely of material needed by auditors and is presented in the language of 
accountancy. 
Printed material was further supplemented by unstructured interviews with 
key informants, including, among others, Steve Cowper, the then Governor of 
Alaska and fund trustee; David Rose, the fund’s executive director; Byron Mallott, 
fund trustee and later executive director of the fund; the late Hugh Malone, 
Commissioner of Revenue and fund trustee; and the late James Rhode, assistant to 
the governor and the fund’s earliest historian (see a full list of interviewees in the 
references). Moreover, during my visits to Alaska I spoke with a variety of 
Alaskans to gain a general assessment of the public’s views on the fund and I have 
been in contact with many Alaska residents since that time. The Alaska Permanent 
Fund is open and transparent both to the public and to researchers, and I was given 
full access to archives and to key informants.9 
 
2.3  Oceania 
I consider four separate states within Oceania: Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu. 
Kiribati and Nauru are both Micronesian states, while Tonga and Tuvalu are part 
of Polynesia. Each fund was set up at a different time and under difference 
circumstances, as discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Kiribati 
The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund was set up in 1956 when Kiribati was part 
of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. The fund is currently administered 
                                                     
9 I was also invited to give a presentation on trust funds to the Governor of Alaska and to the Board 
of Trustees of the Alaska Permanent Fund at their 1990 annual meeting in Juneau. 
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through the Ministry of Finance at its offices in Bairiki on the atoll of Tarawa. I 
made a field visit to Tarawa in 2002, where I was able to access the trust fund 
records held at the Ministry of Finance offices. I was given full access to all 
records and to all individuals involved in managing the fund. Records consisted of 
detailed financial statements prepared by both fund trustees and investment 
advisors and commentaries on them. Unlike in Alaska and Alberta, these reports 
were intended largely for consumption by persons knowledgeable in accountancy 
and financial matters. Detailed financial information was not secret, yet it was not 
made available to the public except upon request. I also conducted unstructured 
interviews with, among others, Tebwe Ietaake, the Permanent Secretary of 
Finance; Atanteora Beiatau, the government’s Chief Economist; Colin Hill, the 
then Australian High Commissioner to Kiribati; and Ueantabo Neemia-Mackenzie, 
Director of the University of the South Pacific campus in Kiribati. I spoke also to 
number of I-Kiribati in order to ascertain their awareness and knowledge of the 
fund. I also consulted the limited amount of secondary publications on Kiribati’s 
economy and on the trust fund. 
 
Nauru 
The Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Fund, an umbrella fund comprising five 
subsidiary funds, was set up in 1922 during the colonial mandate administration of 
Nauru under joint British, Australian, and New Zealander trusteeship. Until very 
recently the fund was managed through the Nauru government’s financial office in 
Melbourne, Australia, although the Nauruan ministers and government officials 
with ultimate responsibility for the fund resided in Nauru. Nauru presents some 
difficulties to the researcher, as the Nauruan government is highly secretive and 
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refuses to release anything other than the most basic financial information (and 
even that is not easy to get: the Nauruan national budget is considered a state 
secret!). I visited the Nauruan Consulate in Melbourne but was not able to gather 
much information there. I also made a trip to Nauru in 2002 but again was unable 
to meet officially with any government officials.10 However, I was able to speak to 
a number of Nauruans (and some expatriates) and also was able to communicate 
with several members of Naoero Amo, a Nauruan opposition political party. These 
members, Kieren Keke and David Abeang, provided me with some Nauruan 
financial statements pertaining to the trust fund that had been submitted in the 
Nauruan parliament as well as copies of several Nauruan newspapers and 
newsletters. These materials were only available in Nauru and they were not 
intended for general distribution. 
There is virtually no secondary literature on Nauru’s economy and its trust 
fund. However, there is rich historical material from the mandate era, when the 
country was essentially under the administration of the British Phosphate 
Commissioners (BPC). I was able to visit the BPC archives in Melbourne and was 
allowed access to the entire collection, some of which was declassified at my 
request. This material contained valuable documents relating to the origins of 
Nauru’s trust fund in the form of memoranda, letters, and financial statements. 
 
Tonga 
The Tonga Trust Fund was formed by the Kingdom of Tonga government in 1989 
and is administered directly by agents of the Royal Family and the Ministry of 
                                                     
10 I was, however, able to meet ‘unofficially’ with one Nauruan cabinet minister involved in 
economic development issues. 
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Finance in Nuku‘alofa, the capital of Tonga on the island of Tongatapu. As in 
Nauru, Tonga keeps information about its trust fund under wraps (though it is more 
open about general economic and budgetary data). I visited Tonga in 2002 but was 
unable to gain access to any government officials specifically involved with the 
trust fund. However, I did speak to Angus Macdonald, the then Australian High 
Commissioner in Tonga. I also consulted Tongan newspapers and the secondary 
literature on Tongan political economy, only a small portion of which contained 
information about the trust fund. I was able to obtain some information about the 
fund from journalistic sources and informal interviews with Tongan citizens as 
well. 
 
Tuvalu 
The Tuvalu Trust Fund was established in 1987 by the joint action of the Tuvalu 
government with those of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The 
fund is administered by the Tuvalu government at offices located in the village of 
Vaiaku on the atoll of Funafuti in Tuvalu. The three other founding countries also 
have seats on the fund’s board of trustees but most fund meetings are held in 
Tuvalu. I visited Tuvalu in 2002 and was able to access archival information both 
in the Tuvalu National Library and at the Prime Minister’s Office (where most 
records pertaining to the Tuvalu Trust Fund are held). I was given full access to all 
records.  
This information was supplemented by interviews with a number of key 
individuals involved with the trust fund, including Saufatu Sopoanga, the Prime 
Minister of Tuvalu; Bikenibeu Paeniu, Minister of Finance and former Prime 
Minister; Solofa Uota, Permanent Secretary of Finance; Panapasi Nelesone, 
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Secretary to Government; James Conway, Advisor to the Tuvalu Trust Fund; and 
Lt Cmdr Steve Cleary, of the Royal Australian Navy. All of these people were very 
forthcoming with information about Tuvalu and its trust fund.11 
In each case, it was necessary to triangulate the textual, interview, and 
theoretical components of the data. Interviews with a variety of individuals, 
including government officials and ‘persons on the street’, helped to ensure that a 
diversity of voices was presented. Financial data was read in the understanding that 
some countries produce more reliable data than others, and data was checked with 
alternative sources when available. 
 
3.  EVALUATING THE CASES 
The intent of this thesis is to explore the use of trust funds as a means of 
development by reversing the flow of capital. Trust funds may help marginal or 
remote developing places invest their capital in more stable and profitable markets 
in core countries. In assessing the ability of trust funds to do this, I am less 
concerned with their impacts on economic growth than with a more qualitative 
understanding of how to sustain marginal economies and provide for the 
livelihoods of their present and future generations. I am also interested in 
understanding trust funds as a tool for augmenting economic equity, both between 
individuals and between generations. A further concern is with the management of 
trust funds themselves, and the factors that enable a trust fund to provide 
sustainable benefits. 
                                                     
11 It is interesting to compare the openness with which my requests for information were received 
in Kiribati and Tuvalu with that of Nauru and Tonga. As I discuss in Chapter 7, openness and 
transparency are important criteria in measuring the success of a trust fund. 
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 In the previous chapters I have outlined various means of sustaining 
resource revenues and distributing the benefits derived from common property 
resources. In assessing the performance of trust funds, I could draw upon three 
means of comparison. The first is comparing the objectives of the six trust funds 
with their outcomes. Did the funds achieve the objectives that their founders and 
managers intended? Second, the funds can be compared to standard industry 
benchmarks. Did the funds produce a rate of return on investment consistent with 
such benchmarks? Third, the funds can be assessed as to their sustainability. Were 
the funds managed so as to ensure their long-term existence, and have they 
maintained the ability to provide benefits? Are the funds still viable entities? 
 In my analysis, I am primarily concerned with the first and third of these 
means of comparison, and my methods reflect this concern. In the following three 
chapters I explore the origins and intentions of the six trust funds, identifying their 
objectives both when the funds were established and how these intentions may 
have changed over time. Each fund is examined within its own political and 
historical context. I then turn to a more direct comparison of the funds in Chapter 
7, in which I identify six criteria that appear to have accounted for the ‘success’, as 
measured against the funds’ own intentions, of several of the cases, and the 
apparent ‘failure’ of several others. These six criteria—investment policy, 
investment location, benefit distribution, governance and management, protection 
of capital, and permanence of the fund capital—closely parallel the obligations of 
fund trustees as described in Chapter 2.  
 Geographers are increasingly foregrounding the importance of the 
financial. Economic geographers are, in a sense, making up for lost time in their 
analysis of financial markets, pension funds, and flows of capital, areas that they 
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had hitherto largely neglected (Martin, 1999). Some economic geographers have 
even suggested that finance should be the core subject of economic geography 
(Clark, 2004a, 2). In this thesis I hope to further this inquiry by exploring the 
directional links between capital flows and economic development, the trust fund 
as an institution for achieving this development, and the place-specific context in 
which trust funds have and could emerge. 
 
4 
 
Alberta 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Canadian province of Alberta established the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund (AHSTF) in 1976 as a response to rapidly increasing provincial oil revenues. 
The trust fund received a portion of provincial oil royalties and invested these 
revenues in ways that were intended both to boost the overall economic 
performance of Alberta and to provide quality-of-life improvements for provincial 
residents. Alberta’s long history of grievance against the economic paramountcy of 
Eastern Canada prompted it to use its windfall revenues as a means of emerging 
from the perceived economic dominance of the eastern provinces of Ontario and 
Québec. The AHSTF, as a pool of capital, would be used by Alberta to diversify 
and expand its economy completely independent of Eastern Canadian finance. 
 Alberta’s establishment of a provincial trust fund was part of a larger 
strategy of ‘province-building’, through which Alberta attempted to transform 
itself from a peripheral into a core region. The strategy was based principally on 
economic diversification, which in Alberta meant reducing its dependence on 
petroleum and other primary resources, and developing secondary, tertiary, and 
quaternary economic sectors. With the rise in oil prices in the mid 1970s, Alberta 
tried to use its windfall gains to follow the development trajectory of Eastern 
Canada: using staple resources as the basis for the creation and expansion of 
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manufacturing and service sectors. The AHSTF was to act as a kind of 
development bank that would help finance provincial diversification projects that 
commercial investors themselves refused to undertake. The fund’s spending on 
social services and infrastructural improvements also benefited many Albertans 
directly and helped solidify their support for the political party in power. Alberta’s 
use of its trust fund as an instrument to negate its perceived colonial position 
within the Canadian confederation and to transform itself into an economic core is 
reflected in the particular nature of the AHSTF’s investments and especially in 
their geographic location. In this thesis, the AHSTF serves as an example of a 
particular kind of trust fund and as an illustration of the particular geographies 
associated with such a fund. 
 
1.1  Western alienation and economic grievance 
Alberta is the westernmost of Canada’s three prairie provinces. Historically, the 
prairie region, which together with British Columbia is known as Western Canada, 
has perceived itself as a resource hinterland. This self-perception of hinterland 
status, in which control of resources has been historically dominated by interests 
based in the eastern part of the country, is a political phenomenon known as 
‘western alienation’ (Gibbins, 1980, 167 ff.). Today, each of the western provinces 
has its own distinct resource base. In Saskatchewan this has been agriculture along 
with potash and uranium mining, while in Manitoba, the third of the prairie 
provinces, it has been agriculture along with some hard-rock mining in the north. 
In British Columbia, the resource sector has been dominated by hard-rock mining 
and forestry. Alberta is distinctive in that, along with agriculture (wheat and beef 
cattle), the province is dominated by the oil industry.  
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 Characteristics of Alberta’s hinterland position include a large territory 
(661,848 km2), relatively small population (3.1 million), large distance from 
principal Canadian and American markets, dependence on external capital, and an 
economy dominated by the primary sector, with only a small secondary sector and 
a small but growing tertiary sector. Though historically rural, Alberta has two large 
cities, Edmonton and Calgary, which now contain nearly two-thirds of the 
provincial population. Not only is there a tension between rural and urban interests, 
but also a North/South divide within the province that is noticeable in the rivalry 
between Edmonton and Calgary. Rural/urban and North/South cleavages are 
reflected in the policy debates surrounding resource management in the province. 
 Alberta, together with Saskatchewan, was created as a province in 1905, 
well behind the establishment of the provinces of British Columbia (1871) and 
Manitoba (1870). Both Alberta and Saskatchewan were carved out of the 
Northwest Territories, a political entity under direct federal government control. 
The Northwest Territories’ government had originally proposed the formation of a 
single province, but the Canadian federal cabinet was able to block this proposal 
using the argument that a large western province would challenge the political 
interests of the two largest eastern provinces, Ontario and Québec (Richards and 
Pratt, 1979, 16).  
The creation of two provinces instead of one was not the only effort of the 
federal government to limit the resource hegemony of the West. On the grounds 
that federal control was needed in order to implement western settlement, public 
lands were not transferred to provincial control until 1930. During the period 1905-
1930, no direct resource revenues accrued to the Alberta government: this 25-year 
period of federal resource dominance, coupled with other factors, solidified 
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Alberta’s hostility to and alienation from the federal government and Eastern 
Canada, an alienation that continues into the twenty-first century.  
Western alienation is a political ideology of regional discontent (Gibbins, 
1980, 169), which is reflected in Alberta’s continuing campaign to reduce its 
perceived dependency on Eastern Canada.1 Western alienation also incorporates 
arguments against the colonial position of Alberta within the Canadian 
confederation (Gibbins, 1980, 173).2 Given this alienation, the Alberta government 
has been consistently aware of the need to develop provincial sources of capital, 
free from federal and eastern control, and to use natural resources for the 
development of the province. As Canada’s only sub-national petro-state, Alberta’s 
political economy differs from all other provinces. The provincial decision to 
establish a natural resource trust fund was the most significant step in freeing 
Alberta from reliance on eastern and foreign capital, as well as providing financing 
for provincial development interests. The province’s trust fund would be used to 
sustain the flow of economic wealth into the province and to invest that wealth in 
Alberta industries, helping the province to make the transition from a peripheral to 
a core economic space. In order to understand the distinctive nature of Alberta’s 
trust fund it is necessary to examine the province’s political-economic history and 
especially its strategy of province-building. The following sections provide a brief 
background to Alberta’s political economy. The discussion of the fund’s origins 
and analysis of its operations follows the sections on political economy and 
                                                     
1 Western alienation is in many respects the Canadian equivalent of a general sense of alienation 
from the dominance of eastern capital in North America. In the United States, this alienation has 
been expressed in a number of agrarian movements, including the Granger Movement (1867-76), 
the Populist Party (1892-96), and the ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ (1970s-80s), among others. 
2 Also interviews with Professor Roger Gibbins, Head of the Department of Political Science, 
University of Calgary, and Director, Canada West Foundation, Calgary, 1987 and 1988. 
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province-building. 
 
2.  ALBERTA POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Alberta is heavily dependent on the oil industry, and the province’s economy is 
consequently highly unstable, more unstable than other oil-producing economies 
such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Colorado, which are more economically diversified 
(Mansell and Percy, 1990, 5, 14). Alberta directly relies on oil and gas for at least 
one-quarter of its provincial Gross Domestic Product, and, including direct and 
indirect linkages, about 70 percent of Alberta’s economy is linked to the oil and 
gas sector (Mansell and Percy, 1990, 17-19; Pembina Institute, 2001). 
 As in other petro-states, oil was understood to provide the means for rapid 
provincial development. Alberta’s first oil discovery was in the Turner Valley, 
south of Calgary, in 1914, during the era of federal government control of 
resources and resource revenues. Though important as a Western Canadian source 
of petroleum, Turner Valley was not an especially significant oil field: production 
had peaked by 1942, and the resource was nearing depletion by the late 1940s 
(Richards and Pratt, 1979, 44). But as good fortune would have it, a major oil 
deposit was discovered in Leduc, near Edmonton, in 1947. This was the Leduc No. 
1 well, drilled by the Imperial Oil Company, an oilfield ten times larger than that at 
Turner Valley (Palmer and Palmer, 1990, 300-301). The size of this discovery, as 
well as several nearby ones in the following years, established Alberta’s position as 
a major oil-producing region. The oil boom was on. 
 
2.1  The politics of oil 
The increasing provincial demands for resource control are reflected in the political 
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parties that have governed Alberta since its creation as a province. From 1905 to 
1921 the province was governed by the Liberal Party, one of Canada’s two major 
political parties of the period and the party that dominated the national government 
at the time of Alberta’s creation. The provincial government changed hands in 
1921, when the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), a populist group drawing 
support from Alberta farmers, and reflecting provincial alienation from federal 
government policy, governed the province (see Macpherson, 1969, 62 ff.; Gibbins, 
1980, 133-35).  
In 1935, in the middle of the depression years, the provincial government 
changed hands yet again, when the Social Credit Party, a rightist-populist party 
under the leadership of William ‘Bible Bill’ Aberhart, was elected. The Social 
Credit Party, with its eponymous ideology, also relied on an agrarian base of 
support and much of the party’s public policy was geared towards addressing 
agricultural interests; this explains in part the Social Credit Party’s passive rentier 
policy for managing oil resource wealth. Moreover, the ideology of the Social 
Credit Party ‘assumed that the most efficient way of developing resources was 
through the private sector’ and that the government lacked the expertise to 
intervene in petroleum development (Palmer and Palmer, 1990, 314).  
Social Credit was a social philosophy developed by Major C.H. Douglas, a 
British economic theorist of the early to mid twentieth century. Douglas’s social 
credit theories began with his analysis of the role of commercial banks in creating 
money through credit. Douglas observed that the increase in the money supply 
derived from bank credit did not also create the funds needed to pay interest on that 
credit. Those funds would have to come from increased consumer debt or from 
economic growth. Douglas’s famous ‘A+B Theorem’ suggested that ‘A’ was 
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equivalent to wages, salaries, and dividends, while ‘B’ was equivalent to interest 
on debt, the cost of services, and intermediate goods. Workers received the ‘A’ 
component, but not the ‘B’ one, meaning that they could not afford to purchase the 
goods that they themselves laboured to produce (Douglas, 1934). The strategy 
favoured by Douglas was to provide the ‘B’ component to workers either in the 
form of dividends (essentially a universal basic income) or as subsidies to 
producers (Douglas, 1934; Richards and Pratt, 1979, 32-33; Macpherson, 1969, 
108).  
This consumerist, anti-business, philosophy appealed to Canadian farmers, 
and inspired the formation of the Social Credit political party in Alberta.3 An 
important component of the economic philosophy of the Social Credit party was 
the payment of dividends to Alberta residents. These dividends would be designed 
to ensure a ‘just price’ for consumer goods, making them affordable to farmers. 
Dividends were never paid in Alberta for several reasons. First, the Douglasite 
wing of Alberta’s Social Credit party, which advocated a strict adherence to 
Douglas’s economic policies, began to lose ground in the late 1930s to more 
mainstream views within the party, especially as Douglas’s views became 
increasingly cranky (Richards and Pratt, 1979, 34-35). Second, the provincial 
government had few sources of funds from which to pay dividends, and used 
World War II as an excuse not to pay them (Macpherson, 1969, 209). Third, the 
federal government disallowed most of the Social Credit programmes in 1945, 
including the dividend programme (Macpherson, 1969, 209-210).  
By the late 1960s—as a result of increased in-migration stemming from oil 
                                                     
3 Information about Major Douglas and his Social Credit theories, including their application in 
Alberta, can be found in Douglas 1934, 1937; Richards and Pratt, 1979; and Macpherson, 1969. 
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development, as well as increased urbanization in the province—support for the 
Social Credit Party was waning and the Progressive Conservative Party, led by 
Peter Lougheed, was able to win the election in 1971 and the party governs Alberta 
to this day. The Progressive Conservative party dispensed with much of the social 
and economic philosophy of its Social Credit predecessors, including the payment 
of dividends to provincial residents. Dividends became associated with discredited 
economic theories, and this association has prevented the Alberta government from 
entertaining the possibility of paying dividends from the province’s trust fund 
earnings. 
 C.B. Macpherson, one of Canada’s leading political theorists, described the 
pattern of political control in Alberta as:  
 
two waves of revolt … each followed by a longer period in which the government 
… became increasingly conservative. Each revolt expressed a cumulative feeling 
that … the economic subordination from which they were suffering was an 
inherent part of eastern financial domination and of the party system (1969, 215). 
 
The electoral victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1971 fits this pattern 
of revolt against the existing structure followed by conservatism.4 The Progressive 
Conservatives were initially concerned with enhancing Alberta’s economic 
autonomy through a strategy of province-building. Province-building was 
abandoned about 20 years after the party’s coming to power, when the party 
                                                     
4 This same pattern, of a newly-elected party’s ‘radical’ phase, characterized by a charismatic 
leader, a clear political vision, and an aggressive policy program, which is later followed by a more 
conservative, less visionary program, may also be found in other Anglo-American political systems. 
Compare Ronald Reagan’s visionary program with his successor George H.W. Bush’s, or Margaret 
Thatcher’s with John Major’s. 
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entered the conservative phase predicted by Macpherson. The Progressive 
Conservative plans for the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF) and 
much other resource policy were developed during the early, ‘radical’ stage of the 
party’s tenure. Once this radical stage ended, the fund became much less important 
in provincial economic policy. The AHSTF was an event in the early stage of 
Progressive Conservative Party power. 
 
2.2  Oil and western alienation 
The Alberta provincial government has historically been the voice of western 
alienation (rather than, say, the Alberta delegation in the federal parliament). Even 
during the Social Credit administration, the province used its oil wealth to defy the 
federal government: Palmer and Palmer (1990, 302) describe how the government 
of Ernest Manning at first refused to supply natural gas to Eastern Canada, because 
they considered this resource as exclusively for Albertan use and as the province’s 
‘God-given legacy.’ And as Richards and Pratt (1979, 17) note: 
 
Westerners of all classes came to perceive Ottawa as an imperial government, a 
complex of institutions organized by central Canadian elites for the purpose of 
dominating and plundering the hinterlands. The provincial administration, 
whatever its political colouration, became the indispensable agent for attacking 
political colonialism and bargaining with external economic interests. 
 
The provincial government continues to lead the protest behind western alienation. 
Each provincial government must demonstrate to its public that it is addressing the 
issues leading to alienation and must further demonstrate that it is taking steps at 
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the national stage to alleviate provincial dependency.5 The strategy undertaken by 
the Provincial Conservative government made use of the province’s oil wealth, 
which would be used to diversify the economy and thereby offset reliance on 
eastern manufactured goods and services. As the provincial government noted in 
an early budget speech: 
 
The future growth of our Province will depend on our ability to guide our 
economy through the transition from a resource and agricultural orientation to a 
balanced economy of both primary industry and secondary manufacturing.... In 
this Budget we are outlining programs directed towards diversification and 
decentralization of the Alberta economy (Alberta Budget Speech, March 1972). 
 
As this budget speech reflects, the new Alberta policy was aimed at diversification, 
meaning essentially that the province would transform itself from a resource 
hinterland and quasi-colony into a diversified manufacturing centre, or from a 
peripheral region into a core. Such was the vision of the province.6 
 The AHSTF was a policy initiative of the Progressive Conservative Party 
and its leader Peter Lougheed. It was in part a reaction against the passive rentier 
policy pursued by the Social Credit government, and a statement that henceforth 
the province would become more active in resource management and economic 
                                                     
5 The Alberta public’s viewpoint with respect to provincial control of oil is reflected in a popular 
bumper sticker appearing on private vehicles in the early 1980s, which read: ‘Let the Eastern 
Bastards Freeze in the Dark’. 
6 As Gibbins (1980, 91) notes, if diversification should be successful in Alberta, the result would 
most likely be increased differentiation and political conflict within Alberta and among the prairie 
provinces in general. The converse of Gibbins’s argument would be that if diversification is not 
successful (as indeed it has not been), Alberta would continue to evidence a pattern of single-party 
dominance (as indeed it has). 
 
Chapter 4: Alberta  97 
development. The next section examines the various resource management 
strategies pursued in Alberta, showing how the trust fund concept came about. 
 
3.  PROVINCE-BUILDING AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
The origins of the AHSTF are best understood in the context of the historical 
development of the provincial state in Alberta and its province-building strategy. 
Province-building was Alberta’s strategy for augmenting its own provincial 
autonomy against that of perceived encroachments by other governments (national 
and sub-national) within Canada7. It was a kind of anti-colonial struggle against 
the perceived internal colonialism of both eastern Canadian provinces and the 
federal government of Canada. 
                                                     
 
3.1  Province-building and resource management 
Province-building is one of three strategies by which a province can utilize the 
resource rents available to it (McMillan and Norrie, 1980, 213).8 Province-building 
is a strategy employed by the state, emphasizing the enhancement of provincial 
autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government, the expansion of the political and 
economic strength of the province, and diversification of the economy. Province-
building state activity, according to Stevenson, includes:  
 
the management of natural resources, the construction of public works, the 
7 Province-building thus differs from national development strategies, as province-building is an 
attempt by a sub-national government to enhance its own powers against those of other sub-
national governments as well as the national government. Province-building therefore does not 
necessarily lead to higher national levels of development. 
8 The other two strategies are non-interventionist rentier policies that involve distribution of 
provincial rents through either collective goods or individual dividends. 
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operation of utilities and transportation enterprises, the building of highways, the 
encouragement of industrial development and diversification, the regulation of 
industrial relations, and the defence of provincial economic interests in 
negotiations with other governments (1980, 266). 
 
In Canada, notes Stevenson, these activities usually lie within the domain of the 
provincial governments, and as such can contribute to province-building. 
 As McMillan and Norrie noted in 1980, ‘the Lougheed government is 
openly and avowedly province-building,’ and ‘a series of “Alberta First” 
interventionist policies have been spawned’ (1980, 213-14). The principal features 
of the province-building strategy were the diversification of the Alberta economy 
and the enhancement of provincial power against that of other governments in 
Canada.  
 
3.2  Economic diversification 
Diversification necessitated intervention in the provincial economy on the part of 
the Alberta state, through some state-controlled instrument. The AHSTF was this 
instrument, and it is controlled by the Alberta cabinet, where it is insulated from 
governmental opposition and societal group pressures. 
The Alberta government had embarked, in the 1970s, on a path that led 
towards an increase in state intervention with the purpose of achieving the 
diversification of the Alberta economy. However, this objective was not in the best 
interests of many groups within Alberta, and in fact was a policy objective of the 
Alberta state, and not necessarily that of all societal groups. The province-building 
objective of diversification entailed several costs that could detrimentally affect 
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societal groups within Alberta. McMillan and Norrie are especially clear on this 
point. They note that: 
 
diversification beyond that sustainable by market forces involves a cost because of 
the inefficient allocation of resources. Thus, the attainment of a greater degree of 
industrialisation in the province may require that Albertans forego better returns 
and opportunities elsewhere (1980, 214). 
 
The Alberta state was able to proceed with this policy of industrialisation beyond 
what the market could sustain because it was equipped with a vast and increasing 
flow of resource revenues. And because these revenues were controlled and 
administered directly by the state, the actual costs of the diversification program 
were not clearly presented to the Alberta public, and remained hidden. 
 In sum, province-building was a kind of sub-national ‘nationalism,’ in 
which the cornerstone of economic policy was diversification. The economic 
situation of a resource hinterland limits diversification beyond certain limits 
resulting from the market. Alberta’s policy of province-building was an effort to 
transcend the limits of the market by diversifying beyond what the market could 
sustain. As such, the Alberta government attempted to enact by fiat policies that 
would abolish the constraints of a resource hinterland. But this trans-market 
philosophy required statist instruments to achieve its corresponding policies: the 
AHSTF was this instrument, viewed not as an end, but as a tool of diversification. 
By defying market constraints, the Alberta government opened itself up to a series 
of problems that have plagued its development policies, and the AHSTF, ever 
since. The following section explores some of the conflicts that arose from the 
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province-building agenda. 
 
4.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROVINCE-BUILDING 
To a certain extent the development of Alberta during the 1970s originated in 
events external to the province. The political crisis in the Middle East, culminating 
in the oil embargo of 1973, resulted in world oil prices doubling by the mid 1970s. 
As the principal oil-producing region in Canada, Alberta was the beneficiary of a 
massive increase in petroleum revenues. To some extent the amount of this 
increase was blunted by existing contractual arrangements with private oil firms as 
to the maximum royalty that the province could extract. However, these 
arrangements were soon altered to suit the province, and these changes stemmed to 
some degree from the actions of the federal government. The strategy of province-
building brought the Alberta government into conflict with both the oil industry 
and the federal government. 
 
4.1  Confronting the oil industry 
In an effort to increase provincial revenues, the government of Alberta raised the 
royalty received from provincially-owned oil resources. The federal oil export tax 
initiated in 1973, which limited provincial revenues, provided some justification 
for the Alberta government to adjust the royalty rates upward. 
 There was no consultation with private industry before the royalty rates 
were increased. As Richards and Pratt observe: ‘in a striking departure from the 
long-established practice of prior consultation, this decision was taken by cabinet 
with no advance discussion with representatives of the oil industry: in effect, the 
industry was handed a fait accompli’ (1979, 225). Alberta was acting to assert its 
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own inchoate policies of province-building. The close alliance with the oil 
industry, which had existed under the previous rentier arrangement, was being 
discarded in favour of a more independent and aggressive state pursuit of its own 
interests. This break ‘put the province on a collision course with the international 
oil industry’ (Richards and Pratt 1979, 226). Alberta's new policies and actions did 
not sit well with many Albertans, including the constituents of the governing 
Progressive Conservative party. As Pratt and Tupper noted in 1980, ‘many Alberta 
businessmen (notably oil executives in the Calgary industry) [did] not, to put it 
mildly, share Lougheed's belief in the necessity of an interventionist state’ (1980, 
254). Industry pressure eventually forced Alberta to reduce royalty rates 
somewhat, although not to their original level. The oil companies made use of their 
traditional threats with some success, claiming that excessive taxes would curtail 
exploration and drilling activity. Some oil companies told tales of woe to their 
shareholders, which culminated in several stories in the Financial Post predicting a 
downturn in the Alberta oil industry (Laxer, 1983, 113-15).  
The Alberta government had difficulty in overcoming these assertions for 
two reasons. First, the government was ideologically committed to free enterprise, 
and one possible strategy to control oil revenues, state intervention in the form of a 
state-owned oil company (such as Saskoil in Saskatchewan), would go against the 
grain of government ideology and would alienate many constituents. Second, the 
province was now so dependent on oil revenues that it needed the oil companies to 
keep drilling at no less than current levels. Hence the Alberta government had to 
back down, in light of industry, media, and federal government pressure, and lower 
the royalty rates and provide additional incentives. The province had nevertheless 
achieved an increase in revenue, and had demonstrated its willingness to confront 
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the international oil firms over control of the resource rents, an action which had 
great symbolic importance. Where private and public interests diverged, Alberta 
was able to make use of its own political and economic resources, including 
ownership of the oil leases, to advance its strategy of province-building. 
 
4.2  Confronting the federal government 
In addition to its conflict with the oil industry over the royalty rate structure and 
the division of resource rents, the province also faced a greater challenge from the 
federal government. The government of Canada had its own set of policy 
preferences apropos resource rent control—in general the government of Canada 
was concerned with the effects of rapid economic growth in Alberta, and with the 
costs associated with this growth. The responses of the federal government were 
designed to mitigate both the costs of the Alberta increase and the political and 
economic influence of the province. The concentration of Canadian petroleum 
deposits in the province of Alberta allowed only a single province to benefit from 
the doubling of world oil prices. Unlike the United States, where Alaska, Texas, 
Louisiana, California, Oklahoma, and others enjoyed an increase in oil revenues, 
Alberta, and to a much smaller extent Saskatchewan, were the only Canadian 
provinces where rents from oil resources increased. As these oil resources were 
located on provincially-owned land, the federal government was unable to benefit 
from the oil boom, as it could not tax the provincial governments. 
 
The equalization system 
Perhaps the most serious problem that the federal government faced was the 
impact of the resource revenue increase on Canada’s equalization system. The 
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equalization system in Canada is a national program which attempts to reallocate 
income within Canada in an effort to achieve similar levels of public goods 
throughout all provinces. The rapid growth of a single province—Alberta—
distorted the equalization system and necessitated some basic changes in the 
manner by which equalization payments were calculated. The equalization system 
is based on a national average of potential provincial income. Provinces falling 
below the average receive a federal payment to bring them up to the national 
average. Alberta's rapid increase in resource revenues caused the national average 
of all provinces to rise. The gap to be filled by the federal government was now 
larger, and, moreover, some provinces which formerly were above the national 
average now fell below it. The federal government was forced into a position in 
which its payments to the ‘have not’ provinces were increasing, yet it was unable 
to tap the increased resource revenues accruing to Alberta. This problem led the 
federal government to institute changes in the equalization system, as well as to 
advance a number of new federal programs that significantly undercut the 
privileged position of Alberta.9 
 
                                                     
9 Alberta’s economic expansion precipitated three basic changes in the equalization system. First, 
only one half of the revenues from non-renewable natural resources were to be counted in 
computing the national average of provincial income. This immediately lessened the impact of the 
oil boom in Alberta, and the resultant strain that it placed on the equalization system. Second, only 
provinces with a per capita income falling below the national average—whether or not they fell 
above or below the national average used for equalization purposes—would be eligible to receive 
equalization payments. Thus Ontario would not become a ‘have not’ province, even though its 
potential tax base might fall below the national average. Third, moneys deposited into provincial 
trust funds—such as the AHSTF—would not be counted in determining the national average. As 
Brooks (1987, 321) notes, ‘part of the lore of intergovernmental relations in Canada is that the 
AHSTF was suggested to Alberta’s premier, Peter Lougheed, by prime minister Pierre Trudeau, as 
a means of “sterilizing” this oil-based income’. While the story is apocryphal, it does indicate that 
in some sense the federal government encouraged the establishment of the AHSTF, as well as its 
continued expansion. 
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The National Energy Program 
The federal program that had perhaps the greatest impact on the Alberta oil 
industry, and the province itself, was the National Energy Program (NEP), which 
was instituted in 1980. This program was designed in part to ‘Canadianize’ the oil 
industry and reduce the level of foreign ownership, and to provide for eventual 
energy self-sufficiency for Canada. The NEP also provided incentives to encourage 
exploration and drilling on the federally-owned lands of the Northwest Territories 
and offshore. These incentives threatened to reduce the level of oil industry activity 
in Alberta, while increasing the ability of the federal government to extract the 
royalties from oil drilled on its own lands. 
 These provisions of the NEP were met with hostility in Alberta and the 
other western provinces, but perhaps the greatest threat to Alberta’s struggle for 
greater control of its oil resources came in the revenue-sharing provisions of the 
NEP. Under the arrangement that existed just prior to the promulgation of the NEP 
in 1979, the distribution was as follows: Alberta received 49% of the oil and gas 
revenues, the oil industry received 39%, and the federal government received the 
remaining 12% (Conway, 1983). After the NEP was implemented, the distribution 
of the resource revenues changed to 41% for Alberta, 31.6% to the oil industry, 
and 27.5% to the federal government (Conway, 1983). All of these provisions were 
attacked by the Alberta government: 
 
Two days after the launching of the program, [Peter Lougheed] appeared on 
province-wide television to challenge the NEP. He lashed out at the federal 
government's imposition of a Natural Gas Export Tax and at the Petroleum and 
Gas Revenue Tax. He flatly rejected Ottawa's schedule for increasing the price of 
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domestic oil and natural gas. He announced that in retaliation against the federal 
measures, the Alberta government, in three phased ninety-day intervals, would cut 
back on oil production, eventually to the tune of 180 000 barrels a day, about 15 
percent of the province's total. In addition, he announced that Alberta would hold 
back on its decisions with respect to further oil sands and heavy oil developments 
(Laxer, 1983, 81). 
 
These actions on the part of the federal government created a three-way battle for 
control of Alberta's oil resource wealth. The oil industry, the federal government 
and the province of Alberta all competed for a larger share of the resource rents.  
 
Other issues 
In addition to the problems in intergovernmental relations generated by rising oil 
prices, the boom led to serious social problems in the province. Crime, drug use, 
alcoholism, and prostitution all increased, and Alberta had the highest rates of 
suicide, divorce, abortion, and teenage pregnancy in Canada (Palmer and Palmer, 
1990, 336). In addition, the rapid rate of urban growth led to problems with 
transportation, education, and other social services. These problems stemmed from 
the massive in-migration sustained and encouraged by oil money. In the absence of 
any wealth-sterilizing or neutralizing mechanism, resource rents entered the 
economy at rates much higher than normal, inflating the fragile economic bubble 
that was now close to bursting.10 
                                                     
10 As indeed it did in the mid 1980s, when oil prices dropped considerably and the Alberta 
economy entered a recession. A popular bumper sticker appearing at this time read: ‘Please God, 
Give Us Another Oil Boom: We Promise Not to Piss it Away This Time’. 
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5.  ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ALBERTA HERITAGE SAVINGS TRUST FUND 
The above discussion has noted how the province-building strategy pursued by 
Alberta since 1971 has been a manifestation of continued western alienation within 
the Canadian federal system. Like other remote resource-dependent regions, 
Alberta was locked in a quasi-colonial status with respect to the industrialized 
centres of Eastern Canada. Provincial strategy evidenced two factors that are 
typically found in the decolonization process: devolution of political authority 
from federal to provincial levels, and diversification of the economy. The second 
factor is a counterpart of the first. And, as in other resource hinterlands, natural 
resources are seen as the key to solving the problems of quasi-colonialism and 
endogenous, sustainable development. Alberta responded to these problems in part 
by establishing a natural resource trust fund (Smith, 1991). By doing so it provided 
a foundation for the province-building strategy as well as providing a basis—which 
would depend on the exact policies pursued—for achieving a sustainable flow of 
revenue. 
 
5.1  Peter Lougheed and the idea of a trust fund 
The AHSTF owes its origins to ideas circulated among the Alberta cabinet in the 
early 1970s. The provincial government was receiving revenues at a faster rate 
than it could spend them, and this fact, coupled with the trust fund principles 
discussed earlier, convinced Peter Lougheed, the Premier of Alberta, that a fund 
should be established. Specifically, the idea of a fund was raised following the rise 
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in oil prices in 1973 (Collins, 1980, 159).11 The Alberta Cabinet proposed a natural 
resource trust fund in late 1974 (Warrack, 1994, 4); in the Alberta Budget Speech 
of February 1975 a fund was specifically mentioned; and later that month an 
election was called. Part of the reason for calling an election was to assess the 
public’s support for the trust fund concept. As Lougheed surely predicted, he and 
the Progressive Conservative government won by an impressive landslide in that 
election held later in 1975. Lougheed interpreted this success as a sign of public 
support for the fund concept (Smith, 1987).12 In autumn 1975, Bill 74 was 
introduced in the Alberta legislature calling for the creation of a fund, but this bill 
was intentionally allowed to die (Smith, 1987). The bill had been introduced to 
alert Albertans to the concept of a fund; by allowing the bill to die the government 
hoped to stimulate public input regarding the fund. The bill, now renamed Bill 35, 
was reintroduced into the legislature in April 1976, where it was approved and 
became the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act. 
 
5.2  The trust fund and provincial resource policy 
Natural resources were central to the Progressive Conservative Party’s vision for 
Alberta. Noting that in the early 1970s the province was deficit-financing its 
budgets, Allan Warrack (1994, 4) lists four aspects of the new resource policy:  
 
                                                     
11 Also interviews with The Hon. Peter Lougheed, QC, Former Premier of Alberta, Calgary, 1987 
and 1988, and with The Hon. Dick Johnston, Treasurer of Alberta, Edmonton, 1988. Lougheed told 
me in these interviews that he viewed the province through the metaphor of a house, with the 
concomitant need to provide for its future economic security through savings. It is clear both from 
the series of interviews with Lougheed himself, and from other sources, that Lougheed was the 
originator of the trust fund idea. 
12 Also interviews with Peter Lougheed, Calgary, 1987 and 1988; and with Dick Johnston, 
Edmonton, 1988. 
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1)  To increase the share of public ownership of natural resources; 
2)  To increase prices of oil and gas to market levels; 
3)  To upgrade resources, which would increase employment; and 
4)  To gain greater investment opportunities as public resources are developed. 
 
These policy dimensions reflect several factors. First, the province would rely on 
the market economy, but it would attempt to increase provincial ownership of 
resources. Second, increased resource prices and increased public resource 
ownership would lead to an increase in provincial revenue. Other aspects of 
Alberta policy suggest that this new flow of resource revenues could be used to 
achieve the provincial goal of economic diversification. These policy objectives, 
together with a dramatic increase in oil prices by the mid 1970s, did in fact provide 
the province with substantial new revenues.  
 The fund was developed as a means to counteract the problems of a 
resource hinterland and its peripheral economy. Specifically, developing a large 
pool of endogenous capital would extend the benefits of resources over time (and 
allow future generations to share in them); it would provide a source of capital in 
addition to that provided by Eastern Canadian banks and by foreign financiers (and 
would, ultimately, replace these sources); and it would provide a pool of capital 
that could be used to achieve the Alberta government’s diversification objectives, 
which were so central to the Progressive Conservative Party’s general program and 
necessary to secure the support of the party’s urban constituents. Thus, while the 
fund did have long-range objectives and was founded on a long-range resource 
management philosophy, it nevertheless provided immediate economic support for 
the governing party. That the provincial cabinet had direct responsibility for the 
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fund strengthened this latter tendency. 
 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act passed the provincial 
legislature on 19 May 1976, and the AHSTF received its first allocation of $1.5 
billion (from general revenues).13 The fund was given three objectives:  
 
1)  To save for the future;  
2)  To strengthen and [later ‘or’] diversify the economy of Alberta; and  
3)  To improve the quality of life for Albertans (Alberta Statutes, 1976).  
 
These stated objectives indicate that the fund would be used to benefit Alberta 
alone. Moreover, the fund could also be used to provide a source of capital for 
Alberta government-sponsored projects. The stated objectives, especially the latter 
two, provided the authority for the province to use the AHSTF as a developmental 
instrument. In addition to specifying the objectives of the fund, the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act specified the fund’s organization, management, 
and investment policies. The Act created the AHSTF through legislation, meaning 
that such legislation could be amended by a motion of the provincial legislature. 
The Act did not provide any constitutional protection for the fund.  
 
6.  FUND OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND INVESTMENT 
For the first 21 years of the AHSTF’s existence, during the period of province-
building under the Lougheed and later the Getty governments, the fund’s 
investments were concentrated in Alberta and consisted overwhelmingly of fixed 
income assets. In 1997 the fund began a major restructure, as it transformed itself 
                                                     
13 All dollar figures expressed in this chapter are in Canadian dollars. 
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from a primarily development-oriented fund into a primarily savings-oriented one. 
The fund served its initial purpose of province-building, and now serves the 
different purpose of providing a sustainable revenue stream for the province, 
which, among other things, allows Alberta to extract no provincial sales tax from 
its residents. 
 Between 1976 and 1987, when the fund was capped, the province deposited 
over $12 billion into the AHSTF. From 1976 until 1982, AHSTF earnings were 
redeposited into the fund. Thus the fund grew rapidly in its early years, from an 
initial balance of just over $2 billion at the end of the first fiscal year in 1977, to 
over $12 billion by the end of the fiscal year in 1985. The fund then stabilized with 
a balance of about $11 or $12 billion, as no new revenues are being deposited into 
it and its earnings are transferred to the general fund. The fluctuations in the fund’s 
balance reflect the changing valuation of its assets as financial markets fluctuate. 
The fund’s shifting investment geographies in the context of different provincial 
development strategies are discussed below. 
 
6.1 Fund governance 
Management 
The AHSTF is managed at the highest level by the provincial government, which 
in Canada means that the provincial cabinet, and especially the provincial treasurer 
and premier, constitute the fund’s trustees. The fund is directly managed by the 
Alberta Treasury and thus the provincial treasurer has great control over fund 
investment decisions. Both the provincial Auditor-General and an AHSTF 
Oversight Committee, composed of nine members of the provincial legislature 
(MLAs), of which three are not members of the governing party, provide some 
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level of oversight of fund management. An Operations Committee, consisting of 
private-sector financial advisors, also provides investment advice to the Alberta 
Treasury.  
 
Accountability and governance 
Despite these various monitoring bodies, the AHSTF remains a creature of the 
provincial cabinet, and thus of the governing political party. The fund has no 
constitutional protection, and the enabling legislation for the fund can be changed 
by amendments enacted by the provincial legislature. In a sense, Albertans thus 
directly elect their fund’s trustees, though in practice the provincial treasurer, 
elected only by his own riding’s (parliamentary district) constituents, is the only 
trustee with direct influence on fund investment practices. 
 AHSTF financial statements are available to the public. The fund issues an 
annual report each financial year (ending 31 March) and this report is also 
available through the internet, as are the fund’s quarterly reports. All financial 
statements are audited by the provincial Auditor-General. MLAs can also answer 
their constituents’ questions about the fund, and the AHSTF office in the 
provincial treasury is also happy to answer questions or to refer one to the location 
of information. The AHSTF has its own logo, which appears on the capital projects 
financed by the fund, making it clear to Albertans where financing for these 
projects came from. The AHSTF has an open and transparent policy with respect 
to its investments, and most financial information is made available to anyone. 
 
6.2  Generation of fund capital 
Prior to the creation of the AHSTF in 1976, 100% of the province’s resource 
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revenues were deposited into the provincial general fund, meaning that they 
became part of the general provincial budget. After the AHSTF was established, 
30% of revenues went into the AHSTF, while the remaining 70% went into the 
general fund. During this period the fund’s investment revenues were redeposited 
into the fund. These provisions were later changed, in 1982, to only 15% to the 
AHSTF and the remaining 85% into the general fund, with fund earnings being 
transferred to the general fund. This change was based on declining revenues and 
the need for funds to balance the province’s budget. Then, in 1987, the AHSTF 
was capped, with the result that, once again, 100% of resource revenues went to 
the general fund. The period of new resource revenues being deposited into the 
AHSTF lasted from 1976 to 1987. Transfers to and from the fund between 1976 
and 2003 are shown in Table 4.1.  
The limited, eleven-year period of resource revenues flowing into the trust 
fund again suggests that the policy underlying the AHSTF was a moment in the 
Progressive Conservative government’s overall policy for Alberta, a moment 
taking place during the earlier, ‘radical’ phase of Progressive Conservative policy. 
The trust fund thus served a particular purpose at a particular time, and was not 
intended to serve the same function in perpetuity. 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Net Income 
(Loss) 
Transfers 
from GRF 
Transfers 
to GRF 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Fund 
Equitya 
      
1976/77 $88 $2120 - ($36) $2172
1977/78 194 931 - (87) 3210
1978/79 294 1059 - (132) 4431
1979/80 343 1332 - (478) 5628
1980/81 734 1445 - (227) 7570
1981/82 1007 1433 - (349) 9661
1982/83 1482 1370 (866) (296) 11,351
1983/84 1467 720 (1469) (330) 11,739
1984/85 1575 736 (1575) (228) 12,247
1985/86 1667 685 (1667) (240) 12,692
1986/87 1445 216 (1445) (227) 12,681
1987/88 1353 - (1353) (129) 12,552
1988/89 1252 - (1252) (155) 12,397
1989/90 1244 - (1244) (134) 12,263
1990/91 1337 - (1337) (150) 12,113
1991/92 1382 - (1382) (84) 12,029
1992/93 785 - (785) (84) 11,945
1993/94 1103 - (1103) (71) 11,874
1994/95 914 - (914) (49) 11,825
1995/96 1046 - (1046) - 11,825
1996/97 932 - (756) - 12,001
1997/98 947 - (922) - 12,026
1998/99 932 - (932) - 12,026
1999/2000 1169 - (939) - 12,256
2000/01 706 - (706) - 12,256
2001/02 206 - (206) - 12,256
2002/03 (894) - - - 11,362
      
Total $24,700 $12,047 ($21,899) ($3486) $11,362 
 
Table 4.1  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund assets, revenues,  
and transfers, 1976-2003 (in C$ millions) 
a at cost 
Source: AHSTF Annual reports, various years 
 
6.3  Geographies of fund asset distribution 
When the fund was set up in 1976 it consisted of three divisions, each focused on a 
particular type of asset and with a particular political purpose. In 1980, the 
province added two additional divisions, but these never amounted to much and 
were insignificant in the AHSTF’s overall structure. The five divisions were the 
Alberta Investment Division (AID), the Canada Investments Division (CID), the 
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Capital Projects Division (CPD), with the two later additions being the 
Commercial Investment Division (CMID) and the Energy Investment Division 
(EID). Figure 4.1 illustrates the original structure of the fund, outlining its source 
of capital, investment divisions, and distribution of earnings. The fund’s 
investment divisions, and their asset types and geographies of investment, are 
discussed below. 
   
Resource Revenues 
Alberta Treasury 
(General Revenues 
Fund)
 
Earnings 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
30% 
70%
 
 Alberta Investment Division 
 Canada Investments Division 
 Capital Projects Division 
 Energy Investment Division 
 Commercial Investment Division 
 
Figure 4.1  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, original structure 
Solid lines indicate legally-mandated transfers. 
 
Alberta Investment Division 
The function of the Alberta Investment Division (AID) was to ‘strengthen or 
diversify the economy of Alberta’ and to ‘yield a reasonable return or profit’ 
(AHSTF, Annual reports, various years). The division was expected to make a 
‘reasonable return’, but not necessarily a ‘commercial return’ on its investments 
(Warrack, 1994). Investments could be either in fixed income assets (debt 
investments, such as bonds, debentures, and so forth) or in equities. In practice 
most of the assets held by this division were fixed income assets and especially 
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debentures issued by various agencies of the Alberta government. Most of this 
division’s assets consisted of loans to provincial crown corporations, such as the 
Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Alberta Agricultural Development 
Corporation, Alberta Municipal Financing Corporation, and Alberta Government 
Telephones (later semi-privatised and called TELUS).  
 Investments in these particular crown corporations reflect the province’s 
desire to initiate the transition from a peripheral into a core economy as well as the 
need to placate various voter groups and factions. The Alberta Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (AMHC), the largest investment of the AID, had several 
purposes designed to appeal to a large segment of the population. The AMHC both 
provided funds to construct and maintain affordable rental housing for low wage 
earners and pensioners and financed (at subsidised rates of interest) mortgages for 
middle-income Albertans. The Alberta Agricultural Development Corporation 
attempted to encourage sustainable agricultural production by providing loans and 
loan guarantees (and financial counselling) to farmers and small agribusinesses and 
by providing disaster relief services. The Alberta Municipal Financing Corporation 
provided subsidised loans to the province’s municipalities, school districts, and 
hospital districts, and made loans to both large and small communities. These three 
crown corporations, by providing subsidised financing for renters and home 
owners (mainly urban), farmers (rural), and municipalities, permitted borrowers to 
avoid depending on commercial, Eastern Canada-based banks for their financial 
needs; the lower-than-market rates of interest also encouraged community 
expansion. The crown corporations, by providing cheaper finance, channelled 
provincial oil wealth to residents in the form of means-tested goods.  
 Other investments of the AID took the form of equity shares in various 
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infrastructural projects designed to offset the province’s reliance on eastern 
finance. Investments in the Syncrude Oil Sands Project, in NOVA Corporation of 
Alberta Ltd, in Alberta Energy Company Ltd, in Millar Western Pulp Ltd, and in 
Prince Rupert Grain Terminal – Ridley Grain Ltd, replaced eastern finance with 
the province’s own capital. Syncrude, Alberta Energy, and NOVA are all 
petroleum-related exploration, development, and production companies; Millar 
Western Pulp operates a pulp mill using Alberta timber; and the Prince Rupert 
Grain Terminal (controlled by Ridley Grain) operates a grain terminal and elevator 
facilities in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, allowing Alberta farmers to export 
their grain while bypassing the more expensive port facilities in Vancouver and 
other Lower Mainland British Columbian port cities. In each of these ventures the 
AHSTF is part of a consortium of investors (including the private sector), and 
some are publicly traded companies. The fund’s investment in these corporations 
allows Alberta to directly influence development in the province by holding seats 
on the boards of directors of each of these entities as well as to ensure continued 
investment in the province’s resource industries.  
 The investments of the AID provided benefits to a wide variety of Alberta 
residents, allowing them to bypass commercial lenders and market rates of interest 
for provincial sources of subsidised credit. Investments in energy companies 
helped to augment and expand the province’s resource sectors (but were not 
directed at creating economic diversification). It is interesting to consider that these 
rather socialistic investment practices were the policy of a professed conservative 
and free market-oriented government. On the other hand, such investments ensured 
voter loyalty and allowed the Alberta government to pursue its development 
policies through other divisions of the AHSTF. It should also be borne in mind that 
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both subsidised credit and energy investments could have been administered 
directly by the province, and did not require a trust fund as the financial 
mechanism to carry out development policies. Including such investments within 
the fund both helped to secure support for its existence and consolidated provincial 
lending under a single entity that was directly controlled by the provincial cabinet 
and treasury. 
While the province claimed that because crown corporations borrow from 
the AHSTF at market rates the fund therefore earns market returns, and that ‘crown 
corporations are safe, secure investments … they always make their payments on 
time’ (AHSTF Annual report, 1991), some analysts have suggested that the returns 
generated by this division were not the same as those from commercial 
investments, and that in fact the fund exposed itself to the default risk of struggling 
government agencies (Warrack and Keddie, 2002).14 The one exception to this was 
the division’s investment in the Syncrude oil sands project in northern Alberta, 
which did generate significant annual revenues. 
 That the province would invest in assets that did not generate the highest 
potential returns (‘commercial returns’) is telling, and reflects this division’s focus 
on investments that would strengthen or diversify Alberta. The assets of this 
division were located entirely within Alberta. The province needed debt funding 
for many of its crown corporations, such as those providing mortgage, agricultural, 
municipal, and telecommunications financing, and used the AHSTF, rather than 
the open market, as a source of funds, thus bypassing the need for external capital 
                                                     
14 Also interviews with Allan Warrack, former Member of Alberta Provincial Legislature and 
former Vice-President and Emeritus Professor of Business Administration, University of Alberta, in 
Tucson, 1994, and in Kauai, 2000. Warrack considers (with the exception of Syncrude) the 
financial performance of the AID to have been ‘poor’. 
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and its colonialist associations. The AID’s investments also had a popular appeal, 
as they were visible signs of fund investment. The crown corporations that 
received AID investment provided mortgage subsidies to Alberta homeowners, 
subsidized the transportation of agricultural commodities (making them more 
competitive internationally), and subsidised local and long-distance telephone 
services, making them less expensive for provincial residents, among other things. 
AID investments benefited a wide segment of the Alberta population, but 
especially low-income renters, middle-income home owners, farmers, and those 
employed in energy and other natural resources sectors. The AID was a clear 
reflection of the province’s avoidance of external capital and its increasing reliance 
on Alberta capital sources. It was also an example of the province’s attempts to 
circumvent market forces by providing credit in places that commercial lending 
failed to penetrate, by lending at below market rates. The Alberta government 
sacrificed a commercial rate of return in order to stimulate provincial development 
in projects that seemed beyond the ability of a peripheral economy to finance and 
to avoid relying on core region sources of credit. 
 
Canada Investments Division 
The other major financial investment division of the AHSTF was the Canada 
Investments Division (CID). Whereas the AID focused on investments entirely 
within the province of Alberta, the CID focused on investments outside the 
province but within Canada. One factor behind this division was the desire of the 
province to mitigate external hostility towards the AHSTF by demonstrating the 
fund’s willingness to use Alberta wealth to help other provinces (Pretes, 1988). 
The division made loans to other provinces between 1977 and 1982 (all of them 
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now repaid) at an average interest rate of 12.5%, which reflects the high interest 
rates prevailing during that period, due in part to the election of a separatist 
government in Québec and the subsequent nervousness in external financial 
markets about investing in Canada (Warrack, 1994).  
 The CID made 33 loans totalling $1.9 billion. These went to five provincial 
governments (Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, and Manitoba) and to provincial crown corporations (usually power 
companies) in these provinces and to Hydro-Québec in Québec (AHSTF Annual 
reports, various years). Like the AID, the CID’s goal was to produce a ‘reasonable 
return or profit’. Though limited by the enabling legislation to no more than 20% 
of total AHSTF assets, the CID was perhaps the most successful of the fund’s 
divisions and certainly the most profitable overall. It is worth bearing in mind that 
the greatest returns came from investments external to Alberta, rather than from 
those within the province. The investment geographies of this division focused on 
maximizing economic returns and not on investing within Alberta. 
 
Capital Projects Division 
The most controversial of the AHSTF’s five divisions was the Capital Projects 
Division (CPD). The reason for the controversy was the nature of the division’s 
investments: the CPD financed capital projects rather than invested in financial 
assets. As such the assets produced little or no financial return (and often entailed 
costs, such as maintenance costs), but were designed to provide social benefits to 
Alberta residents. The goal of the CPD was to ‘provide long-term economic or 
social benefits to the people of Alberta’; but fund managers noted that ‘projects 
may not necessarily by their nature yield a return’ (AHSTF Annual reports, various 
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years). Despite their infrastructural and non-return producing nature (to say 
nothing of the province’s inability to sell these assets), the ‘amounts expended on 
projects are deemed to be assets of the fund’ (AHSTF Annual reports, various 
years). CPD investments were listed in the fund’s annual reports and other 
financial statements as ‘deemed assets’, provoking a statement each year by the 
provincial Auditor-General to the effect that listing capital projects as ‘deemed 
assets’ violated standard accounting practices. In 1987 the Auditor-General finally 
disallowed the inclusion of ‘deemed assets’ in the fund’s financial statements, 
although the AHSTF continued to list them as assets until the fund was 
restructured.15 
 Though ‘deemed assets’ raised the hackles of the accounting profession, 
these infrastructural investments were popular with the public as they were visible 
manifestations of the fund’s commitment to benefit Albertans. Each of the 
division’s projects, where possible, prominently displayed the AHSTF logo, 
helping to publicise the fund’s socially-beneficial investments. The deemed assets 
of the Capital Projects Division were divided into a number of subcategories: 
agriculture and rural development, research and technology, economic 
diversification, environment, and quality of life, reflecting the diverse goals of the 
division. 
 The agricultural and rural development component of the CPD was 
committed to developing the province’s agrarian infrastructure. These included: 
                                                     
15 For example, in the fund’s 1991 Annual report, Alberta Auditor-General David D. Salmon 
observes that ‘the practice of including deemed assets … on the balance sheet is not appropriate nor 
is the presentation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Deemed assets 
represent amounts expended which are not recoverable by the Fund and where assets do exist, they 
belong to other organizations … the financial position of the Fund would be better understood if the 
deemed assets … were not included’. 
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private irrigation water supply, irrigation rehabilitation and expansion, agrifood 
research, grazing reserves development and enhancement, renewable energy 
research, rail hopper cars, and individual telephone line service for rural customers. 
Irrigation projects consisted of grants to assist in the development of 40 projects 
irrigating about 1800 hectares of marginal provincial lands as well as financial 
assistance to the province’s 13 main irrigation districts in order to enable them to 
rehabilitate canals and pipelines. Agrifood grants supported research designed to 
sustain and expand Alberta’s agrifood sector. The division’s funds were also used 
to rehabilitate about 55,000 hectares of marginal grazing lands in order to increase 
pasture productivity. The fund also purchased 1000 rail hopper cars to increase the 
grain carrying capacity of the province’s rail system (beyond that of the private 
sector) and converted about 25,000 rural telephone customers from party to 
individual phone lines. All of these projects assisted rural residents and especially 
those directly dependent on agriculture. 
 The research and technology aspect of the CPD supported cancer, heart 
disease, and occupational health and safety research through research grants and 
scholarships as part of Alberta’s commitment to become a centre of medical 
research. The CPD also provided scholarships to undergraduate and postgraduate 
university students. The principal beneficiaries of these programs were the 
residents of the cities of Calgary and Edmonton. 
 The economic diversification component of the CPD helped finance the 
Alberta Microelectronic Centre and the Electronics Test Centre in an effort to 
boost the province’s fledgling high technology sector. These facilities provided 
consultation and testing services. Other aspects of economic diversification as 
funded through the CPD included support for a Food Processing Development 
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Centre (to conduct research on food processing and packaging technologies) and 
financial support for the construction of 18 airport terminals in Alberta. Though 
economic diversification was a principal goal of Alberta’s province-building 
strategy, the financial commitment to these projects (some of which, such as 
airport terminals and food processing, were of dubious diversification potential) 
was less than 10% of total division investments (AHSTF Annual reports, various 
years). 
 Investments falling under the subcategory of environment included 
programs to fund reforestation nurseries; various water reclamation projects 
designed to sustain the province’s water needs through the construction of 
irrigation canals, dykes, flood-free road systems, and reservoirs; and land 
reclamation projects such as restoring abandoned garbage dumps, sewage lagoons, 
gravel pits, and mine sites. 
 The subcategory of quality of life was oriented towards enhancing 
Alberta’s recreational opportunities through the development of municipal and 
provincial parks and tourism areas. These included the Kananaskis Country 
provincial recreation area in the Rocky Mountains near Calgary; the fund 
supported the construction of 3000 automobile campsites in 30 campgrounds, 17 
backcountry campsites, 13 group camps, 75 picnic areas, and 6 amphitheatres as 
well as 1500 km of hiking, cross-country skiing, and off-road vehicles trails, a golf 
course, and a lodge (AHSTF Annual reports, various years). Other projects funded 
urban parks in Calgary and Edmonton as well as in smaller cities. 
The investments of the CPD were entirely within Alberta, produced no 
direct financial returns, and often entailed maintenance costs borne outside the 
fund, but the ‘deemed assets’ were politically popular and helped develop public 
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support for the idea of a trust fund. Yet the rhetoric of economic diversification 
enunciated in the province-building strategy was not matched in practice, with only 
a small component of deemed assets consisting of projects with a clear economic 
diversification goal. Most of the CPD’s assets were directed at supporting the 
agricultural sector (rural residents) and providing recreational amenities for mainly 
urban residents. The fund’s deemed assets enhanced the quality of life of Albertans 
but did little in the way of diversifying GDP and employment away from the 
primary sector. 
 
Other fund divisions 
The two additional divisions of the AHSTF added in 1980 were the Energy 
Investment Division (EID) and the Commercial Investment Division (CMID). 
These two divisions remained quite small and had little impact on overall fund 
investments. They were important, however, in setting the stage for revisions to 
AHSTF investment policy in the late 1990s. 
 The EID was a division designated to ‘facilitate the development, 
processing or transportation of energy resources within Canada’ and, like other 
divisions, was supposed to ‘yield a reasonable return or profit’ (AHSTF, Annual 
reports, various years). In the early 1980s it included a limited investment of about 
$25 million in debentures of Luscar, an energy company. These assets were 
eventually sold or transferred to other fund divisions, and the EID ceased to exist 
in practice in by 1985. The CMID, on the other hand, remained in use for the 
fund’s duration, and has become the basis of the new financial structure of the 
AHSTF (discussed later). The CMID was intended to ‘yield a commercial return or 
profit’, rather than just a ‘reasonable’ one (AHSTF, Annual reports, various years). 
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The division invested in both Canadian equity and fixed income securities, but 
until the late 1990s the division was never large relative to the AID and CID. The 
division constituted well under 1% of AHSTF assets, reflecting the lack of 
importance attached to savings and commercial returns by the provincial cabinet. 
 The AHSTF, from its inception in 1976 until a major overhaul of fund 
policy twenty years later, was designed to finance government operations in 
Alberta through purchasing the debentures of its crown corporations, and to 
provide social benefits for Alberta residents through investment in physical and 
social infrastructure within the province. Loans to other provinces, while 
profitable, were below market rates of interest at the time and the loans arguably 
were made to stave off hostility and negative publicity in Eastern Canada 
stemming from Alberta’s rapid enrichment. While some Albertans benefited from 
increased funding for selected social services (which could have been financed 
without a trust fund), the diversification aspect of the fund’s existence was 
unsuccessful, prompting Alberta’s leaders to change tack and restructure the 
AHSTF. 
 
6.4  Distribution of fund earnings 
Trust funds generate annual returns from their investments. In general, fund 
trustees, based on fund policies and objectives, can designate various purposes for 
fund earnings. In Alberta, all fund earnings between 1983 and 1997 were 
transferred to the province’s General Revenue Fund (consolidated revenues). Since 
1983 a total of almost $21.0 billion has been transferred from the AHSTF to the 
General Revenue Fund, with another $3.4 billion being spent on capital projects 
(see Table 4.1). Since 1997 a portion of fund earnings has been retained in the fund 
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to offset the loss of the fund’s real value against inflation, so the transfers to 
general revenue have been slightly less than total fund earnings. Fund earnings 
have ranged widely, due to Canadian and global investment conditions. The fund 
generated a net income in every year since its inception with the single exception 
of 2003, the most recent fiscal year.16 In that year the fund sustained a loss of $894 
million, and therefore nothing was transferred to general revenue.17 
 Dividends to provincial residents were never seriously considered as a 
possibility for the distribution of fund earnings (as they are in Alaska) because the 
idea of dividends is tainted by its association with the Social Credit policies of the 
mid twentieth century. As noted earlier, the Social Credit dividend programme was 
never implemented, largely because it was blocked the Supreme Court of Canada 
on the grounds that Alberta did not have the constitutional authority to engage in 
monetary policy. As support for Social Credit as a political party waned in the 
1960s, so too did support for the dividend policy. Moreover, as Alberta’s economy 
prospered during the oil boom years, the perceived need for dividend payments to 
individuals came to be seen as increasingly irrelevant. 
                                                     
16 2004 financial statements have not yet been released, but a net income is expected, based on the 
data in the first three quarterly reports. 
17 It is worth noting here that the only other provincial natural resource based fund in Canada was 
the Saskatchewan Heritage Fund, which was an investment fund set up and administered by the 
Saskatchewan government between 1978 and 1992. The fund received and invested the province’s 
natural resource revenues (primarily oil, potash, and uranium) and attempted to save revenues for 
future generations. The fund was established under the Heritage Fund (Saskatchewan) Act in 1978. 
The initial capital was $465 million, but this grew over the years so that the balance of the fund was 
frequently over $1 billion. The fund received all non-renewable resource revenues, invested these, 
and paid a dividend of not more than 80% of the fund’s balance each year to Saskatchewan’s 
general revenue fund. The fund provided investment capital, usually in the form of loans, to 
provincial crown corporations. Capital projects such as hospitals, airports, restoration of historic 
sites, and universities were also financed. The act enabling the fund was repealed in 1992 on the 
grounds that the fund was no longer necessary. In effect, the Saskatchewan fund was closely 
modeled on Alberta’s, except for its practice of maintaining a constant balance and transferring the 
bulk of its earnings to the provincial government as a dividend (see Saskatchewan Finance, 1978). 
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6.5  The restructured fund 
By the mid-1990s the AHSTF had become less important to Alberta’s overall 
policy objectives.The premier, Ralph Klein, although of the same political party, 
was not associated with the province-building agenda of the earlier era.18 Alberta 
had lived through both an oil boom and the subsequent oil bust, and was now on a 
more stable track. The wild fluctuations in the province’s economy in the 1970s 
and 1980s were in the forefront of Albertans’ minds (as indicated by issues 
discussed in the media) and experiments in diversification and other province-
building objectives did not stir the public as they once did. Safety and stability 
were now the key economic issues, hence the abandonment of province-building 
by the Alberta leadership. 
 The failure of the economic diversification aspect of province-building was 
another critical factor in the restructuring of the fund. The Pembina Institute for 
Appropriate Development has monitored the province’s economic diversification 
policies and has constructed an Economic Diversification Index (EDI) that assesses 
the diversification of Alberta’s economy relative to the Canadian economy as a 
whole. In their 2001 report, the Pembina Institute (2001) found that, although 
Alberta’s Gross Provincial Product (GPP) has grown steadily since 1971, when the 
Progressive Conservatives were elected, the relative diversification of the province 
was lower in 1999 than it was in 1971. Using 100 as the EDI benchmark for 1971, 
the Institute found that the corresponding level for 1999 was below 40. They note 
that ‘Alberta’s economy in 1971 was one of the most diverse in the past 30 years’ 
                                                     
18 Ralph Klein is from Calgary, where he has been mayor, and is not associated with the Edmonton-
based, football-playing ‘good old boys’ network of Lougheed and Getty. 
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(Pembina Institute, 2001). Furthermore, Alberta’s dependence on natural resource 
industries hardly changed between 1971 and 1999, from 28.0% of GPP in the 
former to 25.9% of GPP in the latter (Pembina Institute, 2001). The service 
sector’s position in the provincial economy was constant as well. The realisation 
that the diversification program of province-building was not working, coupled 
with the emergence of new leadership within the party, propelled the provincial 
government down a very different path. 
 In 1995 the provincial government conducted a province-wide survey on 
the future of the AHSTF. The survey was called ‘Can we interest you in an $11 
billion decision?’ and it received over 50,000 responses. The survey results 
indicated that, while Albertans approved of maintaining the fund, they wanted to 
see it invest in more typical trust fund investments that would generate financial 
revenues (something more along the lines of the Alaska fund, knowledge of which 
was becoming more common in Alberta). With these survey results, the provincial 
legislature amended the Alberta Heritage Savings Fund Act to restructure the 
investment practices of the fund. The fund would no longer be used for direct 
economic or social development agendas, but would instead focus on long-term 
financial investments. A follow-up survey conducted in 1998 indicated that a large 
majority of Albertans approved of these changes in fund policy. 
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Figure 4.2  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, new structure 
Solid lines indicate legally-mandated transfers and dotted lines indicate occasional transfers. 
 
 The province thus began the process of converting Alberta-based debenture 
assets into a broader portfolio of equity and fixed income assets that would 
generate long-term income and growth. The five original investment divisions 
were collapsed into two new ones, called the Endowment Portfolio and the 
Transition Portfolio, the latter consisting of the old divisions’ assets that were 
gradually being sold off or exchanged for the basket of investments in the new 
Endowment Portfolio (see Figure 4.2). A minimum of $1.2 billion in old assets (or 
10% of the total) would be transferred each year into the Endowment Fund until 
such time as all old assets were disposed of (Warrack, 1994). A further innovation 
was that the fund would retain a portion of its earnings to offset the real loss of 
value due to inflation. Previously the AHSTF had no inflation-proofing, so that the 
real value of the fund declined each year. In essence, the ‘new’ AHTSF was 
modelled very closely on the Alaska Permanent Fund. This is not surprising, as the 
AHSTF had (at least partially) fulfilled its original intention of supporting the 
provincial economy and providing economic and social benefits to Albertans, and 
Chapter 4: Alberta  129 
because economists and other investment analysts had continually pointed to the 
success of the Alaska fund’s investment strategy. 
 
Year Actual Asset Mix 
(book values) 2003 1993a 1983a 
    
Fixed Income 35.8% 98.2% 95.0% 
Public Equities  
     (Canadian 21.4%) 1.8%) 5.0%) 
     (United States 17.5%) 0.0%) 0.0%) 
     (Other 15.7%) 0.0%) 0.0%) 
     Total 52.9% 1.8% 5.0% 
Private Equities 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
ARSb 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Real Estate 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
  
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.2  AHSTF asset distribution by type of asset, selected years (percent) 
a does not include capital projects assets 
b Absolute Return Strategies, including arbitrage, short selling, etc. 
Source: calculated from AHSTF Annual reports, various years 
 
Fund Asset Mix 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the changes both in the composition of assets and in 
the location of investment. Table 4.2 shows the most recent year, 2003, and 
compares it with 1993 and 1983, or 10 and 20 years prior. In 1983, or seven years 
after the fund’s inception, 95.0% of assets were in fixed income securities, while 
only 5.0% were in equities. The pattern is the same for 1993, with a slightly larger 
proportion of fund assets (98.2%) in fixed income securities and a mere 1.8% in 
equities. In 2003, however, or five years after the restructuring, the proportion of 
fixed income assets has declined substantially to 35.8%. Equities (public and 
private) now represent 53.7% of AHSTF assets. Real estate accounts for 7.9% of 
assets, and the remaining 2.6% is accounted for by Absolute Return Strategies 
(ARS), which include such things as arbitrage, short selling, and other more 
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aggressive and speculative investments. Thus, within a ten-year period, the AHSTF 
has gone from a fund investing almost entirely in fixed income assets (mainly 
debentures and receivables) to one with a diversity of investments with about half 
in equities, a third in fixed income securities, and the remainder in real estate and 
Absolute Return Strategies. The fund portfolio has been transformed from a highly 
stilted one into a portfolio more in accordance with modern investment theories. 
Fund assets are now selected in order to achieve long-term growth and annual 
financial return, rather than to achieve vague ‘economic and social benefits’, which 
are difficult to quantify and measure.  
 
Fund Asset Location 
The geographies of asset distribution have likewise changed. Table 4.3, using the 
same three years as in Table 4.2, shows the location of AHSTF investments as 
belonging to one of three classes: Alberta, Canada (not including Alberta), or 
Other (including the United States and locations outside North America). In 1983, 
75.4% of fund investments were in the province of Alberta, with the remaining 
24.6% in other regions of Canada (mainly accounted for by the Canada 
Investments Division’s loans to other provinces and provincial entities). In 1993, 
the percentage of Alberta-based investments had declined to 42.4%, and that for 
Canada increased to 57.6%. There were still no international investments at this 
time. By 2003, the portfolio had radically changed, now showing only 4.0% of 
investments as being located within the province of Alberta, 64.5% in Canada, and 
31.5%, or almost one-third, in international securities.  
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Year Asset 
Location 2003 1993 1983 
    
Alberta 4.0% 42.4% 75.4% 
Canada 64.5% 57.6% 24.6% 
Othera 31.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
  
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.3  AHSTF asset distribution by location of asset, selected years (percent) 
a including United States and outside North America 
Source: calculated from AHSTF Annual reports, various years 
 
 The shifting of both investment type and investment location of AHSTF 
assets reflects changes in the philosophy and significance of the fund to the 
provincial government. During the years of province-building, Alberta-based 
investments were paramount, because the province-building strategy required 
direct intervention into the provincial economy by financing Alberta crown 
corporations and capital projects. Diversification of the Alberta economy, and not 
its investment portfolio, was the issue of primary concern. By 1993 the fund was 
investing in Canadian fixed asset securities, and by 2003, when province-building 
was no longer an issue, the AHSTF had transformed itself into a typical investment 
portfolio, with equities, fixed income securities, and real estate all adequately 
represented. The restructuring of the fund focused on generating the best financial 
return and letting private market forces determine the composition of the 
province’s economic sectors. Finally, as discussed above, the Progressive 
Conservative Party must have realized that the diversification strategy of the 
province-building years was not in its own best interests.19 The change in the 
                                                     
19 This was also reflected in yet another survey conducted by the Alberta government, called 
‘Looking forward: Planning for the future with the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund’. This 
survey, conducted in 2003, generated 77,000 responses. Sixty-one percent of responses noted that 
the fund should be used for savings and long-term investment (Alberta Government, 2003). 
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AHSTF’s structure reflects this awareness. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The AHSTF served, and continues to serve, two basic functions within the Alberta 
economy. At its foundation, and for the first twenty years of its existence, the fund 
was intended to be primarily a source of investment capital for provincial projects, 
significant within the context of a province-building strategy and within the 
political imaginary of western alienation. In the late 1990s, as the fund was 
transformed, the source-of-capital raison d’être diminished and was replaced by a 
savings and income-generation function. Income generation was less important 
during the early years, because the province had sources of income external to the 
fund; it became more important later when provincial resource revenues declined. 
The AHSTF is distinctive among the cases considered in this thesis for 
several reasons. Its original purpose as an alternative source of investment capital, 
and as a vehicle for the transformation of the province from a periphery into a core, 
distinguishes it from the other funds considered here (see Chapter 7). This, in turn, 
prompted its particular economic geographies and investment practices, such as a 
concentration of investments within the province itself, with only a minor share of 
fund assets in global, or even Canadian, financial markets. The preponderance of 
fixed income assets, rather than a balanced portfolio, is another factor stemming 
from the fund as a provincial capital source.  
I have argued in Chapter 1 that capital flows from periphery to core, in 
terms of the investment of local resource revenues in global financial markets 
through the mechanism of a trust fund, is an alternative development strategy 
worthy of consideration. The AHSTF at first did not pursue such a strategy; rather, 
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it invested its assets within the province (and not globally) and invested in assets 
that did not hold out the promise of long-term, market rates of return (rather than in 
a balanced financial portfolio). The fund included capital projects as ‘deemed 
assets’ though they generated no income, entailed maintenance costs, and could not 
be exchanged on any financial market. These investment strategies were guided by 
a political decision to diversify the provincial economy beyond what the market 
could sustain as part of a larger province-building ambition. These strategies were 
geared towards transforming Alberta from a peripheral economy into one closer to 
the centre of the capitalist core. Yet despite the rhetoric of economic 
diversification, the AHSTF invested in few projects that significantly altered the 
sectoral structure of the economy. Most of the fund’s Alberta investments provided 
various social benefits but did little to transform the economy into one 
approximating that of a core region. The province’s rhetoric of economic 
diversification turned out to be largely empty in practice. 
The AHSTF never increased its real value beyond the first ten years of its 
existence, and its investment returns are smaller now than they were ten to twenty 
years ago. The fund did not achieve the diversification goals of its founders, and 
the province of Alberta is in most respects no more diversified today than it was 
thirty years ago (Pembina Institute, 2001). Given the failure of the diversification 
policy, the development aspect of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund is 
limited when compared with the funds of other regions. Alberta did not initially 
take advantage of the development strategy I have proposed here, in which 
peripheral capital is invested in the core. Alberta instead chose to invest its capital 
largely within its own borders, especially in the building of infrastructure and the 
provision of cheap credit to various consumer groups. In doing so, the province 
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invested in projects deemed either too risky or too unprofitable by commercial 
sources of capital: Alberta failed to follow the market.  
 These policies of the AHSTF were later recognized, by the provincial 
government (the fund’s trustees), by investment analysts (the fund’s advisors), and 
by the Alberta public (the fund’s beneficiaries), as inadequate and inappropriate to 
an income generation role. Fund policy was modified in 1997 to transform the 
AHSTF into a more savings-oriented investment fund, with a balanced portfolio 
aimed at generating a reliable and sustainable income in the long-term. Fund 
trustees and beneficiaries retired the original purpose of the AHSTF as a province-
building tool, and turned instead to a fund more appropriate to a savings strategy, 
which involved the investment of provincial capital in the financial markets of the 
core.  
 
5 
 
Alaska 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaska, in the United States, established the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) in 
1976 to save a portion of its oil revenues stemming from the 1968 discoveries at 
Prudhoe Bay. After some debate over the form that the fund should take, fund 
trustees chose a savings model that was designed to maximize fund income over 
time, rather than to provide immediate social benefits for residents. Unlike the fund 
in Alberta, Alaska’s trust fund invested primarily outside the state and in a variety 
of asset classes. Though the origins of Alaska’s fund stem from a perceived 
marginal position within the American economy, the goal of Alaska leaders was 
not to transform the state into a core region (as in Alberta), but rather to adapt to 
the state’s peripheral economic geography and to solidify its fiscal future by 
creating sustainable sources of state income in addition to petroleum revenues 
(which would eventually be depleted). The APF therefore chose to seek better 
investment returns outside the state. 
 The APF’s investment strategy was part of a long range assessment of the 
nature of the Alaskan economy. State leaders and investment advisors were 
especially concerned with Alaska’s growing dependence on oil revenues. These 
windfall revenues could not be sustained, and in order for Alaska’s economy to 
prosper, alternate sources of revenue needed to be found. Given the state’s 
135 
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peripheral location relative to economic cores, Alaska possesses few non-resource 
based investment opportunities. There is little potential for the development of 
manufacturing or service sectors. This realization prompted the state’s financial 
advisors to recommend an offshore investment policy for part of the state’s oil 
wealth. The APF’s investment geographies thus differed from those of the fund’s 
counterpart in Alberta. The state also chose to pay out a portion of the fund’s 
earnings annually to each Alaskan resident. The result of this direct payment of 
state revenues to individuals has had interesting spatial and temporal effects on the 
Alaska economy and has supported the state’s development objectives by 
providing a sustainable stream of benefits to all Alaskans equally. 
 
1.1  Alaska’s resource economy 
Alaska is the largest state, in terms of its landmass, in the United States, with an 
area of 1,527,464 km2. It is the only American territory lying in the Arctic and 
Subarctic. The population of the state is very small—only about 630,000 people—
making it one of the smallest states, by population, in the nation. Alaska’s large 
territory, small population, distance from the conterminous United States, and 
Arctic and Subarctic location distinguish it from the rest of the country. 
European settlement of Alaska began with a series of Russian expeditions 
in the Bering Sea region led by the Danish commander Vitus Bering. On his 
second expedition in 1741, he landed in Alaska and found the sea otters that would 
become the basis for Russian colonization. New Archangel (later called Sitka) 
became the Alaskan colonial capital in 1806 when the Russian-American 
Company, which was founded in 1799 to exploit the resources of the colony, 
moved its headquarters there. Colonization, especially under the leadership of the 
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autocratic Aleksandr Baranov, the Chief Manager or Governor of the colony, 
brought the Russians into conflicts with the indigenous population. The Russian 
settler population was never more than about 550 people, but by the end of the 
Russian colonial era the Native Alaskan population had declined to around 33,000 
from the original 75,000, largely due to introduced diseases (Naske and Slotnick, 
1987).1 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century Russia had lost interest in its North 
American territories, and the Russians sold their Alaska colony to the United States 
in 1867 for $7.2 million2 (or 2 cents per acre). The Russians were as eager to sell 
the colony as the Americans were reluctant to buy it. Russian Alaska was a drain 
on the Russian treasury as the colony was not self-supporting, it was extremely 
distant from the capital at St Petersburg, and the sea otter population had 
substantially declined. The Russians wanted to sell the colony specifically to the 
United States to block British expansion in northwest North America. The United 
States Congress, influenced largely by Secretary of State William H. Seward, 
finally agreed to purchase Alaska. The purchase was not widely popular and 
Alaska was often depicted in the media as a worthless Arctic wasteland and called 
by such names as ‘Seward’s Folly’, ‘Seward’s Icebox’, and ‘Walrussia.’ 
 Despite early doubts, Alaska proved to be resource rich. American settlers 
discovered and exploited valuable stocks of fish, timber, gold, and other minerals. 
Many of the non-indigenous in-migrants were attracted to the state by its natural 
resources, especially mineral resources (McBeath and Morehouse, 1994, 12). 
                                                     
1 In Alaska, the terms ‘Native Alaskan’, ‘Alaska Native’, and ‘Native’ always refer to the 
indigenous peoples of the state (Eskimo [Inuit], Aleut, and ‘Indian’). 
2 All dollar figures expressed in this chapter are in United States dollars. 
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Economically and politically, Alaska was a colony (Morehouse, 1984; Naske and 
Slotnick, 1987). During the period 1867-84 there was no real government in 
Alaska, apart from a customs office under the jurisdiction of courts in California 
and Oregon. Civil, judicial, and land districts were established in Alaska in 1884, 
under the terms of the Alaska Organic Act. A governor was appointed by the 
president of the United States, and had the power to oversee the administration of 
the Act. By 1906, Alaska had the right to send a delegation of observers to the 
national capital, and in 1912, a second Organic Act was passed, formally making 
Alaska a territory of the United States, and permitting it to maintain its own 
legislature. Despite these decentralizing actions, Alaska was still subject to direct 
control by the federal government: its governor was appointed, and the actions of 
the legislature could be overturned by the United States Congress and courts. Over 
99 percent of the land was owned by the federal government (Morehouse, 1984). 
American perceptions of Alaska changed in the late nineteenth century with 
a series of gold rushes beginning in 1880 in Juneau and followed by similar 
discoveries in other parts of the territory. The largest and most influential of these 
rushes took place on the Yukon River in and after 1896, concurrent with the 
Klondike discoveries further upstream in Canada. This gold rush increased the 
state’s population, and Alaska now came to be portrayed as a land of wealth and 
opportunity (Sundborg, 1946). Gold production declined after 1914 and the 
territory’s population declined with it. Another major event in Alaska’s history was 
World War II and its impact on the American government’s recognition of 
Alaska’s strategic global position. The Japanese invasion and occupation of some 
of the Aleutian Islands during the war prompted increased militarization of the 
territory in the post-war years, along with increased federal spending on 
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infrastructure such as port facilities, highways, and airstrips. The Alaska Highway 
was built, connecting the territory with the 48 conterminous states (through 
Canada) and the United States government gave greater attention to Alaska’s 
position just across the Bering Sea from the Soviet Union. 
 Independence and decolonisation have been major themes in Alaska history 
(McBeath and Morehouse, 1994, 2). During the early twentieth century, Alaska 
Territory made increasing demands for greater decentralization, and even 
statehood. After several failed attempts, Alaska became the 49th state of the United 
States in 1959. Under the statehood act, Alaska was allowed to select about 27% of 
federal lands that would be conveyed to the new state and become state lands. The 
state government selected lands based largely on their location and economic 
importance and chose mainly parcels near urban areas, along roads and railways, 
and areas, such as the North Slope, that had resource potential. 
 At the time of statehood, Alaska’s secondary and tertiary economic sectors 
were limited or nonexistent; resources were exploited for the benefit of outside 
regions, and there was little local input into decision making. In both the political 
sense (absence of local authority and control) and the economic sense (an 
unbalanced resource economy exploited for the benefit of outside interests), Alaska 
maintained a colonial relationship with the rest of the United States. Statehood 
permitted the independent development of Alaska, and the oil discoveries of 1968 
provided potential local capital for development. 
 
2.  ALASKA POLITICAL ECONOMY 
In many respects, Alaska still has a frontier economy, little changed from colonial 
and territorial days. The non-Native Alaska economy has historically been 
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characterized by a series of resource booms: Russian exploitation of the sea otter 
was followed by gold rushes, then by military investment and basing, and then by 
petroleum extraction.3 
 
2.1  The politics of oil 
Oil was first discovered in Alaska on the Kenai Peninsula, south of Anchorage, in 
1957. As this discovery was during the period of territorial administration, the 
resource was on federal land. Nevertheless, the United States government 
negotiated a revenue-sharing provision under which Alaska receives 90 percent of 
royalties, with the federal government receiving only 10 percent. This revenue-
sharing provision differs from that of the other 49 states. The Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 19204 provided for revenue sharing from mineral resource 
extraction on federal lands, with the states receiving 37.5 percent of revenues and 
the federal government receiving 62.5 percent. The Act also specified the uses to 
which the states could put these revenues. In 1976 the revenue-sharing formula 
was revised by the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 19765 and the Federal 
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975.6 Despite the earlier legislation, Alaska was 
granted a special concession, and the later acts did not alter the situation, nor did 
they bring the other states up to parity with Alaska. Congress argued that such a 
provision, which differs from the revenue-sharing provisions of other states, was 
                                                     
3 Interview with George Rogers, Professor of Economics, University of Alaska Southeast, Juneau, 
1990. 
4 U.S. Congress, Public Law 66-146. 
5 U.S. Congress, Public Law 94-579. The act is more commonly known as the Bureau of Land 
Management Organic Act. 
6 U.S. Congress, Public Law 94-377. 
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necessary as Alaska was a remote, developing hinterland and in need of resource 
revenue: ‘this federal mineral revenue-sharing was to be the crutch with which the 
state could financially walk’ (Bradner, 1987, 5). 
 Alaska’s major oil discovery came eleven years later, in 1968, when a 
supergiant oil field was discovered at Prudhoe Bay, in the far northern part of the 
state known as the North Slope. This discovery was on state land, meaning that the 
state alone would receive the resource royalties. The Prudhoe Bay field is the 
largest in the United States, and Alaska is now among the largest oil-producing 
states in the country. 
 Alaska has much in common with many oil-producing nations. Indeed, in 
many respects Alaska is more similar to oil-producing nations than it is to other 
oil-producing states in the United States: 
 
Oil and gas production had had a radically different place in Alaska’s economy 
from the one it occupied in other major oil-producing states of the United States, 
and is having a more crucial influence on its development. Alaska resembles 
Kuwait or Libya more than it does Texas, Louisiana, or Oklahoma, both in the 
prominence of petroleum in the total economy and in the way in which its 
economic influence is exercised -- through government royalties and taxes on the 
oil industry, rather than through private-sector wages and salaries, profits, or the 
royalties of private landowners. Oil revenues made up almost all the State of 
Alaska’s general revenues in the early 1980s (Tussing, 1984, 53). 
 
Petroleum-based economies or petro-states, like Alaska, are, as a whole, subject to 
a greater degree of boom and bust than hard-rock mineral economies (Karl, 1997). 
Alaska has grown increasingly reliant on petroleum exports. Even before the bust 
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years of the 1980s, Alaska experts warned about petroleum dependence: 
 
Many Americans think that [Alaska] is already rich, when in fact it is less fiscally 
sound than before oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay. In 1960, 98 percent of the 
state’s current operating budget (unrestricted General Fund) of $28 million was 
coming from recurring sources, mainly income taxes. By fiscal year 1978 the total 
General Fund budget had risen to just under $800 million ... spending much more 
per capita on government services than was coming in from taxes. Sixty-one 
percent of the unrestricted General Fund budget was coming from non-recurring 
sources (Weeden, 1978, 146). 
 
In Fiscal Year 1969, just prior to the year in which Prudhoe Bay revenues would 
enter the budget, Alaska had a budget of $245 million. As former state legislator 
Mike Bradner noted: 
 
There was a meager capital budget, and a meager loans budget that annually 
received appropriations and which annually ran out of money. The state had 7,756 
employees, a monthly payroll cost of $5.9 million, and the average monthly state 
salary was $760. In 1968 state debt service was only $7.8 million on a debt of $90 
million, for a state debt of $357 per person (Bradner, 1987, 5). 
 
Capital spending prior to the Prudhoe Bay windfall was almost entirely through 
state general obligation bonds, and occasionally from revenue bond ‘lease-back’ 
financing through Alaska State Housing Authority. In 1968 the general bond issue 
was $62.7 million, of which $55 million was for education (Bradner, 1987, 5). 
Sources of funding for state non-capital expenditures included state income tax, 
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state gross business taxes, and state corporate taxes, while the source of funding for 
local communities was from sales and property taxes. Before the oil boom years 
the state relied almost totally on taxation as a source of revenue.  
 Petroleum revenues also affected the role of the state in Alaska society. As 
Alaska grew flush with petro-dollars, the state decided to forego more reliable 
sources of income, such as taxes. Hence the state has grown larger, but has become 
increasingly dependent on a single source of income—a source that will ultimately 
be depleted. The state lowers taxes, yet it funds more programs. These actions 
generate a certain set of expectations in the population, such as expectations 
concerning the state’s role in funding and subsidizing development and social 
programs (Young, 1992, 142-158). When resource revenues begin to decline, it 
will be difficult for the state government to convince the population that it can no 
longer afford such programs, and that taxes must be increased or reintroduced.  
 
2.2  Oil and the colonial complaint 
Political economy in Alaska has always been characterized by struggles over 
natural resources and their development. The state has an economic history 
resembling that of the western states such as Montana or Wyoming (Brown and 
Thomas, 1994). Many western states perceive themselves to exist within a colonial 
relationship with the federal government, a perception that historian Gene Gressley 
called the ‘colonial complaint’ (Gressley, 1963). Western states protest the still 
substantial federal ownership of lands within the West and the ability of the federal 
government to restrict access to the resources on them and prevent state 
governments from using or taxing these lands. As Gressley (1963) noted, western 
states have ‘a long tradition of protest against economic and cultural exploitation 
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by the East’, a tradition that parallels the western alienation imaginary in Canada. 
Western protest often assumes the form of challenges against what is perceived as 
federal efforts to restrict access to natural resources within state boundaries, such 
as the ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ of the 1970s and 1980s (Cawley, 1993).  
 Resource control struggles in Alaska intensified after the discovery of the 
Prudhoe Bay oilfield in 1968. State-owned petroleum had the potential to distort 
the existing political economy by introducing substantial new economic rents into 
the state (into both state and private hands). Moreover, the presence and eventual 
domination by an oil elite—which itself was well integrated with the outside oil 
community—shifted the balance of power within the state and also posed new 
questions about the pace of development and the future of Alaska. The state would 
now have its own revenues and would become less dependent on federal financing, 
and the need for access to federal lands would diminish with new wealth flowing 
into state coffers. 
 Alaska's Prudhoe Bay petroleum discoveries in 1968 forced the state to 
confront the issue of oil wealth management. The first proceeds from this oil field 
were received on 10 September 1969 by the state from the sale of exploration 
leases on the North Slope. The total sum was $900,041,605.34,7 and Governor 
Keith Miller urged that it be saved and invested in treasury bills and other quality 
securities (Kasson, 1983). The amount received from lease sales was nothing short 
of overwhelming, as the state budget for 1969, when the lease money was 
received, was less than $200 million (Brown and Thomas, 1994). The state 
legislature accepted the separate management of the funds, but proceeded 
                                                     
7 This sum soon became part of Alaskan economic folklore as the ‘fabled $900 million’ that began 
the oil boom years (Interview with James B. Rhode, Assistant to the Governor, Juneau, 1988). 
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immediately to spend $36.4 million on capital improvements, such as roads, 
ferries, docks, and airports (Rhode, n.d.). The remainder of the lease money was 
spent on recurring expenditures and on various projects within the next few years. 
What was impressed upon the general public was the rapidity with which the state 
could spend such a large sum.8 
 
3.  ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND 
The Alaska Permanent Fund began as a response to the windfall oil wealth flowing 
into state coffers. Shortly after the receipt of the oil lease funds, various groups in 
the state—including the business community, members of the general public, and 
the state legislature—began to advocate some mechanism to administer at least 
part of the state's oil revenues (Helgath and Bibb, 1986, Goldsmith, 1980). In 1969 
the state government sponsored a series of seminars held at the Brookings Institute 
to assess management options. These seminars recommended that the revenues be 
spent on worthwhile projects that would contribute to the welfare of all Alaskans 
(Kasson, 1983; Alaska Information Service, 1980). 
 Alternative proposals to spending state revenues were being bandied about 
at around the same time. In 1969 Robert Krantz, of the investment firm Kidder, 
Peabody, gave a speech to the Alaska Chamber of Commerce in which he 
recommended a trust fund in which the principal would remain untouched but the 
earnings could be spent by the state legislature (Kasson, 1983; Goldsmith, 1981). 
At about the same time, Governor Keith Miller (Republican) proposed a savings 
trust fund, which he called the Alaska Permanent Resources Fund, but this 
                                                     
8 Interview with James B. Rhode, Juneau, 1988; and Rhode (n.d.). 
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proposal did not receive legislative support (Alaska Department of Revenue, 1984, 
5). Various further bills were introduced into the legislature calling for different 
kinds of funds, but it was the 1975 bill9 creating a permanent fund that was passed 
by the legislature and formed the legal basis for a state trust fund. Though the 1975 
bill passed both houses of the state legislature, it was vetoed by Republican 
Governor Jay Hammond (himself an advocate of the fund, see Hammond, 1994) 
on the grounds that the Alaska State Constitution prohibited dedicated funds:  
 
Constitution of Alaska, Title IX, Section 7. Dedicated Funds. The proceeds of any 
state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose, except as 
provided in section 15 of this article or when required by the federal government 
for state participation in federal programs. This provision shall not prohibit the 
continuance of any dedication for special purposes existing upon the date of 
ratification of this section by the people of Alaska. 
 
A constitutional amendment was required to establish a dedicated fund. Hammond 
wanted a fund with dedicated revenues, rather than one with appropriations from 
the general fund from time to time, in order to guarantee permanence to the fund 
and to ensure that it would receive deposits in all years (the fund proposed by 
Governor Miller was not a dedicated fund, but required periodic appropriations 
from the general fund). If resource revenues were deposited into the fund by the 
state legislature whenever it felt it could do so, then politicians could divert those 
funds to other ends and the permanent fund would not grow. Hammond therefore 
suggested amending the constitution in order to permit dedicated funds 
                                                     
9 CSHB 324 am S. 
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(Hammond, 1994). The constitutional amendment proposed by Hammond was 
approved by the voters in 1976, and in that year (on 2 November) the Alaska 
Permanent Fund (APF) was established: 
 
Constitution of Alaska, Title IX, Section 15. Alaska Permanent Fund. At least 
twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, 
federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received by the State shall 
be placed in a permanent fund, the principal of which shall be used only for those 
income-producing investments specifically designated by law as eligible for 
permanent fund investments. All income from the permanent fund shall be 
deposited in the general fund unless otherwise provided by law. 
 
The establishment of the APF appeared to represent a general consensus on the 
need to save part of Alaska's petroleum wealth (Helgath and Bibb, 1986). As 
commentators noted, the establishment of the fund was based on three arguments: 
saving resource revenues for the future, acting as a restraint on government 
spending, and the generation of earnings to supplement resource revenues (Brown 
and Thomas, 1994). These arguments received public support, furthered by the 
notion that the other 75% of revenues not dedicated to the trust fund could be used 
in other ways. 
 That a savings fund (as opposed to both direct distribution of resource 
revenues or depositing their entirety into the general fund) was proposed and 
accepted by a majority of Alaskan politicians is itself worthy of comment. Brown 
and Thomas note that a dedicated fund was ‘inconsistent with the kind of market-
oriented, laissez-faire economics often espoused by Hammond and his advisors’ 
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because the market solution would be to distribute all revenues to residents directly 
(1994, 42). These authors suggest that the high geographic mobility of Alaskans 
diminishes their time horizons (as many current residents would eventually leave 
the state) therefore making direct distribution inappropriate. Residents would cash 
in during boom years and then depart during busts. Forced savings through a trust 
fund would avoid this problem.10 
 Once constitutional restrictions were removed and the fund was in place, 
Alaskans began to address the issue of what type of fund would be established 
(Alaska Information Service, 1980). Consultants from both within and outside the 
state, in addition to state politicians and business and citizen groups, proposed a 
number of different forms that the APF could take. Proposals for the fund began 
almost immediately. In 1976, Robert Richards of Alaska Pacific Bank authored a 
working paper that suggested three possible uses for permanent fund capital: 
social, economic, and fiscal (Kasson, 1983). The social use would augment the 
welfare of society by assisting low-income Alaskans through subsidies, and would 
also assist poorer communities, usually those in rural areas, through direct 
transfers. An economic use would support Alaskan businesses through subsidies to 
encourage expansion and diversification of the state’s economy. The fiscal use 
would save resource revenues and invest these to generate income for future use. 
 Richards’s working paper outlined three strategies for the use of fund 
capital. Each of these strategies had its own advocates and different advisors, 
                                                     
10 Brown and Thomas also observe that while a savings fund makes economic sense, it does not 
make political sense, because ‘forced savings are being allocated to future generations who cannot 
vote for current politicians’ (1994, 42). This leads them to add that ‘either the politicians who 
supported the Permanent Fund were unaware of this point, or they exhibited a measure of altruism 
not often seen in American politics’ (1994, 42). 
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legislators, and members of the business community and general public supported 
each of them to some extent. In order to resolve these competing strategies, 
Governor Hammond expanded the State Investment Advisory Committee (SIAC) 
and asked it to explore possible uses for fund capital (Kasson, 1983). The SIAC at 
first recommended an economic development orientation for the fund. Yet after 
independent consultants were called in to give fresh perspectives this support 
began to shift. The House Special Committee on the Permanent Fund also held 
hearings in many Alaska communities to assess public views on the fund. The 
results were included in testimony before the state legislature (see Gruening, n.d.). 
 
The economic development proposal 
Proponents of the economic development function viewed the fund as a 
development bank that would finance economic expansion in Alaska. Proponents 
included the SIAC, the Alaska State Senate, the Alaska Department of Revenue, 
and the Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, as well as 
much of the private financial and resource extractive sector and many rural 
residents. Rural residents in particular wanted support for housing, for rural 
infrastructural projects such as power generation, and for assistance with 
renewable resource development such as fisheries and agriculture. These groups 
supported an economic development objective because they expected the fund to 
make subsidised loans and other support available to private enterprises that would 
promote economic growth. Some projects envisioned by this faction included 
permanent fund financing of public utilities, political subdivisions of the state, and 
private investment projects (Helgath and Bibb, 1986; Goldsmith, 1981, 1984).   
 Support for an economic development objective for the fund was based on 
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the perception that there was a capital shortage in Alaska, which prevented capital 
from reaching private industry and rural residents. This perspective was essentially 
based on the mainstream conception of development, which argues that capital 
flows from core to periphery will alleviate local capital shortages and stimulate 
economic development. It is therefore unsurprising that it was supported by the 
private sector and government departments responsible for the state’s economic 
growth. Support for this perspective diminished, however, after a number of 
internal and external consultants argued that structural issues, rather than capital 
shortages, were the cause of insufficient investment in the private sector and rural 
areas. These consultants included Nobel prize-winning economists Milton 
Friedman and Kenneth Arrow, Alaskan economists Arlon Tussing and George 
Rogers, Harvard planner Beldon Daniels, and heavyweight financial advisory firms 
such as Kidder Peabody and Price Waterhouse, among many others. Tussing 
(1977), for example, noted that capital markets were working in Alaska and that 
revisions to the state’s regulatory and taxation policies would be far more effective 
in promoting development than would government financing of development 
projects. Other consultants agreed with these views. They also pointed out that the 
revenues flowing into the state’s general fund could be used to support 
development objectives, and that the trust fund was not the best mechanism for this 
purpose. 
 Although initially well supported, this vision of the APF was not successful 
because, after consultant recommendations, a general consensus11 agreed that the 
                                                     
11 The two main early histories of the Permanent Fund, Kasson (1983) and Helgath and Bibb 
(1986), both speak of a ‘general consensus’ in very broad terms. I draw upon these two well-
researched histories for much of this section. 
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lack of capital was not responsible for the slow rate of development, and that such 
investments would only benefit an elite, and not the public at large (Helgath and 
Bibb, 1986). Furthermore, development funds were available from state sources 
external to the permanent fund. In essence, the consultants had convinced 
supporters of the economic development objective that state-directed and -financed 
development, including economic diversification, would not be in the best interests 
of the state and that private financial markets were adequate to the task.12 
 
The social welfare proposal 
Another proposal for permanent fund management might be termed the ‘social 
welfare’ proposal. This proposal, which counted Governor Hammond among its 
supporters, concerned itself with the disposition of fund earnings rather than with 
the details of how fund principal was invested. Hammond’s proposal for a program 
that he called ‘Alaska, Inc.’ viewed the state as something like a corporation, with 
each resident as a shareholder. The principal of the fund was to be held in 
common, with the earnings distributed to each shareholder/resident. Such a 
program was both individualistic, in that it allowed residents to spend their share as 
they wished, and also egalitarian, in that it distributed fund earnings to all Alaskans 
equally and not just to certain special groups (like rural residents or private 
resource firms). The overarching idea was that public wealth should be directly 
distributed to the public. Rather than the state paternally making decisions for the 
collective use of this wealth, each individual Alaskan would make his or her own 
investment decision. As in Adam Smith’s vision of the ‘invisible hand’, the 
                                                     
12 Alberta’s fund, discussed in the previous chapter, is an example of a fund with a primarily 
economic development purpose. 
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investment decisions of individuals working in their own interest would ultimately 
lead to improvements in collective welfare. 
 Despite the backing of both Governor Hammond and economist Milton 
Friedman, this notion of the APF as a social reform mechanism was ultimately 
rejected by the legislature based on arguments that social reform was best handled 
through open government and not the APF, and that social objectives and 
performance could not be easily measured, compared to financial ones. Some 
analysts also expressed concerns that individuals would misallocate their share into 
non-productive and wasteful activities, that capital would leave the state, and that 
more people would settle in Alaska and dilute the effect of individual payments 
(Rhode, 1978; Groh, 1997). Nevertheless, the ‘Alaska, Inc.’ idea did not fully die 
and it re-emerged several years later in the form of the APF dividend program 
(discussed later). 
 
The savings proposal 
The ultimately successful proposal for the APF envisioned the fund as a savings 
instrument and a true ‘trust’ fund (Helgath and Bibb, 1986). Such a proposal 
reached a wide consensus because it removed fund principal and earnings from the 
influence of special interests, and because it guaranteed a source of finance for 
many years into the future, when Alaska's petroleum revenues would decline. In 
some respects, the victory of the savings approach represents a protest on the part 
of the public against the perceived extravagant spending habits of state politicians 
(Rhode, 1978).13 The savings perspective also denied access to funds to all groups 
                                                     
13 Also interview with James B. Rhode, Juneau, 1988. 
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equally, and no special interest group could feel that they were being denied access 
to state revenues while others had access to them. Thus the savings perspective, 
unlike the economic development one, was perceived as highly egalitarian. 
 The principal economic merit of the savings perspective is that it would use 
resource revenues to generate earnings through portfolio investment, and that these 
trust fund earnings would eventually become substantial enough to augment, and 
later to exceed, revenues from resource extraction. An additional economic 
argument in favour of a savings approach is that saving at least a portion of 
resource revenues prevents these from entering the state’s economy with potential 
distortionary effects such as Dutch Disease. Savings would ‘sterilise’ a portion of 
resource revenues, limiting the adverse effects of a massive injection of new 
capital into the Alaska economy (see Chapter 2). Finally, saving a portion of 
resource revenues would extend resource benefits to future generations. While 
politicians and current residents would not themselves benefit from these saved 
revenues, their children and grandchildren would. 
 As Helgath and Bibb note, ‘at the conclusion of two years of debate and 
public hearings the legislature chose very clearly the “fiscal objective” as 
appropriate for the Permanent Fund’ (1986, 23). A clinching argument for the 
victory of this perspective was that funds for economic development purposes were 
nonetheless available from the bulk of oil revenues that continued to flow into the 
state’s general fund.14 Thus, in a sense, the state could have a savings-oriented 
trust fund and money for economic development at the same time (and with
introduction of the dividend program in 1982 it would have all three proposals). 
 the 
                                                     
14 Interview with Hugh Malone, former Speaker of the Alaska State Legislature, Commissioner of 
the Alaska Department of Revenue, and Permanent Fund Trustee, Juneau, 1988. 
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Alaska now had a trust fund backed by widespread legislative, industry, and public 
support. This perspective on the fund was codified by the 1980 Permanent Fund 
Act15 and by amendments to it in 1982. 
 
4.  FUND OPERATIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND INVESTMENT 
The Alaska Permanent Fund’s governance, investment, and earnings distribution 
policies differ substantially from those of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
discussed in the previous chapter (and are much more like the funds of Oceania, 
discussed in the next chapter). Alaska’s fund is separated from direct control by the 
state’s governor and legislature and it is subject to constitutional protections and 
restrictions. The fund’s investments are located mainly outside of the state in both 
other American states and internationally, and the asset mix is much more diverse. 
Finally, the APF distributes part of its earnings directly to its beneficiaries in the 
form of dividends. In pursuing such policies, Alaska’s fund more closely 
approximates the alternative model of economic development through a trust fund 
that I set out in Chapter 1. Alaska’s fund offsets the state’s peripheral geography 
by investing its capital in the financial centres of the core; the state’s resource-
generated capital flows from the periphery into core economies, where investment 
returns are potentially greater (and with reduced risk). Each of these issues is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 
4.1  Fund governance 
The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, to give it its full name, is a ‘separate and 
                                                     
15 Alaska Statute AS 37.13. 
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independent instrumentality of the state’ (Alaska Permanent Fund, An Alaskan’s 
guide to the Permanent Fund, various years) and an incorporated body that is part 
trust and part corporation. As Warrack and Keddie (2002) observe, this means that 
the state’s saving and investment function is separated from its spending function. 
While the state legislature makes decisions about spending state funds, the bulk of 
the state’s investment decisions are made outside the legislature and through the 
APF. Once placed in the APF, fund capital becomes inviolable and cannot be 
removed or expended by the state (except by constitutional amendment). Only the 
earnings generated by the fund can be spent and there are restrictions on this as 
well (see below). 
 
Management 
The fund is managed by a board of six trustees, who are responsible for broad 
investment policy decisions. These six trustees are appointed by the governor and 
serve four-year terms. Of the six, one trustee is the Alaska Commissioner of 
Revenue, and another is a member of the state executive cabinet. These two 
members serve as liaisons between the state’s executive branch and the fund. The 
remaining four trustees are drawn from the public at large (usually meaning the 
private sector), and must have demonstrated experience in financial management. 
They are often executives from state businesses (including small businesses), 
bankers or financial consultants, or directors of Alaska Native regional 
corporations.16 Trustees are not salaried, but do receive a small honorarium for 
                                                     
16 Interviews with Byron I. Mallot, President, Sealaska Corporation, and later Executive Director, 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, Juneau, 1988; and with Charlie Parr, Permanent Fund 
Trustee, Fairbanks, 1987. 
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each meeting attended.17 
 The fund also employs an executive director, who is a full-time, salaried 
employee and is hired based on financial management experience at a salary 
comparable to a corporate executive in the private sector. A full-time, salaried staff 
of 30 assists the executive director in carrying out the day-to-day operations of the 
fund. More specific investment decisions are outsourced to a number of private 
investment firms, based out of state, who directly manage the APF’s portfolio.18 
The fund thus has three levels of governance: trustees, who make broad policy 
decisions; the executive director and APF staff, who manage operations; and 
investment consultants, who carry out investment transactions in accordance with 
the APF’s guidelines.  
 
Accountability and transparency 
The APF is managed in a very transparent fashion. The fund holds an annual 
meeting that is open to the public, at which any Alaska resident may ask questions 
of the trustees, fund staff, and representatives from investment advisory firms. 
These annual meetings rotate in location to various parts of the state. Other 
meetings of the Board of Trustees are held throughout the year, and most portions 
of these are likewise open to the public. Often these meetings take place in smaller 
and more remote communities. This open style of management allows for a great 
deal of citizen participation.19 
                                                     
17 Interviews with David Rose, Executive Director, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, Juneau, 
1988 and 1990. 
18 Interviews with David Rose, Juneau, 1988 and 1990; and with Jim Kelly, Research and Liaison 
Officer, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, Juneau, 1988. 
19 I attended the Fund’s annual meetings in 1988 and 1990, and made a formal presentation to the 
Board of Trustees at the 1990 meeting. 
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 The fund publishes an annual report and quarterly reports that are available 
on request. These reports provide full disclosure of fund income and assets in two 
parts. The first part of each report summarises fund performance in language that 
can be understood by the general public, and includes a number of simple charts 
and diagrams illustrating fund performance and transactions. The second part of 
the reports consists of audited (by a private accounting firm) financial statements 
including statements of income and loss and balance sheets with fund management 
commentary appended. These reports are in accordance with the Government 
Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34). 
 In addition to the public availability of financial reports and public 
participation in Board of Trustees meetings, the APF has embarked on an extensive 
public relations campaign that helps to explain the fund and its purpose to the 
public.20 For example, summaries of the fund’s operations are included with the 
dividend cheque that each beneficiary receives. The fund also publishes annually a 
short guide entitled An Alaskan’s guide to the Permanent Fund that further 
explains fund purposes and activities and situates the fund’s work in the context of 
the Alaska economy. Video programs about the fund are shown in secondary 
schools so that children are aware of the fund’s goals and performance. 
 Accountability for fund performance is addressed in several ways. Trustees, 
staff, and investment advisors are all held accountable for the fund’s performance. 
The public meetings and publicly-available financial statements noted above 
ensure that the fund’s beneficiaries are aware of what is going on. Auditing of the 
fund’s financial statements by an impartial, independent accounting firm also 
                                                     
20 Interview with Jim Kelly, Juneau, 1988. 
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serves to hold fund trustees and staff accountable. The dividend program is yet 
another means of ensuring accountability. As the part of the APF that each 
beneficiary is most aware of, the amount of the annual dividend acts as a kind of 
bellwether of the fund’s performance. Beneficiaries will certainly wonder why 
their dividend is lower than in the preceding year, or if it is not as large as 
expected. If the amount of the dividend is not to their liking, fund beneficiaries will 
demand explanations from all those involved in the fund’s operations.21 
 
4.2  Generation of fund capital 
As in the other trust funds discussed in this thesis, the Alaska Permanent Fund 
derives the bulk of its capital from revenues flowing from windfall resources. 
Alaska’s massive oil discoveries, discussed above, provided a new source of 
income for the state. As noted in the earlier discussion, Alaskans debated the 
possibilities for the use of these revenues, and determined to save a portion of them 
in a trust fund to be managed for long-term income generation. The general 
structure of fund management is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 The constitutional amendment (to the state constitution) that allowed the 
Alaska Permanent Fund to be created (Title IX, Section 15) specified that at least 
25% of all mineral revenues (lease rentals, royalties, federal revenue sharing 
payments, and bonuses) be placed in the Permanent Fund. Remaining revenues 
would go into the state’s general fund. In 1980, with oil money flowing in and oil 
prices high, the state elected to deposit 50% of mineral-based revenues (mainly 
from petroleum) into the APF. This alteration to the percentage of revenue flowing 
                                                     
21 Interviews with David Rose, Juneau, 1988, 1990. 
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into the fund was by legislative directive, but it has remained in force and since 
1980 the APF has received half of the state’s mineral-derived revenues. These 
recurring, constitutionally-required deposits are known as ‘dedicated revenues’. 
inflation 
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50% 
50% 
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Account 
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Alaska  
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Fund Resource 
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Figure 5.1.  Alaska Permanent Fund structure 
The solid lines indicate legally-mandated transfers and dotted lines indicate  
transfers made at the discretion of the state legislature. 
  
 Table 5.1 shows the amount of dedicated revenues flowing into the fund 
since its inception. The table shows that since 1977, when the first dedicated 
revenues entered the fund, a total of approximately $7,707,000,000 has been 
deposited into the fund as dedicated revenues, representing (since 1980) half of the 
state’s oil revenues. 
 Dedicated revenues are the principal, but not only, source of fund capital. 
Periodically the state legislature has voted to deposit additional sums into the fund 
(these are known as legislative appropriations). In doing so, they remove these 
funds from their control, as once deposited into the APF they cannot be removed or 
expended by the legislature (it is a remarkable case of politicians removing money 
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from their own hands). These appropriations have taken place mainly in years of 
budget surpluses, which typically occur when global oil prices are high. Some 
appropriations have also been made when particular or special sums have been 
received, such as from the sale of new oil drilling leases. Since the fund’s inception 
a total of about $7,390,000,000 has been deposited into the fund by legislative 
appropriations (see Table 5.1). 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Transfers 
from GRF 
Dedicated 
Revenues 
Inflation 
Proofing 
Fund 
Equity 
     
1977/78 $54 $54 
1978/79 84 139 
1979/80 344 483 
1980/81 900 385 1769 
1981/82 800 400 2969 
1982/83 400 421 231 4021 
1983/84 300 366 151 4838 
1984/85 300 368 235 5741 
1985/86 323 216 6281 
1986/87 1264 171 148 7864 
1987/88 418 303 8585 
1988/89 228 360 9173 
1989/90 267 454 9894 
1990/91 435 559 10,888 
1991/92 338 477 11,703 
1992/93 5 315 362 12,385 
1993/94 6 210 372 12,973 
1994/95 6 318 348 13,645 
1995/96 1861 264 407 16,205 
1996/97 829 308 486 17,828 
1997/98 35 230 423 18,516 
1998/99 41 155 288 19,001 
1999/2000 281 310 423 20,015 
2000/01 8 339 686 21,048 
2001/02 258 602 23,525 
2002/03 354 398 352 24,194 
  
Total $7390 $7707 $7883 N/A 
 
Table 5.1.  APF sources of capital and fund equity, 1977-2003, in US$ millions 
Source: calculated from APF Annual reports, various years. 
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 A third major source of fund capital is ‘inflation-proofing’. The fund is 
required by law to maintain the real (as opposed to the nominal) value of its assets. 
Each year, the fund transfers a portion of its earnings back into the fund corpus, 
where it becomes inviolable. This amount is calculated based on a formula, and 
generally averages the past five years of the United States inflation rate (based on a 
federally calculated cost of living index). Throughout the history of the fund, an 
average of about two-thirds of the fund’s earnings have been redeposited as 
inflation-proofing.22 The total amount since 1982 (when the provisions entered 
into force) has been about $7,883,000,000. Inflation-proofing has been the larges
of the three main sources of fund capital (although not by a significant margin
accounting for a little over one-third of fund capital (dedicated revenues and 
legislative appropriations each also account for about one-third of fund capital, see 
Table 5.1). The amount of inflation-proofing relative to total income and to 
dividends is shown in Table 5.2. 
t 
), 
                                                     
 A final source of fund capital is private contributions. As these are 
insignificant when compared to other sources, they do not appear in the table. Yet 
it is important to note that some beneficiaries chose to forgo their dividend and 
elect to have it deposited back into the fund. Though not significant in numbers, it 
is interesting to note that some beneficiaries refuse the dividend and decide to have 
it revert to public purposes. 
22 In 2002 the Board of Trustees proposed that the constitution be amended to limit the fund’s 
payout to no more than 5%, limiting the dividend to the fund’s real (as opposed to nominal) 
earnings. The Board projected average annual earnings of 8% and average annual inflation of 3%, 
resulting in the 5% figure, which the Board deems sustainable. (Their arguments are presented in 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2002). The proposal was backed by former Governor Jay 
Hammond and by many Alaskan citizens, as represented in the editorial pages of the Anchorage 
Daily News. 
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Fiscal Year Net Income 
(Loss) 
Dividends Inflation 
Proofing 
General 
Fund 
Reserves 
Balance 
      
1977/78 $2 $1 
1978/79 8 7 
1979/80 32 12 12 
1980/81 150 28 28 59
1981/82 368 71 71 244
1982/83 471 108 231 110 354
1983/84 530 175 151  557
1984/85 658 217 235  763
1985/86 1021 303 216  1264
1986/87 1069 391 148  529
1987/88 789 424 303  591
1988/89 868 460 360 4 635
1989/90 916 487 454 4 605
1990/91 1030 489 559 4 581
1991/92 1036 488 477 5 645
1992/93 1226 532 362 5 965
1993/94 1098 556 372 11 1117
1994/95 1012 565 348 8 1203
1995/96 1814 643 407 1 104
1996/97 3149 747 486 1 107
1997/98 3435 893 423 1 1383
1998/99 2148 1045 288 3 2590
1999/2000 2249 1172 423 3 2972
2000/01 (884) 1113 686 4 1384
2001/02 (579) 930 602  1136
2002/03 999 691 352 4 100
  
Total $24,615 $12,540 $7883 $287 N/A
 
Table 5.2.  APF income and expenditure, 1977-2003, in $ millions 
Source: calculated from APF Annual reports, various years. 
 
The APF has three primary sources of capital: recurring dedicated revenues 
deriving directly from the state’s oil wealth, legislative appropriations that are 
periodic transfers from the state’s general fund into the APF, and inflation-
proofing from fund earnings in order to protect the real value of the fund. Each of 
these has accounted for approximately one-third of total fund capital since the 
fund’s inception. The first of these is required under the state constitution, the last 
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under state legislation. Only legislative appropriations are not legally required and 
represent a legislative consensus to transfer additional sums from the general fund 
into the Permanent Fund. 
 
4.3  Geographies of fund asset distribution 
The Alaska Permanent Fund’s investments are distinguished by being held almost 
entirely outside the state. I explore two aspects of fund investment policy: the 
fund’s asset mix, and the geographies of asset location. Before exploring each of 
these it is necessary to say something about the fund’s organisational structure. 
 The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation consists of two separate accounts. 
The primary one of these is the Alaska Permanent Fund, and the secondary one is 
the Realized Earnings Account (REA) (formerly known as the Earnings Reserve 
Account). The former is the corpus of the fund and its principal is inviolable, 
meaning that it cannot be expended by the legislature. The latter is a much smaller 
account that holds realised but unexpended earnings (See Figure 5.1). Earnings 
generated by the APF’s investments are placed into the REA to await their 
distribution, whether by constitutional mandate or by legislative decision. There 
are three potential destinations for fund earnings. One of these is inflation-
proofing, required by law. The second is the payment of dividends to fund 
beneficiaries (discussed later). The third is the transfer of fund earnings into the 
state’s general fund, usually in small amounts to cover administrative costs. The 
APF and the REA remain as separate accounts, but their investments are 
comingled, and there is really no separation of these assets for accounting 
purposes. In the following discussion it should be understood that I am referring to 
the assets of the two accounts together. Table 5.2 shows the two account balances, 
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about $24,615,000,000 for the APF, and about $100,000,000 for the REA. The 
latter is tiny when compared to the former. 
 
Fund asset mix 
The APF’s assets are divided into three general classes: fixed income investments 
(such as bonds and treasury bills), equities (mainly shares in private corporations), 
and real estate (both Real Estate Investment Trusts and direct holdings). Table 5.3 
illustrates the percentage of holdings in each class for the years 2003, 1993, and 
1983. 
 
Year Actual Asset Mix 
(book values) 2003 1993 1983 
    
Fixed Income 41% 69% 87% 
Equities  
     (United States 68%) 77%) 100%) 
     (Other 32%) 23%) 0%) 
     Total 51% 24% 11% 
Real Estate 8% 7% 2% 
  
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 5.3  APF assets by actual asset mix, in percent 
Source: calculated from APF Annual reports, various years. 
 
In 1983, less than ten years after the establishment of the fund and only three years 
after the 1980 legislation that stipulated investment policy, the fund carried the 
bulk of its investments, 87%, in fixed income securities, with 11% in (entirely 
United States) equities and only 2% in real estate. This division reflected a 
conservative investment philosophy in which safety was associated with fixed 
income securities and not with the more widely fluctuating prices of shares. 
 The fund has gradually shifted its investment mix towards a more balanced 
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portfolio and its exposure in equities has increased. In 1993 only 69% of 
investments were in fixed income securities, with equities rising to 24% and real 
estate to 7%. In the most recent year, 2003, fixed income securities represented 
only 41% of total fund assets while equities had increased to 51%, reflecting a 
more aggressive investment strategy and also faith in the rising American and 
global stock markets. In 2003 the share of real estate in the portfolio had risen to 
8%. The portfolio is diversified to take advantage of the best investment 
opportunities available, and to diversify the assets sufficiently as to reduce risk. 
Thus APF investments are not targeted toward assets with any particular 
connection to Alaska; they are merely those that are deemed the best available in 
global markets (in terms of balancing returns and risks).  
 Investments are equally diversified and balanced within each asset class. 
Within the fixed income portfolio, about 25% is invested in corporate bonds, about 
38% invested in United States treasury bills (considered to be among the most 
secure and conservative assets possible, as they are backed by the United States 
government), about 22% in mortgage-backed bonds, 12% in non-U.S. dollar 
denominated bonds, and 3% other.23 About 80% of investment decisions in this 
asset class are internally managed, with the remaining 20% externally managed 
(through four investment companies). The APF thus handles directly the majority 
of its fixed income asset transactions. The fund achieved a return of about 15.3% 
on these investments in 2003 (APF Annual report, 2003). 
 With respect to equities, the portfolio is diversified and balanced in a 
number of ways. The fund invests in both domestic and non-U.S. shares (discussed 
                                                     
23 Figures in this and subsequent sections are drawn from the Fund’s Annual reports and Quarterly 
reports, various years, unless otherwise indicated. 
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below). About 80% of the fund’s equities are in companies with a relatively large 
capitalisation (in other words, large corporations) with the remaining 20% in 
smaller firms. Equity assets are equally split between growth and value shares 
(between those whose income potential derives from appreciation in the price of 
the shares and those whose income derives substantially from earnings paid out as 
dividends). Portfolio management is about 58% active (trading to generate profit) 
and about 42% passive (holding for longer term appreciation in value). The sector 
allocation of the fund’s equity investments is as follows, in descending order of 
asset percentage: financials, information technology, health care, consumer 
discretionary, industrials, consumer staples, energy, materials, 
telecommunications, and utilities. Financials and information technology have 
been the stock market darlings of recent years, thus the fund’s heavy tilt towards 
them (about one-third of total share holdings). It should be noted that these sector 
allocations parallel very closely the benchmark allocations of both Standard and 
Poor’s 1500 Index and the Callan Associates CAI Large Cap Style Index.  
 The fund employs 24 investment companies to handle equities trading and 
the assets are held by custodian banks. The equity portfolio is extremely diversified 
in just about every way and is geared towards maximising returns while 
minimising risk in the overall portfolio (in accordance with Modern Portfolio 
Theory) (Alaska Permanent Fund, 1996). In 2003, equity investments returned 
only 0.25% on investment, reflecting poor stock market performances in that fiscal 
year. Long term averages have been much higher.  
 The final component of the fund’s assets is real estate. Real estate 
investments are held both through Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and 
through direct investments. In the APF, about 35% of real estate investments are in 
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the form of REITs and the remaining 65% in direct investments. Real estate 
investments are further diversified by being divided into industrial, office, 
residential, and retail properties. The fund has shares in 58 properties in 17 states 
and the District of Columbia, and these states are distributed throughout the 
Western, Midwestern, Southern, and Northeastern regions of the country. Only two 
investments are in the State of Alaska (in Juneau and Ketchikan). This asset class 
produced a return on investment of 9.1% in 2003. 
 Overall, fund assets have performed well. The ten-year rolling return on 
investment averages between 1985-1994 and 1994-2003 have varied between a 
high of 11.7% and a low of 7.8% for total returns, and between a high of 8.4% and 
a low of 5.3% for real returns adjusted for inflation. These returns compare 
favourably with standard industry benchmarks. 
 
Fund asset location 
The previous discussion has described the diverse and balanced portfolio of the 
Alaska Permanent Fund in terms of its distribution of asset classes. APF assets are 
also distributed geographically, and the fact that they are held largely outside the 
State of Alaska is a critical issue in assessing their role in the Permanent Fund’s 
strategy of pursuing the best investments regardless of location. I have noted in 
Chapter 1 that the flow of investment capital from periphery to core in order to 
seek the best investment returns is a development strategy worthy of consideration, 
and that the investment geographies of fund assets are of critical importance. The 
Alaska Permanent Fund follows that strategy by carrying almost the entirety of its 
assets outside the state. Table 5.4 shows the location of fund assets for 2003, 1993, 
and 1983. 
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Year Asset  
Location 2003 1993 1983 
    
Alaska 1% 4% 3% 
United States 80% 90% 97% 
Other 19% 6% 0% 
    
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 5.4  APF assets by asset location, in percent 
Source: calculated from APF Annual reports, various years. 
 
In 1983 the fund carried only 3% of its assets within the state, with the remaining 
97% being held elsewhere in the United States. The distribution was not much 
different for 1993, with 4% of assets held in Alaska, 90% elsewhere in the United 
States, and 6% overseas. In 2003, a mere 1% of fund assets were held in Alaska, 
with 80% being held in the rest of the United States and 19% globally. 
 Why has the Alaska Permanent Fund chosen to invest 99% of its assets 
outside the State of Alaska? In the discussion of the fund’s origins, I noted that 
Alaskans were in agreement about the fund’s need to avoid being dominated by 
local special interests. Any investment within the state could be perceived as 
favouring particular factions. In-state investment could also lead to rent-seeking, in 
which special interest groups compete for a share of the state’s assets and distribute 
them to themselves without increasing Alaska’s overall wealth or economic 
productivity (Anders, 1988). The Board of Trustees’ decision to invest offshore 
derives in part from the desire to avoid rent seeking in the state (see also Chapter 2 
for a discussion of rent-seeking). 
 The more important reason for the fund’s external investment is the fact 
that better investment returns, with lower risks, are available outside Alaska. As a 
peripheral economy highly dependent on the oil industry, Alaska has few 
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opportunities for profitable investment beyond the natural resources sector. As the 
Alaska Permanent Fund’s goal was to save and invest for the future, a future in 
which oil revenues would decline and in which the trust fund would become the 
primary revenue-generating entity in the state, it needed to pursue a policy of 
secure but profitable investment. Thus the state looked outside for such 
investments, especially to global financial and real estate markets. 
 The geography of the fund’s investment distribution is determined by the 
need to balance the portfolio to offset risk and to generate sustainable returns. The 
only assets held in-state are a small number of certificates of deposit held in 
several Alaskan banks, and two real estate properties. One of these is the building 
in Juneau in which the APF’s offices are located (the fund owns 100% of this 
building and thus avoids having to pay rent). The fund also holds a 13% 
investment in a retail centre in Ketchikan, an investment that was based entirely on 
its return potential and not on any need to direct investment towards that city. 
 The fund invests both in the United States (outside Alaska) and 
internationally. International investments consist of both fixed income and equity 
assets denominated in a number of currencies. Real estate is concentrated entirely 
within the United States. 
 Alaska residents have indicated little support for Alaska Permanent Fund 
investment in infrastructure or industrialisation. A 1998 town meeting survey 
found that only 31% of respondents agreed with the statement that the state ‘should 
invest Permanent Fund public wealth in commercial and industrial development to 
provide more jobs for Alaskans’, while 69% disagreed (Alaska Permanent Fund, 
1999; Doogan, 1998). Other analyses also support the maintenance of the current 
structure of the Permanent Fund (e.g., Piper, 1987; Rose, 1988; Smith, 1991). 
Chapter 5: Alaska  170 
 
4.4  Distribution of Earnings 
The Alaska Permanent Fund is characterised by a number of features that 
distinguish it from several of the other trust funds discussed in this thesis. One of 
its distinguishing characteristics is the fund’s substantial offshore investment 
portfolio geared towards generating commercial rates of return rather than 
providing collective social goods to beneficiaries. The other, even more distinctive, 
feature is the use and distribution of Permanent Fund earnings. The APF pays out a 
portion of its earnings each year in the form of dividends to beneficiaries. Each 
Alaskan resident receives an annual cheque representing his or her share of fund 
earnings. 
 
History of the dividend program 
The dividend program was introduced in 1982 and represents the legacy of 
Governor Jay Hammond’s ‘Alaska, Inc.’ program. That program was part of the 
social welfare proposal debated at the inception of the fund. Though the APF 
emerged as a savings fund, the social welfare proposal was later grafted on to it 
and helped to ensure public support for the continued maintenance and expansion 
of the fund. The dividend gave each Alaskan a personal stake in the success of the 
APF. If the fund grew, so too would the dividend. As Alaska has no state income 
tax and no state sales tax (only municipal sales taxes), the dividend reflected 
allocation of state money directly to citizens, rather than the other way around. 
 Before elaborating on the dividend program, I should first point out other 
uses of fund earnings. As noted above, Permanent Fund earnings generated from 
protected capital are held separately in the Realized Earnings Account, which may 
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be appropriated by the legislature. As Table 5.2 shows, a portion of fund earnings 
has been transferred to the state’s general fund, while a much larger portion has 
been redeposited into the fund to offset the effects of inflation. But, since the 
fund’s inception, a little over one-third of its total earnings have been paid directly 
to beneficiaries as dividends. Table 5.5 shows the amount of the individual 
dividend for each year since the program started in 1982. 
 
Year Dividend 
  
1982 $1000.00a
1983 386.15b
1984 331.29
1985 404.00
1986 556.26
1987 708.19
1988 826.93
1989 873.16
1990 952.63
1991 931.34
1992 915.84
1993 949.46
1994 983.90
1995 990.30
1996 1130.68
1997 1296.54
1998 1540.88
1999 1769.84
2000 1963.86
2001 1850.28
2002 1540.76
2003 $1107.56
 
Table 5.5  APF dividend, 1982-2003, in US$ per capita 
a source of funds was legislative appropriation 
b source of funds was a combination of legislative appropriation and permanent fund earnings 
Source: calculated from APF Annual reports, various years;  
and Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Division, Annual report, 2000. 
 
 Jay Hammond’s initial dividend proposal, as part of his ‘Alaska, Inc.’ plan, 
was to base the amount of the dividend on the number of years’ residency for each 
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recipient, so that, for example, each resident received $50 for each year of 
residency (Hammond, 1994; Groh, 1997). He was supported by a ‘tiny but 
committed group of public officials, political activists, and academics’ (Groh, 
1997). The 1980 legislation that incorporated the Permanent Fund likewise 
established a program giving each adult citizen $50 for each year of residency 
since statehood in 1959. The idea behind the graduated program was to reward 
long-term residents, called ‘sourdoughs’ (who were thought to have pioneered 
Alaskan development), to limit newcomers’ (called ‘cheechakos’) share of the 
state’s wealth, and to prevent migration to Alaska to claim dividends (Hammond, 
1994; Kasson, 1983). 
 This program was immediately challenged by Ron and Patricia ‘Penny’ 
Zobel, two Anchorage attorneys who had resided in the state for less than three 
years. Their suit24 eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, which 
struck down the Alaska legislation as unconstitutional, by an 8-1 margin, in that it 
created classes of citizens based on residency. Hammond then considered using 
Permanent Fund earnings to support municipalities, but was convinced by his staff 
that ‘municipalities had used the state oil money they had received to buy sports 
arenas and convention centres—the kind of items that Hammond considered frills’ 
(Groh, 1997). He changed tack once again, and came out in support of a program 
making annual dividend payments in the same amount to all Alaskans, regardless 
                                                     
24 Zobel v Williams, U.S. S. Ct. 2309.72 L.Ed.2d 672, 1982. The Alaska Supreme Court originally 
upheld the residency-based program by a 3-2 margin, but the Zobels appealed and the United States 
Supreme Court heard the case the following year. Dividend payments were suspended while the 
case was being adjudicated. At the time of the case, the Zobels were publicly vilified in the media. 
Today their role in shaping the dividend program is now all but forgotten, and virtually all Alaskans 
have received more money through the equal distribution program than they would have under 
Hammond’s original residency-based plan. 
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of their length of residency in the state. His backstop bill, prepared while the 
United States Supreme Court was hearing the Zobels’ case, was rushed through the 
Alaska legislature after the court’s decision.25 The backstop bill provided for an 
immediate payment of $1000 to all Alaskan residents and was funded through a 
direct legislative appropriation from the state’s general fund.26 The period of 
residency in Alaska to qualify for a dividend was initially six months, because 
legislators believed that a one-year residency period would get them in more hot 
water with the courts.27 
 The process of implementing the dividend program relied on generating 
legislative and public support. Arguments in favour of the dividend were that it: 
 
 Was the most equitable way to distribute earnings; 
 Creates a constituency in support of the Permanent Fund; 
 Compensates Alaskans for the high cost of living in the state; 
 Produces a large economic impact through multiplier effects; 
 Allows each individual to make his or her own investment decision;28 
 Was based on the idea that state ownership of the oil fields means that the 
people own it and should benefit directly from it (Goldsmith, 2001; Groh, 
                                                     
25 The House bill, which passed by a 28-11 margin, approved a single 1982 dividend payment. The 
Senate version, passed the next day by a 14-4 margin, provided for continuing the dividend 
program on a per capita basis. 
26 The Governor signed the bill on 14 June 1982, and literally ‘hours later’ the state’s computer 
started printing dividend cheques (Groh and Erickson, 1983). Technically speaking, the dividend 
payments are not ‘cheques’ (which are drawn on banks) but ‘warrants’ (which are drawn on the 
treasury). 
27 The length of residency to be eligible for a dividend was amended to 24 months in 1989. The 
Superior Court in Alaska then ruled this residency period unconstitutional, at which point the 
residency period was again amended to 12 months. In 1989 felons were debarred from receiving 
dividends, and in 1996 misdemeanants with two prior crimes were likewise debarred. 
28 In a 1998 town meeting survey, 71% of respondents agreed that ‘individual Alaskans can decide 
how to spend their wealth better than the government’ (Alaska Permanent Fund, 1999). 
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1997). 
 
Goldsmith further notes that the dividend also ‘provides a base income level to 
each citizen regardless of means’ and that it ‘contributes to equality in the 
distribution of income’ (2001). The legislature considered all of these arguments 
and by 1982 there was tripartisan (Democrat, Republican, and Libertarian) support 
for the program (Groh, 1997). 
 
Impacts of the dividend  
The first dividend, in the amount of $1000, was paid in 1982 and was based 
entirely on funds from a legislative appropriation, rather than on Permanent Fund 
earnings. The second dividend, paid the following year, was for $386.15 and was 
based partially on a legislative appropriation and partially on funds derived from 
APF revenues. In all subsequent years the dividend was based entirely on APF 
earnings. The amount of the dividend rises and falls based on fund earnings. 
Between 1999 and 2001, with enormous stock market rises, the fund was able to 
pay out dividends approaching $2000 per capita, but in 2003, reflecting poorer 
stock market performances, the dividend had fallen to $1107.56 (see Table 5.5). 
 Nevertheless, the dividend is paid to each resident, regardless of age, so 
that a family of five would have received in excess of $5500 in 2003. This amount 
can form a substantial component of family income for poorer Alaskans and 
especially those in rural areas (including many indigenous Alaskans), who have 
few other employment prospects. The dividend already accounts for about 6.2% of 
Alaska personal income overall (Knapp et al., 1984; Goldsmith, 2001). The 
dividend may also help stabilise migration patterns in the state. For example, many 
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rural Alaskans might be less inclined to move to urban areas because they have the 
security of dividend income wherever they may live. Thus the dividend may 
reduce rural to urban migration and the concomitant strain it places on urban 
resources (Huskey et al., 2004). Huskey et al. suggest that their results are 
consistent with other studies on the effects of transfer payments and migration 
(e.g., Cebula and Belton, 1994; Knapp and Huskey, 1988; and Shaw, 1986). 
 Details about the contemporary impacts of the Permanent Fund dividend 
are unfortunately lacking. The only substantial study of the dividend’s impact was 
conducted in 1984, based on only two years of data (Knapp et al., 1984). These are 
some of their findings:  
 
 The 1982 dividend ($1000 per capita) directly increased personal income by 
6.3%, or about the same amount as the state’s oil industry payroll;  
 The ‘average’ recipient saved $200 of the dividend, used $200 to pay federal 
taxes, paid off $50 in debt, and spent $550;  
 Of that $550, $450 went towards recurring expenses (food, fuel, clothing) and 
$100 was used for ‘special’ items (travel, electronic goods);  
 Use of the dividend varied with an individual’s income level: lower income 
Alaskans applied more of their dividend towards reducing debt and paying for 
recurring expenses, whereas higher income Alaskans directed more of their 
dividends towards savings; 
 The dividend increased family income by 20% for half of rural Alaska 
Natives, and 6% of all rural Alaskans (Native and non-Native) had their 
income increased by more than 50%; 
 The dividend increased the personal incomes of 39% of all Alaskans (rural 
and urban) by more than 10% (Knapp et al., 1984). 
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These results suggest that the dividend has had substantial effects on the ability of 
the state to provide benefits to its residents and to achieve broad ‘social equity’ 
development goals. 
 No equivalent study of the dividend’s impacts and effects has been 
conducted since 1984.29 However, the Knapp et al. report, combined with other, 
less substantial but more recent studies (Goldsmith, 2001; Groh, 1997) and 
anecdotal and interview data suggests some general patterns. First, the economists 
who authored these reports are in agreement about the general multiplier effects of 
the dividend: dividend income largely recirculates within the state and supports 
local businesses. Second, the dividend did not lead to any apparent migration from 
other states (few people moved to Alaska just to get a dividend). Third, the 
dividend may reduce the wage differential with other states (Alaska’s wages are 
among the highest in the nation to offset its high cost of living), because the 
dividend, as income, has the effect of reducing wages without reducing people’s 
well-being. Fourth, the dividend represents a cash flow to rural Alaska, where it is 
                                                     
29 Although there has been no dividend audit or study of the dividend’s impacts since 1984, the 
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Division (APFDD) does keep extensive records of applications 
and payments. Alaskan residents must apply for their dividend each year by a 31 March deadline, 
and must answer a questionnaire that is used to determine eligibility. In 2000, the APFDD received 
607,596 applications, of which 420,583 were from adults and 187,013 were from children 
(including 8879 newborns). Of these, 585,878 were determined to qualify for dividends. The 
median age of the applicants was 31.5 years old. About 40% of applicants listed Alaska as their 
place of birth, with California at 7%, Washington at 6%, and Oregon at 3% following in rank order. 
The most common first names for male applicants were, in rank order, Michael, John, James, 
Robert, and David, and for female applicants Mary, Jennifer, Linda, Patricia, and Susan. The most 
common surnames were Johnson, Smith, Williams, Jones, and Brown. 79,010 dividends were 
garnished, including 10,846 by the state’s Child Support Enforcement Division for delinquent child 
support payments, 7177 by postsecondary institutions for delinquent student loan payments, and 
23,470 by the Municipality of Anchorage for fines, delinquent taxes, and attorney fees (Alaska 
Permanent Fund Dividend Division, 2000). While this data provides interesting information about 
dividend applicants and recipients, it does not deal with the micro- and macro-economic effects of 
the dividend program.  
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more substantial compared to other sources of income, and in areas of very low 
income (especially rural indigenous communities) it may account for more than 
20% of income (and for some residents the dividend increases their income by 
more than 50%). Fifth, it may reduce rural to urban migration. And sixth, the 
dividend appeared to have little effect on inflation and people’s desire to work. 
 Dividends are also a form of Universal Basic Income (UBI) such as has 
been proposed by the Belgian political theorist Phillipe van Parijs (1995, 2000, 
2001). Van Parijs proposes that governments should make annual transfer 
payments to residents, regardless of their other incomes, in order to provide a UBI 
sufficient for subsistence. He argues for a UBI based on principles of justice, jobs, 
and growth. By justice he means providing the freedom that a basic income would 
allow, giving some individuals the free choice not to work or to limit their working 
hours (individuals who wanted to work would of course continue to do so, and 
would have higher incomes and therefore much greater purchasing power). Van 
Parijs also suggests that the multiplier effects of UBI payment income circulating 
in the economy would promote increased employment and economic growth. He 
notes that Alaska, through its Permanent Fund dividend, is the only place in the 
world that has actually instituted a UBI program. 
 Though van Parijs’s proposal is, at least at this stage, largely a speculation 
given out as a means of forcing societies to consider issues of economic justice, the 
similarities between his general proposal and Alaska’s dividend program are 
striking. As noted in this chapter, dividends have provided a raft of benefits for 
Alaskan residents. Yet the philosophical underpinning for dividend payments in 
Alaska is not so much general principles of economic justice as it is a more 
libertarian tenet of channelling the public’s own wealth directly into the public’s 
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own hands: Alaskans are simply claiming their own. Nevertheless, the net result of 
the dividend is providing a UBI for all state residents regardless of their other 
sources of income. 
 
Subsistence 
Subsistence use of Alaska’s renewable resources forms part of the diverse 
economic livelihoods of both Alaska Native and non-Native populations. The 
Alaska Federation of Natives has estimated that rural Alaskans harvest about 44 
million pounds of fish and game for food each year, with an annual value of $220 
million. These wild foods supply one-third of the caloric requirements of rural 
residents (Alaska Federation of Natives, 2004). About 60% of rural households 
(half Native and half non-Native) statewide harvest game and about 80% harvest 
fish (Goldsmith, et al., 2004). Many households could not survive without 
subsistence.30 As Berardi (1998) notes, ‘subsistence is an important element of 
family economies and a central part of personal and cultural identity’ for rural 
residents.  
 Transfer payments make subsistence possible: they allow individuals and 
families to receive a cash income that supplements subsistence foods and can be 
used to purchase necessary goods such as fuels and clothing. As Dubbs (1992) 
noted, ‘if the transfer economy is eroded, residents throughout village Alaska will 
have to depend on private sector and commercial activities in order to obtain the 
cash necessary if they wish to continue subsistence pursuits’. As private sector 
                                                     
30 During my first visit to Alaska in 1987, I stayed with a family who lived in a log house outside 
Fairbanks. They depended for much of their food on subsistence harvesting. A moose would feed 
the family for almost half a year. During my stay with this family, we ate moose for breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner, and I was impressed by the number of ways that one can prepare this food. 
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employment opportunities are not widespread in rural Alaska, in the absence of 
transfer payments residents would have to consider migrating to urban areas.31 
 The Permanent Fund dividend, as a UBI payment distributed to all 
Alaskans, along with special rural subsidies and Alaska Native regional 
corporations payments, provides the cash that allows rural residents to maintain 
their subsistence lifestyles. About $93 million in dividend payments went to rural 
areas in 2002 (Goldsmith, et al., 2004). As one Alaska Native noted, the 
Permanent Fund dividend ‘is really important for our people out here, especially 
those that are subsistence hunters and gatherers. They rely on that money’ 
(Pemberton, 2003). Berardi (1998, 87) notes that transfer payments ‘have been 
instrumental’ in supporting residents in ‘economically nonviable locations’, often 
the homelands of Alaska’s indigenous peoples. 
 
Public support for the dividend 
In 1999, with state oil revenues declining due to falling world prices, and with the 
state’s budget running into deficit, Alaskan legislators proposed reducing the 
dividend payment in order to balance the budget. By this time the dividend had 
come to be viewed as an entitlement, and Alaskans reacted angrily to the proposal. 
Figure 5.2 shows two popular cartoons from 1999 reflecting citizen views on the 
continuance of dividend payments. The cartoons represent the state government as 
the tool of special interests, denying each Alaskan his or her right to a share of 
state oil revenues. 
                                                     
31 Transfer payments (such as the dividend) to rural areas also have a delayed multiplier effect that 
benefits urban areas as well, as rural residents often use their transfer income to purchase goods and 
services from urban areas (Bradner, 1992). 
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Figure 5.2.  Two Dale Luther cartoons reflecting Alaskan attitudes in the referendum 
on the use of the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), 1999 
 
 Alaska held a non-binding referendum on this issue on 14 September 1999. 
Voters were asked whether they would approve a reduction in the amount of the 
dividend in order to reduce budget deficits and help finance state government (a 
‘yes’ vote). Alaskans voted overwhelmingly, by a margin of 83% to 17%, to retain 
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full dividend payments.32 This result effectively negated further proposals to 
reduce or tamper with the dividend. 
 Other surveys also indicate citizen agreement with the status quo. In 1998 
the Permanent Fund sponsored over 100 community meetings in various parts of 
the state. Participants in these town meetings could express their views to delegates 
from the APF, and were also asked their opinions about the investment of 
Permanent Fund capital and the use of its earnings. In data compiled from those 
meetings, 85% of respondents agreed with the statement that ‘every Alaskan, 
young or old, new comer or old timer, has a right to an equal share in the public 
wealth of the Permanent Fund’. Only 15% disagreed. 74% of respondents also 
agreed that ‘giving equal Permanent Fund benefits to future Alaskans (unborn 
children and people who move here later) is as important as giving benefits to 
Alaskans here today’. When asked if the Permanent Fund should be abolished and 
a lump sum of $38,000 be given to each resident, only 13% of respondents agreed 
while 87% disagreed. These responses suggest strong support for the continuance 
of the fund and its egalitarian provisions (Alaska Permanent Fund, 1999; Doogan, 
1998).33 
 In sum, the dividend program is a distinctive means of distributing fund 
earnings. Wedding societal with individual interests, the dividend allocates public 
funds to individuals equally as beneficiaries of the Alaska Permanent Fund. 
Dividends are based only on Alaskan residence, and they are not means-tested or 
                                                     
32 These figures can be compared to the results in the Knapp et al. (1984) study, which found that 
60% of Alaskans thought that the dividend program was a good idea (and that 10% thought it was a 
bad idea, with 30% having mixed feelings). That study also found that 71% of Alaskans would be 
willing to give up the dividend rather than have state income taxes reintroduced. 
33 It should be borne in mind that citizens attending the town meetings were self selected, and may 
not represent the Alaskan population as a whole (Doogan, 1998). 
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based on the number of years of residence. Dividends recirculate within the Alaska 
economy and help to support local businesses. Though they are equally distributed, 
they benefit (relatively speaking) lower-income individuals and families and 
persons residing in rural areas. They thus serve a rural development function 
without appearing to be targeted at specific ‘special interest’ groups. They further 
remove investment decisions regarding the use of fund earnings from the state and 
place them in the hands of individuals. Thus, what appears initially to be a curious 
socialistic practice of a government giving away money in fact turns out to have 
very Smithian results in renewing the wealth of individuals. The ability of the 
dividend to achieve these ends is based in part on its size (it is in the thousands of 
dollars, not the tens or hundreds) and that in turn is based on the ability of the APF 
to invest at commercial rates of return in national and international financial 
markets rather than being compelled to invest in the poorer returns with higher 
risks found within Alaska itself. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Permanent Fund nicely illustrates the model of development proposed 
in this thesis, in which capital generated in a peripheral region is invested in the 
financial markets of the core. Through the mechanism of the APF, Alaskans 
separate the site of capital generation from the site of capital investment. Shunning 
the potentially more risky and limited investments within the state, Alaskans, 
through their representatives and trustees, chose to invest their windfall revenues 
offshore, in national and global financial markets. These markets provided 
opportunities for greater investment returns with lower investment risks.  
 As discussed early in this chapter, Alaskans debated three proposals for the 
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use of their windfall revenues. They considered using them, as Alberta did, to 
directly stimulate economic growth in the state through investment in local 
infrastructure. This proposal was ultimately rejected, based on neo-liberal 
economic arguments that the government should not invest where the market 
refused to do so, and that the market knows best where to invest. This neo-liberal 
argument led paradoxically to an investment strategy by which the state 
government retained billions of dollars of state oil wealth and invested them 
outside the state. The neo-liberal argument for investment was melded with the 
earlier social welfare proposal by allocating over half of fund earnings to 
individual Alaskan beneficiaries. Thus collective goods provided by the 
government were forsaken for individual decision making as to the investment of 
public wealth. Rather than choosing to follow the Rostovian development path of 
industrialisation, Alaska turned instead to mitigating the effects of its peripheral 
economic position by engaging with the global economy on its own terms as an 
investor. 
 The results of this experiment seem to indicate success. Alaska now 
controls a trust fund valued at over $24 billion on behalf of fewer than 600,000 
eligible beneficiaries. The fund generated an income of nearly $1 billion in 2003 
(during a year of poor market performance) and in earlier years it generated annual 
incomes in excess of $3 billion. The fund transformed non-renewable oil revenues 
into a renewable fiscal resource. The real value of the fund is maintained by 
redepositing a share of earnings to offset inflation, and the remainder of earnings is 
paid out as dividends to each beneficiary. Alaskans continue to vote in support of 
the fund, even allowing the state to run budget deficits rather than dip into fund 
earnings. From the limited research available, the dividend appears to provide a 
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number of social benefits, including support for small-scale and community 
economies and especially those in rural areas. 
 
6 
 
Oceania 
Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The following sections consider the trust funds of four Pacific microstates, 
exploring their origins, management and investment policies, and the impacts they 
have had on trust beneficiaries. The Pacific islands region, which many islanders 
prefer to call Oceania (Hau‘ofa, 1993, 1998), shares a common colonial experience 
and a common geographical remoteness from the core centres of capital. In many 
respects the Oceanic countries are among the most peripheral places on earth. 
Limited investment opportunities in the region have prompted several Oceanic 
states to establish trust funds to reduce their position of marginality by engaging 
with global capital.  
This chapter considers the experiences of Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and 
Tuvalu and the economic geographies and development aspects of their trust funds. 
It will focus in particular on the application of trust funds within specific national 
economic geographies. It is these specific geographies that influence whether or 
not the potential capacities of trust funds are realized. The four cases considered 
here reflect varying capabilities of the state to extend the benefits of resource 
revenues to Pacific island residents. 
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2.  KIRIBATI 
The independent Republic of Kiribati possesses a trust fund that derives from 
colonial times. The fund was set up during the British colonial period as a means 
of saving a portion of the phosphate mining revenues that accrued to the colonial 
government and its entities and with the intent of using these saved revenues to 
benefit the people of the islands. The fund is now under the control of the Kiribati 
government, and it invests in offshore assets with the goal of producing a sufficient 
return to help finance government activity. In doing so, Kiribati funds government 
services without having to tax heavily its largely subsistence-based populace. The 
fund invests offshore in order to provide social benefits within the country. 
 
2.1  Kiribati and the political economy of an atoll state 
The Republic of Kiribati is a Micronesian island state in the Central Pacific (see 
Map 1). The country comprises the Gilbert Islands (Kiribati proper), the Phoenix 
Islands, and the Line Islands, including Kiritimati (Christmas Island). Prior to 
independence in 1979, Kiribati was part of the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
Colony (GEIC). Kiribati contains 34 islands, all but one of them coral atolls, with a 
combined area of 811 km2. The total population is about 92,000 and consists 
primarily of Gilbertese, known as I-Kiribati. Nearly half the population lives on the 
capital island of South Tarawa. Kiribati’s exclusive economic zone totals 
3,550,000 km2 (the second largest in the region), giving a sea to land ratio of 4377 
to 1. Kiribati’s small land area and generally unproductive coral soils (Mason, 
1960) means that today most of the nation’s wealth is derived from offshore 
fishing licences granted to overseas fleets. Copra and seaweed are the most 
important domestic exports and their production provides cash income for 
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residents. 
Kiribati is a low-income country with an estimated 2001 GDP (PPP) of 
about US$79 million, or about US$800 on a per capita basis. Only about 20% of 
the working-age adult population is formally employed, and most of those hold 
jobs in the public sector (Throsby, 2001, 2). The remaining 80% depend on a 
combination of subsistence (fishing and agriculture) and family support (from both 
resident and non-resident family members) for their livelihood. The generation of 
new wealth depends heavily on offshore income from fishing access fees, 
remittances, and development aid, in addition to revenues from the country’s trust 
fund. Kiribati uses the Australian dollar, and thus avoids the need for setting its 
own monetary policies and managing the currency. The country does not have a 
reserve bank or monetary authority and the use of the Australian dollar limits the 
ability of Kiribati to exercise its own monetary policies (Kiribati, 2000a). 
 
2.2  The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund 
The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF) was established when Kiribati 
was part of the GEIC. The source of fund capital was royalty revenue from the 
extensive phosphate deposits on the island of Banaba (Ocean Island), which was 
part of the GEIC. These deposits were discovered by Albert F. Ellis, a New 
Zealand geologist employed at the Sydney office of the Pacific Phosphate 
Company (then John T. Arundel and Co). In 1899 Ellis took an interest in a stone 
doorstop at the company’s office and suspected that it might contain phosphate. 
Ellis tested the stone, and the results suggested an incredible phosphate content of 
78 percent (Ellis, 1935; Williams and Macdonald, 1985). Ellis established the 
provenance of the doorstop as coming from Nauru; he also realized that the 
Chapter 6: Oceania  188 
neighbouring island of Banaba, which was known to be geologically similar, was 
likely to contain phosphate. He revealed his discoveries to the company, which 
arranged for field visits to gather more samples.  
Ellis made field visits to both islands in 1900. On Banaba, he immediately 
negotiated a 999-year agreement with Temati, the alleged ‘king’ of the island, 
giving the company exclusive rights to mine phosphate on Banaban lands in 
exchange for an annual payment of £50 in cash or trade goods (Ellis, 1935; 
Macdonald, 1982, 95-96).1 Phosphate mining began on Banaba in 1900 and 
continued until 1979. In 1945, largely because of the extensive environmental 
damage done to the island (which was never very agriculturally productive), the 
Banabans were relocated to a new home on the island of Rabi, in Fiji, a plan that 
had been under discussion since 1928 (Schutz and Tenten, 1979). Mining 
continued on Banaba until 1979, when Banaban agitation, falling world phosphate 
prices, and depleting reserves convinced the newly-independent Kiribati 
government to close the mines (K. Teaiwa, pers. comm., 2002).  
 The post World War II period was a time of rebuilding after the disaster of 
war, when the main island of Tarawa was heavily damaged. Michael Bernacchi, 
Resident Commissioner of the GEIC for much of the 1950s, advocated order, 
reconstruction, and the colonial administration’s demonstration of concern for 
locals’ welfare and lack of exploitation (Macdonald, 1982, 173). He proposed 
establishing a trust fund, to be administered by the GEIC on behalf of the islanders, 
                                                     
1 The terms of the agreement were periodically revised, under British government pressure, and 
rental payments, compensation for damage, and royalties were later paid to the Banabans. During 
the period 1900-13 the Pacific Phosphate Company made a total profit of more than £1,750,000, of 
which less than £10,000 was paid to Banabans. See Macdonald (1982, Chap 6) for details. 
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based on the revenues from Banaban phosphate.2 In the continuing debate over 
whether phosphate revenues should be saved or spent, Bernacchi clearly supported 
saving part of the phosphate revenues. His proposed fund would accumulate 
reserves to generate income when phosphate revenues ceased flowing.  
Bernacchi pushed for the fund in 1956 because in the following year the 
agreement that the colony had with the United Kingdom regarding copra exports 
was due to expire and would put the colony in a weaker financial position 
(Macdonald, 1971, 140). The Revenue Equalisation Fund (later Revenue 
Equalisation Reserve Fund) was accordingly created in 1956 with $555,5803 
provided by the colonial administration, of which $155,580 came from the sale of 
Japanese assets from their wartime occupation and $400,000 from the GEIC’s 
general fund (Toatu, 1993). As Macdonald notes, the trust fund ‘represented the 
first positive step that had been taken to safeguard the Colony’s financial future’ 
(1982, 173). 
Thereafter, varying amounts of phosphate revenues from the Banaba mines 
were deposited into the fund. In 1963, the new Resident Commissioner, V.J. 
Andersen, reversed this policy, arguing that phosphate revenues were more 
urgently needed for infrastructural projects. From 1963 to 1967 no revenues were 
                                                     
2 The Banabans at this time had their own trust fund, which was set up in 1913 and based on the 
earlier recommendations of the then Resident Commissioner, Captain John Quayle Dickson RN. 
From 1908 onwards, the fee that the Pacific Phosphate Company paid for phosphate rights was paid 
to the GEIC, rather than into the British treasury. After the Banaban fund was established, the 
Pacific Phosphate Company paid 6d per ton to the government and another 6d per ton to the 
Banaban fund. Albert Ellis was retained as the company’s representative on Banaba until his later 
appointment to the British Phosphate Commissioners (see the Nauru section of this chapter). The 
Banaban fund was later used to finance the relocation of the islanders to Fiji and was a model for 
the RERF. 
3 Currency figures in this chapter are expressed in the local currency for each country, unless 
otherwise indicated. For Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu this is the Australian dollar, while for Tonga it 
is the Tongan Pa‘anga. 
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deposited into the fund. In 1967, concerned with the financial position of the 
colony, the British government ordered a socio-economic survey be carried out 
under the direction of Sir George Mooring. The Mooring Report of 1968 called for 
depositing 25% of phosphate revenues into the trust fund, and this policy was kept 
in place until the closing of the Banaban mines in 1979. 
 Prior to independence, all income generated by the fund was reinvested, 
and drawdowns began only after 1979. When Kiribati became independent in 
1979, the Ellice Islands formed a separate country called Tuvalu. The Tuvaluans 
asked for a share of the trust fund, but Kiribati was successful in arguing that the 
fund belonged to it alone. Kiribati was also successful in convincing aid donors 
that fund capital not be considered in aid decisions (Macdonald, 1982, 273). 
 
Fund governance 
When the RERF was first set up it was managed by the colonial authorities. After 
Kiribati’s independence, the fund was transferred to the independent government 
and its structure was elaborated within the new National Economic Planning 
Office, part of the Ministry of Finance. The RERF is managed by a unit within this 
office, called the Investment Unit, along with the Policy Analysis Unit, the Budget 
Unit, and the Line Ministries (which handles the economic affairs of the remoter 
islands). Each of these units is under the direction of a Senior Economist, and 
within the Investment Unit there are two other economists assisting the Senior 
Economist. All of the units are under the direction of the Chief Economist.4 The 
Investment Unit is responsible for the nation’s investments, including those of the 
                                                     
4 Interview with Atanteora Beiatau, Chief Economist, Kiribati Ministry of Finance, Tarawa, 2002. 
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RERF. This unit is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fund and for 
supervising the independent private investment firms that handle trading, 
investment advice, and custodianship of the assets. 
 Overall policy decisions for the RERF are set by the RERF Committee, 
comprised of six members. These include the Minister of Finance, who serves as 
the chair and is an elected Member of Parliament; the Permanent Secretary of 
Finance, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Attorney-General, the Chief Economist, 
and the Director of Planning. The RERF Committee appoints investment fund 
managers, makes auditing decisions, and sets operational guidelines including fund 
asset composition.5 It meets quarterly. The Committee also helps to integrate the 
activities of the fund into the overall mission of the Ministry of Finance and into 
overall government policy.6 
 The third component of investment management is the independent 
investment firms that directly trade and hold the fund’s assets. At the present time, 
two firms have this responsibility, both based in London: Nikko Global Asset 
Management (UK) Ltd and HSBC Asset Management (Europe) Ltd. A third 
private firm is the custodian that holds the fund’s assets: State Street Australia Ltd, 
based in Sydney.7 Together there are three levels of administration: at the top is the 
RERF Committee, which sets overall policy objectives; the Investment Unit of the 
Ministry of Finance, which handles investment operations, coordination of 
investment policy with the national budget, and supervision of investment 
                                                     
5 Interviews with Tebwe Ietaake, Permanent Secretary, Kiribati Ministry of Finance, Tarawa, 2002; 
with Atanteora Beiatau, Tarawa, 2002; and with Teuea Toatu, Consultant, Canberra, 2003. 
6 Atanteora Beiatau also told me that various ministers and other government branches often ignore 
the advice of the Ministry of Finance, making implementation of overall financial strategies 
difficult. 
7 Interview with Atanteora Beiatau, Tarawa, 2002. 
Chapter 6: Oceania  192 
managers; and the independent private firms that directly manage the fund’s 
investments by holding and trading assets.  
 Accountability does not appear to be a major issue with respect to the 
RERF. I-Kiribati in general are aware of the fund, and many of them express pride 
in the financial independence that it gives their country.8 Most are not familiar 
with the specific operations of the fund, yet they do know that it produces an 
income that finances government operations (when needed) and indirectly su
projects on the outer (i.e., not South Tarawa) islands. Fund reports are audited by 
the national Auditor-General and tabled in Parliament. According to the Asian 
Development Bank, the RERF has been well managed, and the fund has not been 
subject to charges of favouritism or corruption (ADB, 1998). 
pports 
                                                     
 
Generation of fund capital 
The RERF has grown considerably since its inception in 1956 and reported a 
balance of $658.0 million in 2000. Table 6.1 gives details about the growth of the 
fund capital as well as its earnings and per capita values. The table shows data for 
the years 1989-2000 as well as for 1956, 1968, and 1979. Data from these three 
earlier years allows for some comparisons between fund operations during 
Kiribati’s independence and several sample years during the colonial 
administration. 
 The RERF redeposits the entirety of its earnings back into the fund corpus. 
Parliament, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, may make additional 
8 I draw this conclusion from random informal interviews and conversations with a variety of I-
Kiribati on South Tarawa and on the ‘outer island’ of North Tarawa during my visit to the country 
in 2002. 
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deposits into the fund (for example, during times of budget surplus) and may also 
make drawdowns from fund capital. For example, Table 6.1 shows that in 1999 the 
fund recorded earnings of $54.5 million, of which $5 million was withdrawn with 
the balance remaining in the RERF. In 2000, the fund generated earnings of $58.9 
million, all of which remained as part of the fund’s corpus. It is in this manner, 
rather than through new resource revenue deposits, that the fund grows. 
 
Geographies of fund asset distribution 
The RERF aims for an equal balance of equity and fixed income investments, with 
about 46% of the portfolio invested in equity investments and 54% in fixed interest 
investments (State Street, 2002). Fixed income investments include mainly bonds 
(corporate and government) and cash assets. Equities include corporate common 
and preferred shares. Assets are held in various currencies, though Australian 
dollar-denominated investments account for about 31% of the total, mainly 
because Kiribati does not have its own currency and instead uses the Australian 
dollar. RERF assets held in other currencies helped increase the value of the fund 
during the 1990s as the Australian dollar depreciated against many currencies 
(ADB, 1998, 52). These other currencies included the US dollar (26% of 
investments), euro (22%), yen (10%) and sterling (7%), with the remaining 4% in 
other currencies (e.g., Singapore dollar, Malaysian ringgit, Swiss franc) (State 
Street, 2002; NICAM, 2002; HSBC, 2002). None of the fund’s investments (other 
than very small cash holdings) are in Kiribati itself. 
 
Distribution of fund earnings 
The function of the RERF at this time is to stabilise government revenues, 
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especially at times when copra and fishing revenues are low. At these times the 
government is authorized to make drawdowns against RERF income. The 
government did this annually between 1989 and 1997, when a total of $44.5 
million was withdrawn (the fund generated earnings of about $345 million during 
this period, so only about 13% of earnings were removed). Between 1998 and 2000 
no withdrawals were made from the RERF (see Table 6.1 for details of deposits 
and withdrawals). RERF income thus provides the Kiribati government with a 
cushion against downturns in its resource (copra and fishing) industries. Redeposit 
of fund earnings ensures that the fund continues to grow and that its real value is 
maintained. RERF annual earnings are equivalent (2000) to about one-third of the 
budget’s estimated current expenditures, and to about one-fifth of the country’s 
total annual expenditure (including development expenditure) (Kiribati, 2000b; 
ADB, 2002) 
The Kiribati Statistics Office conducted three household surveys in 1996 in 
order to determine income and expenditure patterns in the country, using the 
islands of South Tarawa, Onotoa, and Butaritari as case studies (ADB, 1998; 
Kiribati Statistics Office, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). These surveys found that 
expenditures on food on the three islands were similar, but that the two outer 
islands of Onotoa and Butaritari had much lower percentages of income spent on 
fish and meat (about 18% of total food expenditure on Tarawa, but less than 8% on 
Onotoa and Butaritari). Household income on South Tarawa was $268 per 
fortnight, on Butaritari $93 per fortnight, and on Onotoa $10 per fortnight. Both of 
these figures indicate the much higher dependence on subsistence on the outer 
islands. About 80% of I-Kiribati are engaged in subsistence (AusAID, 2001). 
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Year RERF 
Balance 
RERF 
Incomea 
Deposits Drawdown Returnb Population Per 
Capita 
Value 
Per 
Capita 
Income 
1956 0.55 … … 0 … 42,000c … … 
1968 1.6 … … 0 … 54,000c … … 
1979 68.0 … … 0 … 57,100 1192.9 … 
1989 185.9 29.9 0 5.0 7.1% 70,389 2641.0 424.8 
1990 220.4 38.6 0 4.0 7.2% 72,335 3046.9 533.6 
1991 261.1 42.3 0.4 2.0 6.7% 73,465 3554.1 575.8 
1992 295.8 28.7 12.5 6.5 6.5% 75,146 3936.3 381.9 
1993 353.4 63.0 0 5.5 5.7% 75,901 4656.1 830.0 
1994 318.3 63.2 0 4.4 4.6% 76,737 4147.9 823.6 
1995 367.9 20.5 0 3.5 4.0% 80,169 4589.0 255.7 
1996 371.8 22.0 0 5.6 4.5% 81,612 4555.7 269.6 
1997 458.9 36.9 0 8.0 4.6% 83,081 5523.5 444.1 
1998 570.1 72.0 0 0 4.4% 84,577 6740.6 851.3 
1999 601.5 54.5 5.0 0 3.6% 88,000 6835.2 619.3 
2000 658.0 58.9 0 0 4.0% 92,000d 7152.2 640.4 
 
Table 6.1. Selected Statistics on the Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund.  
A$ millions (except per capita). 
 
Sources: calculated from Lahmeyer 2002, Throsby 2001, Kiribati 2000b, ADB 1998, 
Macdonald 1982. 
Notes: 
 … = not available 
 a including interest, dividends, and realized currency and capital gains and losses 
 b interest and dividend rate of return (does not include currency and capital returns) 
 c includes Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) 
 d estimate 
 
 Kiribati’s economy still depends heavily on subsistence. But, as the Asian 
Development Bank notes, ‘while household production can continue to sustain a 
basic livelihood, it cannot produce the funds needed to purchase imports of fuel, 
machinery, and the other items that are now essential components of the I-Kiribati 
lifestyle’ (ADB, 1998, 187). I-Kiribati have been increasingly integrated into a 
cash economy since the 1920s, when missionary and colonial influence led to a 
rising demand for imported clothing, foods, and other goods such as pots and pans, 
knives and axes, and soap (Schutz and Tenten, 1979). The cash economy has 
altered I-Kiribati society in substantial ways. As Talu and Tekonnang note: 
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Parents are eager for their children to be educated, not for what it will do to them, 
but because it will enable them to obtain jobs which bring home money. It is also 
changing their attitude to marriage. Formerly, parents wished to see their children 
married so they could have grandchildren; today some people are opposing 
marriages because this cuts off a source of income for them. In quite a few cases 
money has taken precedence even over land values. Many cases are known of 
people who have sold their land to buy a motorcycle or other assets (1979, 163). 
 
I-Kiribati of today are well connected to the modern world and thus have need of 
cash and imported goods to supplement their subsistence-based household 
economies. 
The mainstream development response to the country’s need for cash 
income is recommending an expansion of the private sector (ADB, 1998; Duncan 
et al., 1999). The Bank further notes, however, that past efforts to develop 
productive industries ‘have been disappointing’ (ADB, 1998, 187). The Bank sees 
the encouragement of the private sector as the solution (because of the perceived 
need for formal employment); the trust fund, however, may at some point provide 
an alternative source of revenues that could provide a basic income to I-Kiribati if 
distributed as dividends. Dividends could provide a supplement to subsistence 
livelihoods. 9 As the Asian Development Bank notes, ‘the people of Onotoa and 
Butaritari seem to be able to maintain an acceptable standard of living with 
                                                     
9 Most I-Kiribati also depend on the production of copra for part of their cash income. The Kiribati 
government’s policy guarantees the same copra price to all producers, on whatever island they may 
be located. The price paid is not means-tested. This has the effect of reducing differences in 
incomes between producers on outer islands and those on South Tarawa, equitably distributing that 
income to all (ADB, 1998, 190). 
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minimal cash incomes’ (ADB, 1998, 65). The Bank also notes, however, that the 
need for cash to finance children’s education and other goods has prompted many 
people to relocate to South Tarawa in order to enter wage labour.  
Transfer payments through the trust fund may help encourage people to 
remain on outer islands and reduce overpopulation and consequent urbanisation 
problems in South Tarawa. At the moment the RERF generates about $640 per 
capita. A redeposit of at least a portion of this revenue is needed to maintain the 
fund’s real value and offset inflation. In future, if fund earnings continue to rise, a 
portion may be available for dividend payments. The amount available would be 
enhanced by an increase in Kiribati’s fishing licensing fees. 
 
2.3  Conclusion 
Kiribati’s Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund has been considered a success by a 
variety of analysts (ADB, 1998; Toatu, 1993; IMF, 1995; Throsby, 2001).10 The 
Asian Development Bank further notes, for example, that the health of the average 
I-Kiribati has improved during the past two decades, and that the Kiribati 
government has been able to maintain a high level of health expenditure (ADB, 
1998, 192). With a window of phosphate revenues lasting only from 1900 to 1979, 
preceding Kiribati’s independence, the fund has grown to hold assets of $658 
million, or about $7152 per capita, increasing by a factor of ten during the 
independence period. Fund assets are invested entirely offshore, in Australian, 
North American, European, and Asian financial markets. This practice follows the 
                                                     
10 Also interviews with Tebwe Ietaake; Atanteora Beiatau; Ueantabo Neemia-Mackenzie, Director, 
University of the South Pacific Kiribati Campus; and Colin Hill, Australian High Commisioner, 
Tarawa, 2002; and Teuea Toatu, Canberra, 2003. 
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model described in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in which capital generated in the 
periphery is invested in the core.  
Kiribati did not attempt to transform itself into a core economy. It did not 
directly invest any of its trust fund assets within its own sovereign boundaries. 
Instead, the fund’s trustees chose to mitigate the disadvantages of the country’s 
peripheral position by engaging directly with global financial markets. Using fund 
managers based in London and Sydney, Kiribati built up a portfolio of offshore 
investments that provides an annual income. This income assists the country when 
it experiences budget deficits. In doing so, Kiribati avoids having to impose or 
increase taxes on its subsistence-dependent population, and avoids the need to 
request aid from international donor agencies, placing it in debt and in a position of 
dependence.11 Capital generated years ago on the remote Pacific island of Banaba 
is now being invested throughout the world. Kiribati has transformed a local, non-
renewable resource into a renewable one that stimulates local development. 
 
3.  NAURU 
The trust fund of Nauru, the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust, is the oldest 
considered in this thesis, having been established in 1922. The trust fund was set 
up under the peculiar colonial administration of the island, which was a League of 
Nations mandate territory and later a United Nations trusteeship, with the British 
Empire as the trustee and Australia as the de facto administrator. During the entire 
colonial period, Nauru was effectively ruled by a quasi-private institution known 
                                                     
11 As Teiwaki notes, foreign aid is a ‘strategy by the metropolitan countries to exert their influence 
in national politics’ and that the conditions of foreign aid ‘tend to undermine national sovereignty’ 
(1988, 153). 
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as the British Phosphate Commissioners, who were responsible for mining and 
exporting the phosphate rock that was, and still is, the sole basis of the Nauru 
economy. 
 The fund was established in order to provide Nauruans with a resource that 
would support them after phosphate was depleted. Like the other funds considered 
in this thesis, the idea was to save and invest a share of resource revenues in order 
to generate an income that could be used to finance government activity in the 
absence of resource revenues. During the colonial administration all of Nauru’s 
finances were managed in great secrecy, a policy that continues to the present. 
Nauru’s fund was poorly administered after Nauruan independence, and as a 
consequence its value has declined considerably, to the point where the fund as a 
viable entity is questionable. Given its limited resource base, Nauru in essence had 
only one opportunity to invest the proceeds of that resource, an opportunity which 
it squandered. Nauru chose to invest the bulk of its assets internally, and to weight 
them heavily towards on-lending to other government entities. These poor policy 
choices resulted in a very different outcome from the case of Kiribati, which faced 
similar constraints but made different policy choices. 
  
3.1  Nauru and the political economy of phosphate 
The Republic of Nauru, like its neighbour Kiribati, is a small Micronesian state in 
the Central Pacific, located almost on the equator (see Map 1). Unlike Kiribati, 
Nauru consists of a single island only 21 km2 in size, making it one of the world’s 
smallest countries. Nauru is distinctive for its historical mix of Micronesian, 
Polynesian, and Melanesian features, including its unique language. Nauru was 
once part of Germany’s Pacific empire but was mandated to the British Empire as 
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a whole after Germany’s defeat in the First World War, although it was in practice 
administered by Australia. The population today is about 12,000, about three-
quarters of which are Nauruans, the others being mainly guest workers of 
Oceanian, Filipino, and Chinese descent. Nauru’s GDP (PPP) was estimated at 
US$5000 per capita in 2001, though estimates vary and data on any aspect of the 
Nauruan economy are difficult to obtain.12 Nauru’s economy has been entirely 
based on phosphate extraction during the twentieth century, though internet 
banking is an emerging industry. Both phosphate mining and internet banking have 
been problematic in recent years, as will be seen below. 
 
3.2  The Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust 
Nauru became a German colony in 1888, part of the German Micronesian 
territories governed from Jaluit in the Marshall Islands. As a small and relatively 
remote island, Nauru was insignificant in terms of German colonial ambitions, but 
it was useful as a place of trade and for the production of a few products such as 
copra. Its phosphate deposits remained unrecognized and unmined.13 
As noted in the section on Kiribati, phosphate deposits on Nauru were 
discovered by the New Zealand geologist Albert F. Ellis, who was employed at the 
Sydney office of the Pacific Phosphate Company (then called John T. Arundel and 
Co.). Ellis’s discovery that the office doorstop was a piece of phosphate rock from 
Nauru led him to the conclusion that that island contained phosphate in 
                                                     
12 Indeed, at times the national budget, and even the population census, have been given the status 
of state secrets as far as visiting researchers have been concerned (R.G. Ward, pers.comm., 2002). 
13 Nauru’s trust fund emerged under somewhat murkier circumstances than those of Kiribati, 
Tonga, or Tuvalu, and involved a great deal of secrecy and colonial machinations. This section 
therefore elaborates on Nauruan colonial history and is more detailed than the corresponding 
sections for the other three Oceanic states. Much of the information on the British Phosphate 
Commissioners is drawn from Williams and Macdonald’s excellent study The phosphateers (1985). 
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commercially exploitable quantities (Ellis, 1935; Williams and Macdonald, 1985). 
The company arranged for field visits to gather more samples, on both Nauru and 
Banaba. 
The site visits, conducted in early 1900 under somewhat secretive terms in 
order to avoid alerting the Germans of the discovery (in Nauru), confirmed the 
earlier tests. Both Nauru and Banaba had enormous phosphate deposits that could 
be mined relatively easily and cheaply, and would provide an important source of 
fertilizer for the emerging Australian and New Zealand agricultural sectors. As 
Ellis noted, the sample drawn from a shaft about eight feet deep was ‘phosphate all 
the way down and no bottom reached’.14 John T. Arundel and Company, now 
reconstituted as the Pacific Phosphate Company, reached an agreement with the 
German government to lease the phosphate deposits and mine them, and 
exploitation began in 1907. Less than a decade later war broke out between Great 
Britain and Germany, and Nauru was seized by Australian forces in 1915. 
After World War I, former German territories were removed from German 
administration and parcelled out, under various terms, to the victorious Allied 
powers. Australia, under the vociferous Prime Minister W.M. ‘Billy’ Hughes, 
argued for the outright annexation of Nauru as Australian territory (Weeramantry, 
1992, 9, 44-45; Horne, 2000, 163; Hiery, 1995, 120). This position brought 
Australia into conflict with Woodrow Wilson of the United States, who argued that 
former German territories should not be annexed, but rather should be ‘mandated’, 
with the ultimate goal of independence, by the Allied colonial powers. The 
fledgling League of Nations created three classes of mandates. ‘A’ mandates 
                                                     
14 British Phosphate Commissioners Archives, Melbourne, BPC R178/0, WOB 3/0, Item 17. 
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consisted of formerly Turkish territories, such as Syria and Lebanon, which were 
thought to be very close to independence. ‘B’ mandates consisted of the bulk of 
German African territories, which were thought to require a much longer 
preparatory time before independence would be reached. The adamant Australian 
position, backed by a few other states such as New Zealand and South Africa, led 
to the third category of ‘C’ mandates, which gave far greater powers to the colonial 
metropolitan power, provided that the ‘sacred trust of civilization’ be upheld, and 
that the territory eventually be prepared for independence. Nauru, along with other 
former German Pacific territories such as New Guinea and Samoa, was given a ‘C’ 
mandate. In 1920, at the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Nauru mandate was 
awarded to the British Empire, or literally to ‘His Britannic Majesty’, and not to a 
single country. This was unique among the mandates (Viviani, 1970, 9-10).  
A year prior to the official League of Nations award of the Nauru mandate 
to the British Empire, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand had met in secret 
to divide the island’s phosphate among themselves (Hiery, 1995). The Nauru 
Island Agreement, signed in 1919 between the three countries, gave 42 percent of 
the phosphate to Great Britain, 42 percent to Australia, and 16 percent to New 
Zealand. The agreement also created the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC), 
a tri-partite body that held all title to the phosphate and the physical plant for its 
extraction, and was responsible for mining and shipping phosphate to the partner 
countries. The rights were purchased from the Pacific Phosphate Company for £3.5 
million. Though the administration of the island itself was also the responsibility of 
the three countries, Australia gradually took the lead and essentially conducted all 
administrative matters itself, with the BPC acting as a quasi-private company 
handling phosphate extraction, loading, and transport. During both the League of 
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Nations mandate period and the subsequent United Nations trusteeship Australia 
treated Nauru as its own colonial territory (e.g., Clarke, 1962). 
Though Great Britain tended to see the BPC as an investment, Australia 
and New Zealand saw the institution as a vehicle for providing their own farmers 
with subsidized fertilizer. Nauruan phosphate was sold at cost to fertilizer 
companies in the latter two countries, helping to boost agricultural output while 
encouraging farming on marginal lands—which required heavy inputs of fertilizer 
to make them productive. Australia, with its poor soils, especially benefited from 
this scheme. Any profits derived from phosphate operations, such as from the 
occasional sale of phosphate to other countries such as Japan, were divided among 
the three member states according to the same formula. 
The BPC did not operate in a vacuum on Nauru, because the island was 
inhabited. The Nauruans had their own system of land tenure, and even the 
phosphate lands, located in the centre of the island, were privately held by 
individuals (Weeramantry, 1992, 163-65). Albert Ellis, during his 1900 
reconnaissance of Banaba, had signed an agreement with the purported ‘king’ of 
that island, which, so the company argued, gave them the right to extract phosphate 
(see the Kiribati section of this chapter). A similar agreement was concluded with 
the Nauruans, giving them a small royalty, which they could use in trade, in return 
for the rights to mine phosphate on their lands. At first, the Nauruans, like the 
Banabans, were amazed that men would actually pay for rocks that seemed so 
abundant and generally useless (except for making fishing lures) (Williams and 
Macdonald, 1985; Viviani, 1970).  
The BPC generally claimed that they had no legal obligation to pay 
royalties to the Nauruans, other than perhaps some compensation for damage to 
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land, structures, and fruit trees. However, the BPC did decide to pay a small 
royalty ‘voluntarily’ (Williams and Macdonald, 1985; Weeramantry, 1992, 108). 
This royalty was generally returned to Australian interests in the form of trade. 
Indeed, this was one of the reasons that royalties were given. 
The origins of Nauru’s trust funds can be traced back to events on Banaba. 
Captain John Quayle Dickson RN, the Resident Commissioner on Banaba in 1910, 
suggested setting up a trust fund, from company resources, which would allow the 
Banabans to purchase another island at the time when theirs became uninhabitable 
from extensive mining (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 89). His successor as 
Resident Commissioner, Edward Carlyon Eliot, actually set up a trust fund in 
1913, with an initial allocation of £4734 plus a regular royalty payment of 6d per 
ton (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 100).15 The income from the fund would be 
used on the behalf of the Banabans or paid directly to them, in addition to the other 
royalties that they received. Though the Nauruans were probably unaware of the 
Banaba situation, they did begin to agitate for higher royalties and additional 
payments from the BPC in 1925 (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 205). The 
response from the Commissioners was to suggest that the Nauruans did not really 
understand money, and that they needed very little of it anyway, as their tropical 
island provided them with their every need (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 282). 
The BPC further suggested that the small royalty currently paid to the Nauruans 
was sufficient, and that it allowed them to purchase trade goods. The Nauruans, 
however, were already beginning to show a concern for their economic future; they 
                                                     
15 See also letter from Alwin R. Dickinson, BPC UK Commissioner, to Under Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, 25/7/1921. BPC Archives, Melbourne, MP1174/1/0, Item 807. According to this 
letter, 6d per ton was paid to the Banaban trust fund, and the payment to Nauruans was only ½d per 
ton. 
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knew that the phosphate would not last forever and they wanted some provision for 
their future (Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 213-14). In response, the BPC set up 
a small trust fund in 1922, the seed of what would eventually become the Nauru 
Phosphate Royalties Trust.  
The Nauru fund owes its origins to the actions of the BPC’s UK 
Commissioner, Alwin R. Dickinson. In 1921, Dickinson proposed a Nauru fund 
similar in purpose to that in Banaba. He thought that the fund would not need to be 
as large as the Banaban fund, because agricultural land would not be destroyed in 
Nauru, as it was in Banaba.16 Nevertheless, Dickinson proposed a royalty of 6d per 
ton, of which 3d per ton would be paid into the trust fund. He noted that ‘in my 
view it is at least desirable to accumulate a substantial sum for the welfare of the 
natives in Nauru’.17 The other two commissioners as well as the administrator did 
not agree, and instead proposed a total royalty of 3d per ton, with 1d per ton of this 
going to the trust fund (only one-third of what Dickinson had proposed). This 
alternative proposal was accepted by the Colonial Office on 5 August 1921, 
effectively settling the matter.18 Dickinson continued to pursue the matter but 
dropped it after correspondence from Harold Gaze, the BPC’s Administrator, 
stated that ‘correspondence with Nauru shows that the natives are satisfied with 
settlement’.19 The Nauru trust fund can thus be considered as the creation of the 
UK’s Commissioner, Alwin R. Dickinson, even though his original proposal was 
                                                     
16 BPC Archives, Melbourne, MP 1174/1/0, Item 807. 
17 BPC Archives, Melbourne, MP 1174/1/0, Item 807. This file contains correspondence between 
Dickinson and the Australian Commissioner H.B. Pope, the New Zealand Commissioner Albert 
Ellis, and the BPC’s Administrator, Harold Gaze, dating from 1921. 
18 The increase in the total royalty from ½d to 3d per ton did not sit well with Australian Prime 
Minister Billy Hughes; Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, wrote to him on 20 June 1921 
outlining the new terms and asking for his cooperation. BPC Archives, Melbourne, K178/0, Item 
21. 
19 BPC Archives, Melbourne, MP 1174/1/0, Item 807. Note initialled by H. Gaze, 22/12/1921. 
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watered down. 
This fund received less than 0.1 percent of the total value of the phosphate. 
Conceived in secret prior to the League of Nations mandate in 1919, the BPC 
continued to be a highly secretive body. Financial information was kept under 
wraps, and not often released—and usually under external pressure—to either the 
League of Nations or even to the partner governments (Williams and Macdonald, 
1985, 279). The Commissioners felt that financial information, which included the 
value of the phosphate, was best kept within the BPC and not revealed to the 
Nauruans or to the foreign public (Weeramantry, 1992, 105, 232).20 This legacy of 
secrecy was to last even to the present, and strongly affected, and affects, the 
manner in which the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust is operated.21 The 
arguments used by the BPC, that the Nauruan public did not understand the arcane 
world of international finance, are still used today (Ellis, 1935, 259; Weeramantry, 
1992; The Visionary, 2001).22 
Nauruan concerns for their future continued to grow. Their island home 
was gradually being destroyed by the mining operations, reducing the amount of 
land suitable for agriculture or living.23 At one point the Nauruans considered 
relocating to another island; this proposal never came into fruition because of the 
                                                     
20 ‘Promises, tricks, and deceit’ were used in dealing with the Nauruans, according to Hiery (1995, 
241). 
21 For details on the BPC’s secrecy, see Williams and Macdonald, 1985, 359, 364, 472-73. Connell 
(2004) notes the extreme secrecy of Nauru’s first independent government under President Hammer 
DeRoburt, quoting a 1987 Australian government cable stating that ‘DeRoburt himself has a 
secretive and arrogant approach to government’. DeRoburt’s successors continued the same style of 
governance. 
22 My informal interviews with a number of Nauruans and Nauruan residents in 2002 revealed a 
general popular pattern of mistrust in government, a lack of knowledge and feeling of involvement 
with the trust fund, and a perception of government corruption and waste. Moreover, all of the 
Nauruans interviewed said they had no idea of what would happen when the phosphate runs out. 
23 Hiery notes that ‘the mandatories used all means at their disposal to break Nauruan resistance to 
the exploitation of their environment and the destruction of their fields and gardens’ (1995, 241).  
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lack of a suitable island on which the Nauruans could have complete sovereignty. 
Instead, Nauruan leaders proposed independence for the island, with complete 
Nauruan control of the phosphate industry and its revenues (Weeramantry, 1992, 
265-306). 
Nauru’s independence was granted in 1968, and the newly-independent 
republic assumed control of the phosphate industry and the trust funds, now known 
as the Nauru Phosphate Royalty Trust, with four component parts. Each of these 
components had its special function, but it is the Nauruan Long Term Investment 
Fund, which was supposed to provide for Nauru’s economic needs in the post-
phosphate era, that is of particular interest. 
 
Fund governance 
At Nauru’s independence in 1968, the assets held by the Commonwealth 
trusteeship and the British Phosphate Commissioners were transferred to the 
Nauruan government. These included both the Nauru Phosphate Corporation and 
the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust.  
The Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust (NPRT) is administered directly by 
the Nauru Ministry of Finance. Its operations are highly secretive, and little is 
known about the exact administrative structure. A Trust Board does exist, but its 
composition is uncertain. The Nauruan parliament is empowered to examine the 
reports of the NPRT, but in practice it does not always do so. The tight circle of 
control of Nauru politics by a small clique of politicians effectively seals off details 
of the fund’s structure from the general public.24 
                                                     
24 Interview with John Raige, Nauru, 2002, and information from Kieren Keke and David Abeang, 
Naoero Amo political party, Nauru, 2002. 
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The Nauruan government operates with a great degree of secrecy, 
especially with respect to financial matters. Charges of corruption have been rife. 
For example, the Nauruan newspaper The Visionary has noted that ‘government 
accountability to the people has been lacking in Nauru for decades (The Visionary 
12-01, 2001, 7). The same source describes the Nauruan government as a secret 
organisation and notes that the media has had very little access to Nauruan 
politicians. Another Nauruan newspaper, The Nauruan, found that former Nauruan 
president Kennan R. Adeang was paid a $600,000 ‘consulting fee’ in order to 
investigate the possibilities of establishing an offshore banking centre in the 
country; Adeang was also paid a monthly $50,000 ‘consulting fee’, which was 
listed in the national budget without explanation (The Nauruan 2(1) and 2(2), 
1998). The NPRT operates within this context of secrecy and corruption. 
The NPRT is divided into four parts, each of them separate trust funds, 
though they are administered as a single unit and their investments are 
commingled. Fund 1 is the Nauruan Long Term Investment Fund, which is 
supposed to invest for the future in order to provide the Nauruan government with 
an income when phosphate supplies are depleted. Fund 2 is the Nauruan Land 
Owners Royalty Trust Fund (RONWAN), which is designed to provide a 
continuing stream of earnings to Nauruan landowners whose land has been 
affected by phosphate mining. Fund 3 is the Nauru Housing Fund, established in 
order to provide affordable and heavily-subsidised housing to Nauruans. This fund 
is insignificant in size when compared to the other three. Fund 4 is the Nauru 
Rehabilitation Fund, designed to save phosphate revenues and use them to 
rehabilitate Nauru’s environment, which has suffered considerably from mining. 
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Figure 6.1.  Nauru trust funds and their links to revenue sources and expenditures. 
Source: Government of Nauru 
 
The NPRT has been implicated in several schemes to generate additional 
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revenues through the sale of Nauruan passports to foreigners. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
one of these schemes, depicting a complicated and perhaps fanciful outline of how 
passport revenue would enter the trust fund.25 More important for this analysis is 
some indication of how the trust fund, labelled here as NPRT, is linked to other 
government operations.  
 
Generation of fund capital 
The NPRT receives a share of the revenues generated by the Nauru Phosphate 
Corporation (NPC), whose sole business activity is the mining and export of 
Nauruan phosphate. The exact amount of the royalty payment is unknown, but it 
has probably varied over time, depending on the financial position of the NPC. As 
of 1998, about $17 million of back royalties were owed to the NPRT and listed by 
the fund as receivables (see Table 6.3). As NPC operations gradually wind down 
due to depletion of the phosphate, the payment to the NPRT, if any, will decline as 
well and may even cease to exist. 
 
Geographies of fund asset distribution 
As many scholars have deplored, Nauruan financial information is difficult to 
obtain (Connell, 2004).26 I was, however, fortunate in acquiring copies of some 
financial materials submitted to the Nauruan parliament, consisting of NPRT 
                                                     
25 Nauruan passports have been sold to overseas buyers (The Nauruan 1(5), 1997). Changes made 
to the Nauruan Community Ordinance (Amendment) Act of 1997 and the Passports Act of 1997 
created a new class of Nauruan citizens, which gave the right of Nauruan residence and the right to 
own property, but required investment in the country (The Nauruan 1(4), 1997). The desire to use 
passports as a sovereignty resource continues in Nauru. During my visit to the island in 2002, I met 
a rather shifty Australian ‘consultant’ who was attempting to convince the Nauruan government to 
invest in his passport sales scheme. 
26 Connell’s paper notes that ‘little information has ever been available on the finances of the 
NPRT’. Connell himself does not include any financial data on the NPRT in his paper. 
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financial reports for 1998.27 
The data presented here reveal a great deal about the financial position of 
the NPRT. Table 6.2 shows the total assets of the trust fund, disaggregated into the 
four component funds, for 1998, as stated in the fund’s financial reports. Total 
assets are listed as $2.1 billion, of which nearly $1.4 billion is in the form of 
receivables. This table also shows that Fund 2 has the largest balance, followed by 
Fund 4 and Fund 1, with Fund 3 being very much smaller than the others. 
 
Fund 1 $163,041,000 
Fund 2 $349,038,000 
Fund 3 $1,954,000 
Fund 4 $226,985,000 
Subtotala $741,017,000 
Receivablesb $1,375,783,500 
Total $2,116,800,500 
 
Table 6.2.  Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust reported assets (1998) (A$) 
 
a Includes $239,486,000 in loans collateralized against the trust fund. 
b See Table N-2 for details. 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
 
The total amount of payments receivable, nearly $1.4 billion, is disaggregated in 
Table 6.3. This table reveals that the bulk of these receivables are from the 
Republic of Nauru Finance Corporation (RONFIN), a kind of on-lending agency 
that made loans to other agencies, using NPRT assets as collateral. RONFIN 
                                                     
27 Information provided through John Raige during my visit to Nauru in 2002, with information also 
from Kieren Keke and David Abeang, Nauru, 2002. Nauruan financial data is not highly reliable,  
and even the trust’s independent auditor, Pannell Kerr Forster of Melbourne, has not approved the 
reports. The auditor refused to state that whether Nauru’s financial statements accurately reflected 
the financial position of the NPRT because of the trust’s failure to disclose information (even to its 
own auditors!) and because properties are listed at values disclosed by trustees, and not by 
independent external sources (The Visionary 2-01, 2001). However, the information provided here 
is the best available, and I believe that this is the first time it has been made available to an 
academic researcher. 
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receivables accounted for $930 million of the total NPRT receivables. The second 
largest share of receivables was from the Republic of Nauru itself, and this figure 
is not disaggregated further. Other Nauruan entities, including the Bank of Nauru, 
the Nauru Superannuation Board, the Nauru Phosphate Corporation, and others, 
also owed money to the NPRT.28  
 
RONFIN $930,000,000 
Republic of Nauru $391,391,000 
Bank of Nauru $220,500 
Nauru Superannuation Board $2,286,000 
NPC $1,321,000 
Other controlled entities $33,346,000 
Phosphate royalties owed by government $17,219,000 
Total $1,375,783,500 
 
Table 6.3.  NPRT reported payments receivable (1998) ($A) 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
 
Table 6.4 shows NPRT reported income for 1998, broken down by the four 
component funds. The total income reported was $71.9 million. 
 
Fund 1 $33.6 million 
Fund 2 $18 million 
Fund 3 $1.7 million 
Fund 4 $18.6 million 
Total $71.9 million 
 
Table 6.4.  NPRT reported income (30 June 1998) (A$) 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
 
Nauruan budget estimates for 2000-2001 gave an estimated total revenue of $36.4 
million, of which $11 million was accounted for by the Department of Finance and 
$11.5 million by the Island Development and Industry Secretariat. The breakdown 
                                                     
28 The Nauruan Phosphate Corporation has missed most of its payments to the NPRT since 1995 
(The Visionary 2-01, 2001). 
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of the latter is shown in Table 6.5, with roughly equal parts of this revenue source 
derived from the activities of the NPC, the Bank of Nauru, fishing licences to 
foreign vessels, and international leases. The budget does not indicate the source of 
the Department of Finance’s contribution, but it is likely that this represents part of 
the earnings of the NPRT. 
 
NPC $3 million 
Bank of Nauru $3 million 
Fisheries $3 million 
International Leases $2.5 million 
Total $11.5 million 
 
Table 6.5.  Breakdown of Island Development and Industry (IDI) revenue 
contribution (Budget Head 02) estimates for 2000-2001 (A$) 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
 
What, then, is the real financial position of the NPRT? Table 6.6 illustrates my 
calculations as to the real value of the trust fund. The fund’s recorded balance is 
about $2.1 billion, of which $1.3 billion is in the form of payments receivable that 
are highly unlikely to be paid. Many of these entities owning money to the trust 
fund are now insolvent or very nearly so. Thus we can assume that the trust fund 
will never receive these payments. This leaves a subtotal of $766 million in fund 
assets. 
 This $766 million consists of receivables listed as fund assets in the amount 
of $457 million. These receivables are also unlikely to be paid, and should be 
written off as well, leaving a subtotal of $309 million in fund assets. Of these 
assets, $239 million are collateralized loans, in which NPRT assets have been used 
as collateral by other Nauruan government entities, such as RONFIN. As the debts 
of RONFIN and other agencies will not be paid, the NPRT assets will be forfeited 
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and cannot be considered as trust fund assets. If we deduct these collateralized 
assets, we are left with a figure of $70 million. Of these remaining assets, $26 
million are still receivable. As they are also not likely to be collected, we can 
deduct them as well, leaving a final figure of $44 million. This gives a much more 
accurate depiction of the real value of the NPRT. Though on paper it may appear 
to have a balance over $2 billion, in reality the balance is $44 million at best, and 
even these assets may be over-valued or non-liquid. Table 6.6 thus illustrates the 
rather poor financial position of the NPRT. 
 
Recorded fund balance $2,116 million 
Less: Receivables written off ($1,350 million) 
Subtotal $766 million 
Less: Receivables listed as fund assets ($457 million) 
Subtotal $309 million 
Less: Collateralized loans ($239 million) 
Subtotal $70 million 
Less: Assets still receivable ($26 million) 
Total estimated fund assets $44 million 
 
Table 6.6.  NPRT estimated real assets (1998) (A$) 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
 
Turning now to the kinds of assets in which the NPRT invests, we can see 
in Table 6.7 the fund’s asset breakdown by asset class. Five main classes are 
shown. The first, real property, accounted for 11% of fund assets in 1998 (a 
breakdown of properties held is shown in Table 6.9 and discussed below). The 
NPRT, unlike its counterparts in Kiribati, Alaska, and Alberta, held no fixed 
income securities. An insignificant amount was held in equities and cash. By far 
the bulk of the fund’s assets, 86.6%, were in the form of accounts receivable. As 
noted above, these receivables will never be received, given the Nauruan 
government’s insolvent financial position, and thus cannot be considered true 
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assets, as discussed above. 
 
Asset Class In A$ As % of total assets 
Real propertya $234,000,000 11.00% 
Fixed income securities 0 0 
Equities $38,000 0.002% 
Cash $3,800,000 0.18% 
Accounts receivableb $1,832,783,500 86.60% 
Other and unknown $46,179,000 2.18% 
Total $2,116,800,500 100% 
 
Table 6.7.  NPRT assets by asset class (1998) 
 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
a Does not include loans made to property controlling entities (which are listed under receivables); 
valuations in Table 6.6 include these loans. 
b Includes both accounts receivable owed to NPRT (see Table 6.3) and fund assets listed as 
receivables 
 
The nature of the NPRT’s assets is peculiar. The fund has eschewed the 
most typical classes of trust fund investments, fixed income securities and equities, 
and instead has loaned the bulk of its assets to other Nauruan government entities. 
How these government entities have invested these loans is unclear, but my 
sources in Nauru suggested that at least part of these funds was used to prop up the 
national airline, Air Nauru, and the national shipping company, both of which are 
thought to be unprofitable. These kinds of investments are very questionable for 
fund assets held in trust for beneficiaries. 
 The bulk of the NPRT’s assets appear on the balance sheet as receivables 
from the Republic of Nauru Finance Corporation (RONFIN). This is a state-
controlled on-lending agency, empowered to carry on the Nauruan government’s 
business of finance and investment, including the issuance of securities (such as 
government bonds). The RONFIN Act of 1972 allows RONFIN to use NPRT assets 
as collateral, meaning that the investment practices of RONFIN can substantially 
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affect the financial position of the NPRT. I was unable to obtain financial 
statements for RONFIN, so the details of its investment practices cannot be 
included here. 
Table 6.8 presents the same data as in Table 6.7, but with payments 
receivable removed. A similar picture emerges. If these payments are removed 
from the balance sheet, then receivables listed as assets account for almost 62% of 
total assets, with real property now accounting for over 31%. Again, fixed income 
is nonexistent while equities, cash, and other assets are negligible.  
Table 6.9 illustrates the geography of the NPRT’s real property investments, 
showing the name of the property, to which of the four component funds it is 
attached, the value of the property in 1998, the amount collateralized, and the 
lender who holds the mortgage, lien, or other claim on the property. 
 
Asset Class In A$ As % of total assets 
Real propertya $234,000,000 31.58 
Fixed income securities 0 0 
Equities $38,000 0.005% 
Cash $3,800,000 0.51% 
Accounts receivable $457,000,000 61.67% 
Other and unknown $46,179,000 6.23% 
Total $741,017,000 100% 
 
Table 6.8.  NPRT recorded assets by asset class (1998) 
 
Source: Calculated from Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Financial Statements (1998) 
a Does not include loans made to property controlling entities (which are listed under receivables); 
valuations in Table 6.6 include these loans. 
 
 The majority of the fund’s real property assets are located in Australia and 
the United States. Australian properties are concentrated in Melbourne, and include 
most famously Nauru House (as of 2005 no longer owned by the NPRT or any 
Nauruan entity), the Southern Cross Hotel (partial share), and the Savoy Park 
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Plaza. Nauruan real estate investments have been largely in commercial office and 
hotel properties. 
 
Property Fund Value (1998) Amount 
Collateralized 
Loan 
     
Australia     
Nauru House, 
Melbourne 
Fund 2 – 100% $112.8 million $47.5 million National Mutual – 
RONFIN 
Savoy Park Plaza, 
Melbourne 
Fund 2 – 100% $30 million $31.25 million Citibank – RONFIN 
Savoy Tavern, 
Melbourne 
Fund 2 – 100% $3.5 million   
Islanders Place, 
Melbourne 
Fund 1 – 100% $500,000 $1.2 million Gourlay Nominees 
– loan to RONFIN 
Wills St, Kew, Vic Fund 1 – 100% $600,000   
Southern Cross 
Hotel, Melbourne 
Fund 1 – 76.95% 
Fund 2 – 8.53% 
Fund 4 – 14.52% 
NPRT’s share 
$53.9 million 
  
Railway Square, 
Sydney 
Fund 2 – 100%  $43.1 million 
$7.8 million 
Bankers Trust 
Multiplex 
USA     
Hawaiki Tower, 
Honolulu 
Fund 1 – 48.26% 
Fund 4 – 51.74% 
$113.2 million $69.8 million Fincapital & various 
other loans – loan to 
NPRT 
Forest Heights, 
Portland 
Fund 1 – 72.72% 
Fund 4 – 27.28% 
50.1 million $2.9 million Centennial Bank – 
NPRT 
Pacific House, 
Washington 
Fund 1 – 74.76% 
Fund 4 – 25.24% 
$7.5 million   
Bentwood, Texas Fund 1 – 100% $54.8 million $13 million Drago Doic – NPRT 
Raytheon Building, 
Houston 
Fund 1 – 75% 
Fund 4 – 25% 
$15 million $10 million Coastal Bank – 
NPRT 
Pacific Star Hotel, 
Guam 
Fund 1 – 24.05% 
Fund 2 – 67.67% 
Fund 4 – 8.28% 
$139.4 million $13.5 million Fincapital & Bank 
of Guam – loans to 
RON Guam 
Yigo Home, Guam Fund 1 – 100% $330,191   
Guam Consulate Fund 1 – 100% $467,402   
Other     
16 Kimberley St, 
Suva, FIJI 
Fund 1 – 100% $288,583   
Sukuna Rd, Suva, 
FIJI 
Fund 1 – 100% $173,000   
Grand Pacific 
Hotel, Suva, FIJI 
Fund 1 – 70% 
Fund 4- 30% 
$6.7 million   
Taiwan Consulate Fund 1 – 100% $490,000   
Western Samoa 
Land 
Fund – 100% $1.4 million   
Denig School, 
NAURU 
Fund 4 – 100% NPRT’s share 
$480,000 
  
TOTAL  $591,629,196 $240,050,000  
 
Table 6.9. NPRT real estate assets, 1998. 
Source: Government of Nauru Budget (1998) 
 
NPRT assets in the United States are also considerable, and include properties in 
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Hawai‘i, Oregon, Texas, and Guam, among others. Smaller holdings are in various 
Oceanic countries including Fiji, Samoa, and a small investment in Nauru itself. 
Most of the more valuable properties have been collateralized and as of 2005 many 
have been lost through foreclosure. In the context of real property, at least, Nauru 
attempted to diversify risk by investing outside the country. 
 
Distribution of fund earnings 
The distribution of the NPRT’s income is unclear, but some facts may be 
ascertained. Of the NPRT’s four separate trust funds, one of them, the Nauruan 
Land Owners Royalty Trust Fund (RONWAN), is supposed to make payments to 
individual Nauruan landowners. In 2001, a Nauruan newspaper noted that 
RONWAN was experiencing a shortage of cash and could not meet its payout 
requirements to beneficiaries (The Visionary 14-01, 2001). At about the same time 
the Bank of Nauru was declared insolvent, and depositors are restricted in the 
amount of cash that they may withdraw from the bank each week. In 2002 this was 
limited to only a few hundred dollars per week. The disposition of earnings from 
the other three NPRT trust funds may either be redeposited into the fund, or 
transferred to Nauru’s general fund. The exact distribution cannot be determined at 
this point. 
 
3.3  Conclusion  
Data from 1998 suggest that the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust has a real value 
of only around $44 million, not the $2 billion claimed in the fund’s financial 
reports. Even this amount may overstate the value of the fund, as, over the past 
several years, the fund has been forced to sell off many of its real property assets in 
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order to meet its debt obligations. The NPRT may in fact have assets considerably 
less than $44 million. 
 Nauru’s fund was established in 1922 during the League of Nations 
mandate era, when the island was administered by Australia and the British 
Phosphate Commissioners, who wrapped their financial activities in a veil of 
secrecy. This secrecy continued into the independence era. This lack of openness 
and transparency contributed to the poor performance of the fund, as assets were 
used for collateral for other Nauru entities in the absence of any real oversight.  
 Contrary to the model described in this thesis, Nauru chose to invest the 
bulk of its assets within Nauru itself, in the form of loans to other Nauruan 
agencies; the country did not separate the site of wealth generation from the site of 
investment. Nauru thus put its fund into a difficult position on two counts: by 
investing locally, rather than in global financial markets, and by choosing high 
risk, low return investments, rather than a more balanced portfolio that would be 
available in global markets.  
The financial situation for Nauru is now especially critical, as, unlike most 
other Pacific islands, Nauru has virtually no subsistence food production, and even 
fresh water must be imported. Most Nauruans do not work, but are supported by 
royalty payments received from their own phosphate lands. Health and education 
benefits, as well as island infrastructure, have been funded by the Nauruan 
government. Now that phosphate stocks are running out, both individual royalties 
and state resource revenues will be severely restricted.29 
                                                     
29 Many recent journalistic sources have commented on Nauru’s financial problems. See, for 
example, Easdown, 1988; North, 1993; The Australian, 2001; Skehan, 2003, Steward and Chulov, 
2003; and Callick, 2004. Nauru has recently experimented with alternative sources of revenue, but 
these have also resulted in disaster. For example, the United States government recently charged 
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Nauru’s historic lack of transparency and openness with respect to fiscal 
policy and activity, and its apparent unwillingness to use qualified investment 
advisors in other countries, precipitated a dramatic decline in the value of the trust 
fund such that it can no longer provide the benefits that it was supposed to provide. 
Nauru thus illustrates the perils associated with secrecy, with local investment, and 
with the failure to diversify the investment portfolio. 
 
4.  TONGA 
The Kingdom of Tonga set up a small trust fund in 1989 with the professed 
intention of using the fund to stimulate economic development. Under the 
country’s traditional and nearly absolutist monarchy, the fund quickly became 
implicated in the Royal Family’s penchant for esoteric investments and schemes. 
The fund itself derived its capital from the dubious sale of Tongan passports to 
non-Tongans, and the controversy that this policy generated both within the 
Kingdom and outside continued in the management of the fund’s assets. Tonga 
provides an example of a trust fund that was mismanaged due to limitations on its 
accountability and transparency of governance. I include it in this thesis as an 
example of a failed trust fund and of the problems potentially inherent in funds 
derived from sovereignty resources. 
 
4.1  Tonga and the politics of sovereignty resources 
The Kingdom of Tonga, the only remaining independent kingdom in Oceania, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Nauru with allowing the Russian mafia to launder US$70 billion through Nauruan banks in 1998, 
and threatened to restrict the island’s ability to conduct transactions in US dollars (Hilzenrath, 
1999). 
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consists of several small archipelagos and several outlying islands in the South 
Pacific (see Map 1). The capital is Nuku‘alofa on the main island of Tongatapu. Of 
the 169 Tongan islands, 36 are inhabited. Tonga is distinctive among Oceanic 
countries in that it was never colonized by any foreign power, though it was a 
British protectorate from 1900 to its formal independence in 1970. Tonga is 748 
km2 in size and has a population of about 108,000, nearly all of whom are Tongan. 
GDP (PPP) per capita was about US$2200 in 2001. Tonga uses its own currency, 
the Pa‘anga. 
 Tonga’s political system, as a kingdom, is different from its Pacific 
neighbours. The King—Taufa‘ahau Tupou IV—has nearly absolute power. The 
Tongan Legislative Assembly has 30 seats, 10 of which consist of cabinet 
ministers appointed directly by the King, 2 are governors of the northern 
archipelagos of Vava‘u and Ha‘apai and are also directly appointed by the King, 9 
are elected by the country’s 33 nobles, and 9 are People’s Representatives and are 
popularly elected. The King therefore appoints 12 of the 33 seats directly and 
exerts an influence over the election of the seats reserved for the nobility. Tonga’s 
Constitution can easily be amended by the Legislative Assembly. Members of the 
Royal Family own or control the majority of Tonga’s major businesses including 
its communication, internet, and brewing sectors.  
The Tongan economy depends heavily on tourism, fishing, and agriculture, 
the latter including exports of squash, coconuts, bananas, and vanilla. Remittances 
from overseas nationals are also important and supplement the subsistence 
livelihoods of many Tongans. Given this dependence on agriculture and 
remittances, the Tongan government, and the Royal Family in particular, have 
attempted to diversify the economy and increase the Kingdom’s revenues by 
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developing Tonga’s sovereignty resources. These include offshore banking, marine 
vessel registration, and the sale of passports to non-nationals. Most of these 
ventures were unsuccessful and brought censure on the government, but continued 
nevertheless. Nearly all of these projects have been approved or sponsored by the 
Royal Family, and their activities remain highly secretive.  
Tonga’s efforts to establish itself as a offshore banking centre have met 
with failure. As Van Fossen notes, ‘new offshore banking legislation introduced in 
1984 led to the licensing of a number of banks that defrauded depositors. Almost 
all were deregistered’ (2002, 48). Tonga was unable to enter successfully into a 
highly competitive industry, largely due to the fraudulent practices of these banks 
and the consequent stigma attached to the country’s banking sector. 
Tonga has also been equally unfortunate in its ventures into flag of 
convenience vessel registry. In January 2002, the Israeli navy and air force seized 
the Tongan-registered ship Karine A in the Red Sea. The ship was carrying 50 tons 
of arms destined for the Palestinian Authority. The weaponry included 122 mm 
and 107 mm Katyusha rockets with 20 km and 8 km ranges, respectively, 120 mm 
and 80 mm mortar shells, anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, sniper rifles, 
Kalashnikov rifles, and assorted ammunition (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2002). The ship was loaded in Iran. The capture of this ship provided yet another 
embarrassment for the government, especially as the country could be perceived as 
supportive of terrorism. Tonga banned further ship registration in 2002, but 170 
vessels still sail under the Tongan flag (Fiji Times, 2002).  
Other Tongan ventures, such as the Tongasat satellite company, which 
controls six orbital slots, and the licensing of Tonga’s top level internet domain, 
‘.to’, are thought to be more profitable, but these ventures are controlled by the 
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Royal Family (Tongasat in particular by Princess Pilolevu Tuita) and do not make 
public their financial data. 
 
4.2  The Tonga Trust Fund 
The Tonga Trust Fund is embroiled in this world of speculative investment and 
possible corruption. The Legislative Assembly passed the Tonga Trust Fund Act in 
1989, which, according to Kenneth Bain,30 ‘provided for the management of 
moneys segregated from the ordinary revenues of Government to be used to fund 
development projects approved by the Legislative Assembly’ (Bain, 1993, 165). 
The fund quickly became a creature of the Royal Family and reflected its interests. 
 
Fund governance 
The TTF is controlled by the King and is managed by three trustees: the prime 
minister (the King’s son), the minister of finance, and the minister of justice (Van 
Fossen, 2002, 48-49). These trustees establish investment policy in consultation 
with the Privy Council (ADB, 2001). Despite the fact that audits were supposed to 
take place and the results made available to the Legislative Assembly, ‘the 
objective of the trust fund was clear: to keep the money away from the ordinary 
budgetary and foreign exchange processes and rules of government (Bain, 1993, 
165). As a result, the fund does not release financial information. Table 6.10 
presents some limited information about the TTF’s accounts as gleaned by Van 
Fossen (2002) from Tongan budgetary documents. 
                                                     
30 Kenneth Bain served as Secretary to the Tongan Government in the 1950s and has published 
several books about Tonga, including The New Friendly Islanders (1993), which received the 
king’s imprimatur and even included a foreword by the monarch himself. 
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Generation of fund capital 
The Tonga Trust Fund has its origins in the exploitation of a sovereignty resource: 
the sale of Tongan passports to non-nationals. In 1984 the Tongan government 
began to sell passports, under an Act of the Legislative Assembly and under the 
King’s authority, to Chinese nationals through an office in Hong Kong (Moala, 
2002). These passports were of two types: Tonga protected persons passports, 
which were essentially travel documents and did not confer citizenship or the right 
of residence in Tonga, and special citizenship passports, which granted 
‘citizenship’ but did not confer the right of residence or other rights belonging to 
Tongan citizens. Protected persons passports sold for US$17,000 to individuals 
and US$25,000 to families, while citizenship passports sold for US$35,000 plus a 
US$2000 handling fee (Moala, 2002, 78). The government also sold passports to 
citizens of other countries, including nationals of South Africa, Libya, Thailand, 
and the Philippines, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos included (Lawson, 1996, 102-
103). Both categories of passports were in a different class from the normal 
Tongan passports, and did not confer right of residence in Tonga. In total 426 
passports were sold under this act and possibly more during other time periods 
(Moala, 2002; Goodwin, 2003).31  
 The sale of passports to non-Tongans was challenged by several of the 
People’s Representatives in the Legislative Assembly, notably including ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva, the leader of Tonga’s small but influential Pro-Democracy Movement. 
Pohiva and others challenged the sale on the grounds that passport recipients were 
                                                     
31 218 of which were sold after the repeal of the 1984 Act in 1988. 
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not entitled to Tongan citizenship under Clause 29 of the Constitution, which 
requires five year’s residence in Tonga in order to qualify. At about the same time, 
purchasers of these passports began to discover that their new Tongan passports, 
acquired in good faith, were not being accepted as valid travel documents by many 
countries, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. Purchasers began to 
demand that the Tongan government take action to normalise their passports.  
Faced with challenges from both the local Pro-Democracy Movement and 
dissatisfied passport recipients, the Tongan government moved to normalise the 
passports. The challenges had embarrassed32 the Tongan government and resulted 
in the Nationality Act of 1988, which repealed the 1984 Act, and the Constitution 
was amended in 1991 to further clarify the situation. Passport recipients were 
granted full Tongan citizenship and right of residence. Essentially, as Kalafi 
Moala,33 the editor of the Taimi o Tonga newspaper, noted, the government tried to 
retrospectively pass laws to make legal what they had done illegally (Moala, 2002, 
81). The Tonga Trust Fund (TTF) was formed with money from these passport 
sales.  
 
Geographies of fund asset distribution 
The majority of TTF assets were deposited into a Bank of America account in San 
Francisco, though the TTF did invest in other projects as well, though what these 
were remains uncertain (Moala, 2002, 106, 119; ADB, 2001).  
                                                     
32 Lawson (1996, 102-103) notes that one of the implications of the passport scandal was the 
decline in respect for the Tongan nobility; and that women, rather than nobles, were increasingly 
seen as the real forces behind maintaining Tongan traditions. 
33 Kalafi Moala, editor of the country’s ‘opposition’ newspaper Taimi o Tonga [Times of Tonga], is 
a long-time critic of the Tongan government’s absolutism. He has been arrested and imprisoned in 
Tonga on several occasions and is currently living in New Zealand, as he is banned from entering 
the Kingdom. 
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Year TTF reported 
assets 
TTF budgeted 
development 
contributions 
TTF actual 
development 
contributions 
Total actual 
development 
budget 
Total 
recurrent 
revenue 
1988-89 $8.1 0 0 $8.4 $29.0 
1989-90 $19.4 $1.6 $1.7 $8.0 $32.3 
1990-91 $24.7 $6.2 $1.6 $9.6 $36.6 
1991-92 $27.6 $5.6 $0.2 $5.6 $34.8 
1992-93 $26.5 $10.8 $1.8 $7.2 $37.6 
1993-94 $27.8 $8.4 $0.0 $8.5 $40.2 
1994-95 $28.1 $2.5 $1.6 $16.2 $45.6 
1995-96 $30.1 $6.4 $1.1 $13.8 $50.9 
1996-97 $32.3 $6.5 $0.9 $12.8 $49.2 
1997-98 $32.3 $4.0 $3.6 $12.6 $41.7 
1998-99 $42.0 $2.3 $1.1 - - 
1999-00 $43.1 - - - - 
 
Table 6.10  Tonga Trust Fund assets and development  
contributions 1988-2000 (US$ million) 
Notes: - means data not available. Fund balances as of 31 March of each year. 
Source: Van Fossen (2002). 
 
 The chequered history of the TTF did not end with the scandalous source of 
its assets. The Bank of America cheque account, estimated to contain between 
US$21 and US$35 million (Moala, 2002; Goodwin, 2003), was discovered in 1994 
by a Bank of America employee, Jesse Dean Bogdanoff,34 who, during a routine 
audit, was surprised to discover so large a sum in a non-interest-bearing account. 
According to his own story (Goodwin, 2003; Moala, 2002), Bogdanoff made 
several attempts to contact the Tongan government to suggest other investment 
options. Not getting any response, he departed for Tonga himself and managed to 
gain an audience with the King. As his Bank of America contract prohibited 
Bogdanoff from stealing a client from the Bank, he apparently convinced the King 
                                                     
34 In addition to his employment with Bank of America, Bogdanoff also ran his own company, 
Wellness Technologies, which specialized in the sale of magnets to cure back pain. He is also an 
active member of the Buddhist sect Soka Gokkai. 
 
Chapter 6: Oceania  227 
in 1999 to appoint him as a financial advisor to Tonga and was granted the 
additional title of Court Jester.35 He was given an annual salary of US$250,000 
(Goodwin, 2003). 
 After several years of providing investment advice and seeing the value of 
the TTF increase (due in large part to rising global financial markets in the mid 
1990s) Bogdanoff persuaded the King to invest a large portion of the fund’s assets 
(actual amount unknown, but thought to be around US$26 million according to the 
Tonga Star newspaper) in a Nevada [USA]-based company called Millennium 
Asset Management Services (MAMS).36 MAMS invested in viatical settlements, 
in which the company bought life insurance policies from people with termina
illnesses (often AIDS), was named beneficiary, and then collected a large return on 
the death of the insured. Bogdanoff claimed that the investment would produce a 
30% return in 18-24 months (Goodwin, 2003). TTF assets were invested in 
MAMS, but failed to produce the desired returns and the invested capital was 
never seen again. The mysterious vanishing of the trust fund assets (the location or 
dispersal of the assets is still unknown) provided a second embarrassment for the 
Tongan government.  
l 
                                                     
 In 2002, after several Tongan ministers visited the United States and were 
unsuccessful in locating the missing millions, the Tongan government filed suit 
against Bogdanoff in a San Francisco court, charging him with fraud, negligence, 
35 His official title was ‘King of Jesters and Jester to the King’. He was photographed in motley 
wearing a green, gold, and purple jester’s cap. The basis of Bogdanoff’s claim to this title, as he 
told the King, was his birthday on 1 April. 
36 Other investments of TTF assets, under the direction of Bogdanoff, were in various fly-by-night 
dot com companies and in a company whose business was the generation of electricity from 
flywheel devices. Only a small portion of TTF assets went into anything resembling development 
projects in Tonga and most of these were in the form of loans (Van Fossen, 2002). Some of these 
loans were listed on the books as TTF assets but had no likelihood of being recovered. 
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and breach of fiduciary duty. The suit claims that he skimmed about US$5 million 
off the top and that he received commissions from MAMS itself of up to US$1 
million (Goodwin, 2003; Tonga Star, 2002). Bogdanoff claimed that he was misled 
by MAMS and therefore he is as innocent as the Tongan government. He also 
claimed that, in any case, the Royal Family merit this financial loss: ‘karmically 
they deserve it because they have been ripping off the Tongan people for 1000 
years’ (quoted in Goodwin, 2003, 19). The response of the King to this scandal 
(and the loss of the bulk of the TTF’s assets) was to ignore it. The King has made 
no mention of the trust fund’s losses in any of his public statements.37 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
The Tonga Trust Fund differs in part from the other trust funds considered here as 
it was never intended (except perhaps rhetorically) as a trust in which a 
government acts as trustee for citizen beneficiaries; the TTF was clearly a creature 
of the Royal Family. The development aspect of the TTF was not entirely 
fictitious, in that some loans were made to other government agencies for 
potentially developmental purposes. Van Fossen (2002, 48) notes that US$10.7 
million of TTF assets were listed as accounts receivable from the Tongan 
government, a sum, however, that is unlikely to be repaid. The TTF invested in 
overseas assets in an attempt to increase its revenues through high-risk investments 
rather than to diversify or globalise its portfolio.  
                                                     
37 My requests to the Tongan government for information on the TTF naturally went unanswered, 
but corroboration for most of the events related here and compiled from journalistic sources was 
given by Angus Macdonald, Australian High Commissioner in Tonga, in an interview in 
Nuku‘alofa in 2002. The many Tongans I spoke to while on Tongatapu typically expressed great 
respect for the Royal Family, but were rather more cynical about the government’s investments and 
those of the TTF in particular. 
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 Tonga’s political climate, as the last bastion of monarchy in the Pacific, 
may have some considerable bearing on the management of the fund. 
Anthropologists Patrick Kirch and Marshall Sahlins (1992), in their work on the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, describe what they call the ‘political economy of grandeur’, in 
which the status of Polynesian royalty and nobles is linked to personal possessions 
and the flaunting of wealth. Speaking of royal and noble chiefs in Hawai‘i, Kirch 
and Sahlins observe that ‘each one felt compelled to demonstrate in the new 
medium of commercial prowess that he or she was equal to and better than, and 
same and different from, the others’ (1992, 77). These authors go on to describe 
the thirst for novelty, the desire to hoard treasure, and the status-enhancing 
obligation to feed the commoners of the Hawaiian chiefs. They further note that 
‘European commodities had a special value as signifying the capacity of the ali‘i 
[nobles] to incorporate the traditional generative powers of Kahiki, the lands of the 
sky beyond the horizon’ (Kirch and Sahlins, 1992, 80). I suggest that the Tongan 
Royal Family is engaged in similar stratagems. The TTF provides a direct source 
of finance, separate from the national budget, allowing the monarch to pursue 
traditional Polynesian forms of display. Kirch and Sahlins note that the Hawaiian 
chiefs’ enterprises ‘came to very little, if not dead losses’ (1992, 81). By following 
in the same path, the Tongans have brought about the same outcome. 
The Tonga Trust Fund, based on the sale of passports to non-Tongans, 
attempted to convert the sovereignty resource of citizenship into liquid assets 
through the mechanism of a trust fund. Unfortunately for Tongans, the disastrous 
investments of the fund did not abide by prudent fiduciary practices and resulted in 
great losses. The concept of extending sovereignty resource benefits over time 
failed due to the actions of fund trustees and the lack of transparency in fund 
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management, which might have prevented such investments from going forward. 
 
5.  TUVALU 
When Tuvalu separated from the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony, and what 
became the Republic of Kiribati, it was one of the most marginalised states on 
Earth. The country had no resource base—unlike Kiribati and Nauru it had no 
mineral resources—and did not possess a trust fund dating from the colonial era. 
When Tuvalu separated from Kiribati in 1978 it was unable to claim a share of the 
trust fund established in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. Yet Tuvalu was 
aware of the importance of this fund, and how it helped stabilise the economy of a 
marginal atoll state. Tuvalu had no resources upon which to build a trust fund—
even its sovereignty resources, such as the sale of postage stamps, were 
insufficient—but it was able to convince a consortium of donor countries to help it 
establish a trust fund with donor aid money. This fund, the Tuvalu Trust Fund, was 
modelled after that of Kiribati and has performed equally well. Tuvalu’s trust fund 
is distinctive in that it is based on a novel use of foreign aid that has benefited both 
Tuvalu itself as well as the donor countries. As in the case of Kiribati, Tuvalu’s 
fund invests offshore in primarily fixed income and equity investments. Tuvalu is 
now able to finance its recurrent expenditures without foreign assistance. 
 
5.1  Tuvalu and the problems of remoteness 
Tuvalu is a small Polynesian state in the South Pacific and is one of the world’s 
smallest countries (see Map 1). The country was formerly part of the British 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony but was reluctantly granted independence by the 
British in 1978, after insisting on separating from the remainder of the colony, 
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which went on to become the Republic of Kiribati in 1979. Tuvalu consists of nine 
small islands comprising 26 km2. The capital is Vaiaku on the atoll of Funafuti and 
the population numbers about 11,000, nearly all of Tuvaluan ethnicity. Tuvalu is 
one of the world’s most isolated states, and can only be reached by air twice per 
week on 21-seat propeller aircraft flying from Suva, Fiji. There is no air service 
between the nine islands of Tuvalu and a single ship makes deliveries and carries 
passengers between islands. GDP (PPP) per capita is about US$1100 and most 
Tuvaluans participate at least partially in subsistence livelihoods, though some 
revenue is gained from copra exports and fishing licences granted to overseas 
fishing fleets. Like Kiribati and Nauru, Tuvalu uses the Australian dollar as its 
currency. Tuvalu is isolated and resource poor, and it was for this reason that the 
British were hesitant about granting independence to Tuvalu. The islands of 
Tuvalu have infertile soils, and the country is prone to natural disasters including 
cyclones and tsunamis (Mellor, 2003). The country has, nevertheless, made good 
use of its sovereignty resources. 
 
5.2  The Tuvalu Trust Fund 
When Tuvalu become independent in 1978, it was ‘almost penniless’, and the 
conditions of independence were harsh on the country.38 For example, the new 
nation had no moveable property except for one ship. Financial reserves were 
negligible (Tuvalu, 1988). The country lacked such basic amenities as paved roads 
and street lighting, had few motor vehicles, no overseas representation, and 
depended on foreign air carriers to connect it with the outside world. The country 
                                                     
38 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Secretary to Government, Funafuti, 2002. 
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depended on continued foreign assistance—reluctantly given, as the British had 
opposed Tuvaluan independence—to finance all government activity. Budget 
deficits were penalized with threats of a reduction in the amount of foreign aid.39 
 In the late 1970s, in the early years of Tuvalu’s independence, the only 
resource income was the sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors. This 
sovereignty resource provided a small amount of independent income to the state. 
Tuvalu issued a variety of stamps, often reflecting foreign, non-Tuvaluan themes, 
as these appealed to collectors. Even today the country continues to sell postage 
stamps to foreign collectors.40 The investments made through philatelic sales were 
disappointing, however, and this was due to the inadequacies of the public 
accounting system, which obscured the vulnerability of the economy, resulting the 
in the accumulation of foreign debt (Tuvalu, 1988). Given the limited financial 
income derived from the philatelic business, Tuvalu was continually seeking long-
term aid commitments from donor countries, and especially from the UK (Tuvalu, 
1984). 
 Henry Faati Naisali, the Tuvaluan Minister of Finance, was aware of the 
Kiribati trust fund and wanted to replicate it in Tuvalu; he realized that the fund 
was working well for the newly-independent nation of Kiribati and was 
disappointed that the terms of Tuvaluan independence did not include a share of 
that fund. Naisali proposed to the British government that it grant Tuvalu a larger 
sum of international aid money in advance, which could be used as the basis for a 
                                                     
39 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Funafuti, 2002. 
40 It is interesting to note that these stamps are printed almost entirely for overseas sales. Even the 
Tuvalu post office does not carry most of the stamps, which must be purchased from the Philatelic 
Bureau. Among collectors, Tuvaluan stamps are much rarer when they have been posted, rather 
than when they are unused. 
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trust fund, instead of responding to annual requests for aid from Tuvalu (Bell, 
2001).  
This initial request was turned down by the British. Naisali then went to 
Australia and New Zealand in an attempt to convince these donors to contribute to 
a potential Tuvaluan trust fund; he further asked Australia and New Zealand to 
help him convince the British to contribute as well.41 As Naisali noted years later, 
‘my objective in seeking to establish the Trust Fund was to give Tuvalu political 
independence through the achievement of a greater level of financial 
independence. Future generations of Tuvaluans will have greater freedom to set 
their own destiny’ (Tuvalu Trust Fund, 1997). 
 Naisali also used the terms of the Philatelic Agreement signed between the 
British and Tuvalu governments in 1983 as a further argument in support of a trust 
fund. This agreement specified that the sum received from the sale of a ‘leaders of 
the world’ series of postage stamps would be placed into a separate fund called the 
Special Philatelic Fund, which would be invested and fund earnings used to 
finance recurrent expenditures of the Tuvalu government (Tuvalu, 1984). This 
meant that the idea of a trust fund began appearing in formal agreements within 
five years of Tuvalu independence.42  
 Naisali continued his campaign to solicit aid donations to a potential 
Tuvalu trust fund, and he hired several Australian consultants to advise on the 
matter. In 1983, the UK government announced that budgetary support for Tuvalu 
would decrease substantially (by about $100,000 per year) beginning in 1987, 
                                                     
41 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Funafuti, 2002. 
42 The Tuvalu Provident Fund, a pension fund for retirees, was established in 1984, to which the 
employee would contribute 5% of earnings matched by the employer, with the benefit payable as a 
lump sum upon retirement (Tuvalu, 1984). 
Chapter 6: Oceania  234 
forcing Tuvalu to consider alternatives for generating revenues (Tuvalu, 1988). 
The country considered three possible strategies: increasing direct and indirect tax 
rates, balancing the budget by cutting fiscal expenditure, and seeking alternative 
sources of revenue. The first two strategies ‘were politically unacceptable and were 
therefore not pursued’ (Saitala, 1995, 46).  
The break for Naisali came in 1984, when during a personal meeting with 
UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he was able to convince Thatcher to 
support his idea for a Tuvalu trust fund, based on arguments that Tuvalu was badly 
treated after its independence, when all of the GEIC trust fund went to Kiribati (B. 
Macdonald, pers. comm., 2002). In 1985 the potential donors—the UK, Australia, 
and New Zealand—each commissioned independent studies on the merits of 
establishing a trust fund in Tuvalu. These reports supported the fund in concept, 
noting that it would help stabilise the economy of Tuvalu and reduce its annual 
requests for donor aid. The Australian report also advanced a further argument in 
favour of the trust fund, namely that: 
 
The fund appears best suited to countering unwanted advances by the USSR. 
Without the security of government revenue provided by the fund, Tuvalu would 
appear more prone to difficulties in dealing with the Soviets (Fisk and Mellor, 
1986, 112). 
 
The consultants also noted that previous investment revenues from the National 
Bank of Tuvalu and the Philatelic Fund were held overseas, and this practice was 
consistent with the aims of the proposed Tuvalu trust fund (Fisk and Mellor, 1986). 
 Now that the green light was given by the three potential donors, who had 
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committed to providing funds, the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) was established in 
1987, and codified in an international agreement signed by the governments of 
Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Tuvalu (Tuvalu Echoes 93, 1987; Australia, 
1988). Each of the three donor countries reserved the right to withdraw its initial 
capital from the fund (though not the earnings), and maintain a seat on the trust 
fund board. The donors were thus granted substantial involvement in and oversight 
of the affairs of the TTF. 
 
Fund governance 
The TTF differs from the other trust funds considered in this thesis in that it has 
substantial participation from outside countries, and the fund’s management is 
partially in the hands of these initial donors. The TTF is administered by a Board, 
chaired by the Minister of Finance of Tuvalu, with representatives from each of the 
three major initial donor states (UK, Australia, and New Zealand) and with the 
Tuvalu Permanent Secretary of Finance as the secretary of the Board. The Board 
sets general investment guidelines and supervises investment transactions, which 
are conducted by independent private investment firms based in Australia. At 
present these are INVESCO and Citigroup. Another investment firm, Watson-
Wyatt, also based in Australia, is the fund’s monitor.43  
 An oversight role of the Board’s activities is given to the trust fund’s 
Advisory Committee. Initially the UK pushed for a kind of policing committee that 
would audit ‘just about everything’ concerned with the TTF.44 However, a 
compromise was reached when Australia and Tuvalu ‘came to [Tuvalu’s] rescue’, 
                                                     
43 Interview with Solofa Uota, Permanent Secretary of Finance, Funafuti, 2002. 
44 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Funafuti, 2002. 
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arguing that such an invasive policing committee was unnecessary and that an 
Advisory Committee, together with an independent fund monitor, could handle the 
work of oversight and monitoring.45 The Advisory Committee contains 
representatives from the three donor states plus Tuvalu itself. The Advisory 
Committee meets twice per year and its role is limited to advising on investment 
policy.46 Altogether, about 19 people have some management role in the TTF.47 
 The structure of the TTF is similar in outline to that of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, in that it consists of two component parts. In Tuvalu these are 
known as the ‘A’ Account and the ‘B’ Account.48 The A Account is the corpus of 
the fund, and includes the sums donated by the three donors, plus occasional 
additional donations (some of them from other countries, such as Japan), as well as 
contributions from the Tuvalu government. This fund generates earnings, a portion 
of which is redeposited into the fund in order to offset inflation and maintain the 
real value of the fund. The Australian inflation rate is used as the basis for 
determining the amount of inflation-proofing redeposited into the A Account.49 
The remaining income, as well as other windfall revenues, is deposited into the B 
Account, which also generates an income that is redeposited. The B Account may 
also make transfers to Tuvalu’s consolidated revenues, which must be approved by 
parliament and included in the Tuvalu budget.50 The capital in the A Account can 
be withdrawn only as a last resort, whereas the B Account acts as a cushion for use 
                                                     
45 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Funafuti, 2002. 
46 Interview with Solofa Uota, Funafuti, 2002. 
47 Interview with James Conway, Advisor to the Tuvalu Government, Funafuti, 2002. 
48 Recently the B Account has been renamed the Consolidated Investment Fund (CIF). I use the 
term B Account in this thesis, however, as the CIF still commonly goes by that name in Tuvalu. 
49 Interview with Solofa Uota, Funafuti, 2002. 
50 Interview with Panapasi Nelesone, Funafuti, 2002. 
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during economic downturns.51 In general, the A Account is the responsibility of 
the Board, in which the donors still have a stake. The B Account is the 
responsibility of the Tuvalu government. Whenever the Tuvalu budget is in 
surplus, the surplus funds are placed in the B Account. 
                                                     
 
Generation of capital 
As noted in the above section, the original source for the TTF’s capital was foreign 
aid donations, which were advanced to Tuvalu as a lump sum rather than being 
annually requested and budgeted. The idea was to allow the Tuvalu government to 
assume control and responsibility for its finances, rather than having to depend on 
annual aid solicitations (Tuvalu, 1984). Several other donors, such as Japan and 
South Korea, have also made small contributions to the TTF. Tuvalu budget 
surpluses and extraordinary earnings are also deposited into the fund, including 
those from the sale of the internet ‘.tv’ rights (discussed below). 
Table 6.11 illustrates the growth of the TTF from its inception in 1986, 
with an opening balance of $26.4 million, of which Tuvalu’s contribution, or share, 
was $1.6 million. At that time the Tuvalu share of the fund was very small. Over 
the past two decades both the overall fund balance and Tuvalu’s share have 
increased substantially. Tuvalu’s share is now approaching half of the total balance 
of the fund. The fund balance in 2002 was $76.7 million, of which just under 10% 
was held in the B Account, where it is available to the Tuvalu government for 
drawdowns. Stock market performance in the late 1990s contributed to the rapid 
growth in fund assets during this period. 
51 The B Account functions in a manner similar to that of the Earnings Reserve Account of the 
Alaska Permanent Fund. See Chapter 5. 
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Datea Tuvalu Share Total 
Opening 1.6 26.4 
1987 1.6 26.8 
1988 1.7 29.5 
1989 1.9 31.9 
1990 2.0 33.8 
1991 2.0 35.3 
1992 2.6 36.7 
1993 2.6 37.5 
1994 3.7 38.9 
1995 4.9 42.7 
1996 6.5 45.0 
1997 9.5 48.0 
1998 15.7 54.9 
1999 15.9 55.8 
2000 18.2 60.5 
2001 23.7 67.1 
2002b 32.2 76.7c 
 
Table 6.11. Tuvalu Trust Fund Balance, A$ millions 
 
a Balances as of 30 September for each year, 
 except for opening balance 
b Estimate 
c $7.2 million of which is in the B Account in liquid assets 
Source: Tuvalu Trust Fund, First Half-Yearly 
Report, various, Funafuti 
 
Geographies of fund asset distribution 
At present, the TTF invests about 70% of its principal in aggressive assets (mainly 
equities) and about 30% in defensive assets (mainly fixed income securities), with 
the majority (about two-thirds) of assets in Australian dollar-denominated 
investments. A recent Board decision, reflecting downturns in international stock 
markets, has determined that the fund should invest equally in aggressive and 
defensive assets.52 All equity and fixed income assets are located outside Tuvalu, 
                                                     
52 Interview with Solofa Uota, Funafuti, 2002. Today the benchmarks for investment are: Growth 
Assets: Australian shares 25%, international shares 20%, real estate 5%; Non-growth assets: 
Australian fixed interest 15%, international fixed interest 15%, liquid assets 20% (INVESCO 
Australia, 2002; Citigroup Asset Management, 2002). 
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largely in Australia, the USA, Asia, and Europe. The fund’s sole real estate 
investment is in Fiji, and consists of the building housing the Tuvalu diplomatic 
mission and employee residences in Suva. Thus the entirety of the TTF’s assets is 
invested outside the country, separating the site of capital generation from capital 
investment. 
A further interesting aspect of the spatiality of Tuvalu’s resources and 
investments lies with its revenues from the internet ‘.tv’ top-level domain. In the 
early 1980s the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigned each 
country a two-letter internet domain, which for Tuvalu was ‘.tv’ (AusAID, 2002; 
Hanley, 2004). This, by sheer accident, was a desirable ending, of very little use to 
Tuvalu itself (the country does not maintain many internet sites and it does not 
even have television) but of interest to foreign corporations, especially those in the 
television and telecommunications industry. The ‘.tv’ ending could also be 
licensed to individuals who may want to set up their own website at rates lower 
than those for ‘.com’ and other such top-level domains.  
Several investors were interested in acquiring rights to the ‘.tv’ domain, 
which they could then on-licence to other users. In 1997 Tuvalu negotiated with a 
Canadian company, which submitted the winning tender, to licence the domain, 
but this company defaulted. In 1999 Tuvalu signed an agreement with DotTV 
Corporation, based in the USA, giving them the rights to market and manage the 
‘.tv’ domain, and paying Tuvalu a royalty of $1 million per quarter plus 20% 
equity in the company. Several payments were made, and Tuvalu received $5 
million in royalties before DotTV Corporation also ran into financial trouble and 
was bought out by Verisign, the same company that licenses the ‘.com’ domain, 
among others. The new royalty agreement provided about $500,000 per quarter 
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plus 5% of quarterly revenues over $5 million. Some of this income was deposited 
into the Tuvalu Trust Fund but much was used for infrastructural development, 
including paving the Funafuti’s roads, installing street lighting, and paying the 
admission fee of $50,000 to join the United Nations (Hanley, 2004).53 Tuvalu thus 
benefited from a cyber-resource that is spatially abstract.  
 
Distribution of fund earnings 
A portion of the Tuvalu Trust Fund’s earnings are redeposited into the fund, in 
order to offset against loss in real value due to inflation. The amount redeposited is 
determined by the rate of inflation in Australia (Tuvalu, 1995). Any sum remaining 
after this redeposit is transferred to the B Account. B Account capital can then be 
drawn upon to make up shortfalls in the Tuvalu national budget, helping to finance 
government services for Tuvaluans. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
The Tuvalu Trust Fund is highly regarded both in Tuvalu and by external assessors 
(AudAID, 2002; Mellor, 2003; Saitala, 1995; Tuvalu, 1995).54 The trust fund has 
allowed Tuvalu to transform its sovereignty resources—donor aid and internet 
domains—into state-administered financial assets that generate earnings used to 
finance government activity. As a consequence, Tuvalu has no national debt and 
can independently finance its own budget, without depending on continual aid 
                                                     
53 Also interview with James Conway, Funafuti, 2002. 
54 Also interviews with Saufatu Sopoanga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu; Bikenibeu Paeniu, Minister of 
Finance of Tuvalu and former Prime Minister; Solofa Uota; Panapasi Nelesone; and James 
Conway; Funafuti, 2002. The trust fund is also highly regarded by other Tuvaluans, who are aware 
of the fund and have positive feelings towards it. 
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from foreign donors (foreign aid is still used to finance specific and non-recurring 
projects, such as hospitals and airstrips). Tuvalu has effectively deployed the 
model outlined in this thesis, of investing externally in order to generate a stream 
of sustainable revenues that can finance development needs. This is especially 
important in a country in which only about 25% of the population is engaged in the 
formal economy (Fairbairn, 1993). 
 At present, Tuvalu is satisfied with the progress of its trust fund, though 
there is some discontent over the continuing involvement, after almost two 
decades, of the three main donor states. Bikenibeu Paeniu, the Minister of Finance 
and former Prime Minister of Tuvalu, noted in an interview that the TTF is still too 
much controlled by the donors, and that this inhibits the ability of Tuvalu to solicit 
additional contributions from other countries because the fund is seen as a 
‘creature of the donors’.55 The Minister also noted that any changes to the 
international agreement that governs the TTF had to be tabled in the parliaments of 
four countries, making it difficult to amend. Though the TTF has performed well 
and has been well managed, the Minister hinted that the presence of the donors 
continues a kind of neo-colonial tradition that limits the sovereignty of Tuvalu. He 
also noted that Tuvalu’s financial position is ‘naked’ to the donor countries: too 
visible, and that this open position reduces Tuvalu’s bargaining position in 
negotiations. Yet the donors are reluctant to remove themselves.56 
 Despite these gripes, the fund remains popular with the vast majority of 
Tuvaluans. The success of the TTF has prompted the Tuvalu government to 
develop an Outer Island Fund (known as the Falekaupule Fund), which targets 
                                                     
55 Interview with Bikenibeu Paeniu, Funafuti, 2002. 
56 Interviews with Bikenibeu Paeniu and James Conway, Funafuti, 2002. 
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development in the outer islands (i.e., not Funafuti). This fund was established 
with $2 million, the principal coming from an Asian Development Bank loan as 
well as a community contribution. Earnings from the investment of this fund are 
returned to the island communities, which can submit proposals for local projects, 
although the exact financial mechanisms have not yet been determined. The 
general aim of this fund is to reduce migration from the outer islands to Funafuti. 
 Tuvalu, by following the model outlined in this thesis, has been able to 
transform itself from a penniless newly-independent state into one that can 
independently provide for the welfare of its citizens, reducing and even eliminating 
the need for foreign aid and private remittances. By separating the sites of capital 
generation and capital investment, Tuvalu can sustainably finance its recurring 
expenditures. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This overview of four Oceanic funds has revealed interesting similarities and 
differences. Though located in a common region, with a broadly similar cultural 
background, the four Oceanic states have pursued differing fiscal and investment 
policies, and have thus achieved differing performance outcomes. In some 
respects, two of the Oceanic countries, Kiribati and Tuvalu, have more in common 
with the investment practices of Alaska than they do with their neighbours in 
Nauru and Tonga.57 
 Kiribati, like Alaska, drew on a mineral resource (now depleted) to 
                                                     
57 And, in some respects, the overall investment philosophy of Nauru had much in common with the 
earlier investment policy of Alberta, in terms of investing primarily in loans to other government 
agencies and within the state. 
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establish a trust fund, saving a portion of resource revenues and investing them 
outside Kiribati. Kiribati invested offshore, where investment returns are 
potentially greater and whereby risks can be reduced through diversification. 
Tuvalu, though lacking a mineral resource base, was able to use sovereignty 
resources—donor aid and its internet domain—to generate revenues that could be 
invested in government and development activities even though the site of 
investment was external. Nauru and Tonga had problems with their trust funds, 
partially based on the philosophy of investing internally (as did Alberta) and 
partially based on poor management practice, and especially the lack of openness 
and transparency in fund governance. These issues are explored in comparative 
perspective in the next chapter. 
 
7 
 
Making trust funds work 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The six trust fund cases examined in depth in the preceding three chapters illustrate 
various degrees of success in achieving the development goals of each state. This 
chapter identifies six key criteria that determine the relative performance of each 
fund, assessing their ability to sustain and equitably distribute natural resource 
revenues. These six criteria are: 
 
1. Investment Policy: whether to invest in capital (infrastructure) assets or in 
financial (portfolio) ones. 
2. Investment Location: whether to invest onshore (locally) or offshore (globally). 
3. Benefits Distribution: whether to distribute fund benefits (usually fund earnings) 
directly to individuals (through dividends) or through the provision of collective 
goods (by the government). 
4. Governance and Management: whether the fund and its management are open 
and transparent to the beneficiaries, or whether this information is kept secret, and 
the nature and degree of public input into fund decision making. 
5. Protection: whether the fund’s assets are protected from misallocation by the 
trustees, and whether legal structures exist to prevent fund asset depletion without 
permission of the beneficiaries. 
6. Permanence: whether the fund is intended to last in the long term or permanently, 
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These six criteria help determine the ability of each trust fund to provide a 
sustained and equitable distribution of fund benefits to the beneficiaries. The 
preceding chapters have identified certain special or unique features of each fund. 
These include such features as the Alaska fund’s payment of dividends to 
individuals, Alberta’s heavy investment in non-income producing capital assets 
and its largely onshore investment policy, Nauru and Tonga’s tradition of fund 
secrecy and limited public involvement, and the legal protection given to the trust 
funds in Alaska and Tuvalu, the former by constitutional amendment, and the latter 
by an international treaty. In this chapter, these six criteria are examined in greater 
depth and the various policies of the six funds are compared. 
 
2.  INVESTMENT POLICY: CAPITAL ASSETS OR FINANCIAL ASSETS 
Investment policy is a key issue in determining why some trust funds contributed 
to greater levels of social welfare and equity. In general terms, fund assets can be 
directed towards either financial or capital investments. Financial investments 
include shares, bonds and other forms of fixed income securities, and real estate 
(where investment in real estate is a form of speculation or for income production), 
whereas capital investments consist of physical plant and infrastructure. In the 
former case, the principal goal is to produce a high and stable income with a low 
level of risk over the long term, while in the latter case social welfare goals (in a 
broad sense), such as the provision of employment or the diversification of the 
economy, may be paramount. 
 The investment policy pursued by a trust fund shapes the overall character 
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of the fund. Some funds, such as that of Alaska, have a strict ‘trust’ function; 
others, such as Alberta, are ‘developmental’ funds. As described in Chapter 5, the 
Alaska Permanent Fund resulted from a compromise among various interest 
groups, each with its own conception of what the Alaska fund should be. This 
compromise resulted in a fund with a clear ‘trust’ function; that is, it was to capture 
a share of the revenues derived from petroleum exploitation and invest these for 
the long-term financial benefit of all Alaskans, including future generations. To do 
so, the fund could not favour particular projects, which also meant that it tended to 
invest nearly all of its assets outside the state. Alberta, on the other hand, 
established its Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund with ‘developmental’ goals. 
The fund was to provide an alternate source of investment capital replacing that of 
Eastern Canadian banks, and was to intervene in the Alberta economy to diversify 
it (beyond what the market was doing). The ‘trust’ and ‘developmental’ goals of 
these two funds dictated different investment policies. 
 The distinction between financial and capital investment is perhaps the 
most fundamental decision facing fund trustees. The factors dictating a particular 
choice are complex and case-specific. Nevertheless, some common issues face all 
trust funds:  
 
1. Fund trustees need to determine the basic purpose of the fund: is it to provide 
investment capital for development projects, or is it to provide income for 
government use or individual use?  
2. How is conflict between interest groups avoided? Windfall revenues create the 
potential for rent-seeking, in which interest groups (non-productively) compete for 
a limited pool of fiscal resources, each wanting their own special project financed. 
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3. Windfall rents, entering a small economy, may lead to an inability to decide how 
to spend this new income. Saving resource rents in a trust fund may be a default 
procedure, rather than part of an overall fiscal strategy. 
4. Political issues emerge when resource rents accrue to marginal regions, which 
often harbour feelings of resentment against political and economic centres. New 
income may provide support for articulating an ‘anti-colonialist’ discourse. 
5. Fund trustees must decide if the fund’s primary function is to stabilise the 
economy. If so, then fund assets must be liquid (not capital assets) in order to 
draw them down them quickly. 
 
The choice of whether to invest in financial or capital assets is thus both politically 
and economically driven.1 Each of the five points noted above depends on political 
circumstances within the state. If fund trustees seek to enhance state revenue, they 
must avoid doling out fund capital to special interests. They must also design an 
overall fiscal strategy that allows the trust fund to expand while staving off public 
pressures for reduction of taxes and an increase in state services. If, on the other 
hand, fund trustees are more interested in intervening in the structure of economy, 
then they may decide to use the trust fund as the vehicle for intervention. This 
means that the trust fund could be viewed as a kind of development bank, 
financing capital projects and negotiating with key interest groups to buy their 
support (by financing their projects).  
The desire for government intervention in the economy often stems from 
dissatisfaction with the way the capital market is working in the state. In the case 
of sub-national states, this dissatisfaction might be directed against either the 
                                                     
1 The decision to invest locally is largely a political choice, whereas the decision to invest in global 
financial markets is a rational economic choice. 
Chapter 7: Making trust funds work  248 
national government or other sub-national states, or both. In the case of developing 
independent states, dissatisfaction might be directed against international finance 
agencies (such as foreign commercial banks or the World Bank) or against 
developed nations in general. In each case a trust fund provides an alternative 
source of investment capital that responds to perceptions of marginality. 
The selection of an investment policy entails consequences. For example, 
the distribution of risk can differ greatly between forms of investment. Risk can be 
reduced through a diversified portfolio of financial investments, which are invested 
in a basket of international currencies and markets. Capital or developmental 
investments, however, are all made in local currency, and within the same state. 
Thus an economic downturn within the country or region can seriously affect the 
performance of capital assets. 
Financial investment reduces the potential for interest group conflict, 
because no group can claim that others have profited from investment decisions 
(because most financial investment is external—this is discussed in a later section). 
Conversely, capital investment is often highly visible—a tangible asset. It is 
usually local and non-mobile. Beneficiaries of the fund see their assets ‘at work’—
such as in the recreation areas, rolling stock, grain terminals, rural telephone 
service, and other infrastructure financed by the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund. In Alaska, where the Alaska Permanent Fund’s investments are almost 
entirely financial, citizens have only their annual dividend cheque as a tangible 
proof of their fund’s existence. In the Pacific cases of Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu, 
the financial investment policies of the trust funds or the use of the fund revenues 
are aimed at funding government services, and thus the funds and their assets 
remain invisible to beneficiaries. It is not difficult to imagine a case where this 
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invisibility of assets leads residents to call for abolishment of the fund in times of 
fiscal crisis. 
Economic stability is also a consequence of investment policy. Some trust 
funds—such as those of Kiribati and Tuvalu—serve a specific stabilization 
function, and others may have the same purpose in a more occluded way. A 
stabilization fund is interventionist, but does not aim for economic diversification. 
Rather, stabilization funds attempt to even out economic activity over periods of 
boom and bust. The fund will collect revenue at a higher rate during boom periods, 
when rents are high, and disburse them during bust periods, when the economy is 
sluggish and there is a shortage of capital. In order to slow down the entry of rents 
into a small economy during a boom period, the government may decide to 
sterilize rents—externalise them and prevent them from entering the local 
economy—by investing abroad. Investing locally in nongovernmental financial 
assets ‘would transmit resource revenue volatility to the economy’ (Davis et al,. 
2001, 17). This issue is more fully discussed in the section on investment location. 
A key element of a capital investment policy is diversification of the 
economy. Diversification, as a conscious government policy, goes counter to the 
ideology of the ‘laws of the market’, which argues that if an economic opportunity 
existed (such as a new industry or sector) then private capital would move in and 
exploit it. Both Alaska and Alberta are historically marginal economies (in a 
national sense) based on primary sectors. Alberta harboured an historic grudge 
against the perceived centres of Canadian economic power in Ontario and Québec, 
as described in Chapter 4. The windfall revenues deriving from oil price increases, 
captured and invested in a trust fund, allowed Alberta to claim its place under the 
Canadian economic sun. The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund had an 
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enormous symbolic importance, as a sign of Western Canadian economic ascent, 
in addition to its more practical purpose as an alternative source of development 
capital in Alberta (Pretes, 1988). 
Financial vs capital investment is perhaps the most basic policy choice 
facing fund trustees. Reasons for choosing among these alternatives are both 
political and economic, and include questions of whether the fund is to serve as a 
source of income (for individuals or the state) or as a source of capital (which is 
expected to generate future income), whether the state is interventionist or not, and 
the relationship between the state and powerful interest groups that clamour for a 
share of the wealth. Consequences of these policy choices include issues of the 
distribution of risk, of liquidity of assets, on whether income is generated, and on 
the ability of the state to intervene beyond the market. 
 
3.  INVESTMENT LOCATION: ONSHORE OR OFFSHORE 
A second issue for fund trustees is the choice of where to invest. In some respects 
the choice of investment location is the paramount factor in the fund’s pursuit of 
economic development. As noted in Chapter 1, trust funds may serve as part of a 
development strategy that deviates from the mainstream concept of structural 
economic transformation in stages. Investing outside the local region separates the 
sites of capital generation from the sites of investment. The flow of capital from a 
peripheral to a core region might be advisable when the periphery contains limited 
investment opportunities. 
The distinction here is between investing within the boundaries of the state 
(within the region covered by the trust fund), or investing beyond these, for 
example in national or international financial markets. The choice of investment 
Chapter 7: Making trust funds work  251 
location is often closely related to the overall goals of the fund (fiscal or social) 
and the type of investment (financial or capital), and there is also the issue of 
visibility—whether fund beneficiaries see their investments in action. 
 The most basic determinant of investment location is the relative marginal 
position of most trust fund economies. As discussed in Chapter 2, trust funds are in 
part a response to a (perceived) peripheral position in a national or international 
economy, and reflect a desire on the part of the state to use natural resources to 
diminish economic and political marginality. Marginal economies are typically 
defined by their dependence on the primary economic sector (especially mining or 
agriculture) and on their remoteness from markets. Marginal economies—such as 
Alaska, Alberta, and the four Pacific islands discussed in this thesis—usually 
desire some greater contact and involvement with global markets. Setting up a trust 
fund is one way of decreasing marginality, by providing a new and independent 
source of investment capital as well as additional state revenue. 
 Paradoxically, the marginal position of resource-dependent economies 
(such as the five cases included here) stimulates the desire for local development 
but provides limited opportunities for local investment. Under the assumptions of 
free market economies, it is assumed that worthwhile investment opportunities will 
not go unexploited: non-local capital will move in whenever an attractive 
investment project presents itself. If non-local capital fails to move in, it suggests 
that the risk-adjusted returns are too low for private investors. This is the perilous 
investment situation into which some fund trustees have chosen to plunge, and, as 
we shall see, often to their detriment.. 
 Internal investment means investing within the state or region covered by 
the trust fund. These investments are typically in capital projects, as financial 
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investments are normally not constrained by state boundaries (unless, however, 
they are partly government-owned). Internal investments are typically a policy 
choice of interventionist governments that are dissatisfied with the hand they have 
been dealt, so to speak, by the market. Interventionist governments may choose to 
invest internally in order to achieve economic diversification, to subsidise domestic 
tradeables sectors, to provide employment and other social benefits, to reduce the 
tax burden, and to visibly demonstrate fund operations. 
 Economic diversification was a clear goal of the Alberta government in the 
1970s and 1980s. Hitherto, the province had been largely dependent on two 
industries, agriculture and petroleum. With the price rises in petroleum in the 
1970s, Alberta received windfall rents from provincial oil lands. These unusual 
revenues allowed the province to finance its diversification policy. For example, 
money was invested in petrochemical industries and in the recovery of oil tar 
sands. The province was also determined to become a leading Canadian centre of 
medical research, and invested trust fund moneys in research facilities in both 
Edmonton and Calgary (mainly at the two universities and their allied hospitals). 
Alberta also subsidised several industries, notably agriculture (the traditional 
economic base and the source of many votes), by financing their infrastructure. 
The provincial government used Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund capital to 
construct a grain terminal in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, allowing Alberta 
farmers to export their grain to Asia at a lower cost and also by bypassing the 
overused facilities in Vancouver. The government purchased additional rolling 
stock, increasing the capacity for grain export by rail. 
 Employment generated by Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
investments is more difficult to quantify, but certainly the construction of 
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infrastructure, such as that noted above, created new jobs, as did Heritage Fund 
subsidies on home mortgages (which increased housing construction). That is but 
one example of the multiplier effects of provincial spending on employment. 
Alberta is unique in Canada in not having a provincial sales tax. This tax, which is 
as high as 12% in some provinces (e.g., Newfoundland), is considered by many 
Albertans as almost an affront to their petroleum-rich economy. Even in times of 
fiscal crisis, such as the ‘bust’ period with low oil prices in the late 1980s, the 
provincial government refused to impose a provincial sales tax. In every case the 
argument made was that consumers should not be taxed when the province is 
simultaneously depositing ‘excess’ revenue into a trust fund. Finally, internal 
investment, in capital assets, demonstrates tangibly the province’s commitment to 
providing amenities for residents. Fund investments such as provincial recreation 
areas and rolling stock are emblazoned with the Heritage Fund logo, leaving no 
doubt about where the money supporting these projects comes from.  
 Internal investment, in a marginal region, faces limited opportunities. In 
Alberta, the provincial government, despite its diversification ambitions, found 
relatively few opportunities for investment. Many of these were related to the 
petroleum sector (such as petrochemicals and oil sand extraction) or to 
agriculture—hardly real sectoral diversity. Development opportunities—despite 
available capital—were lacking in most manufacturing and service industries, 
often due to the distance from markets. Internal investment in capital projects also 
meant that the provincial government had to negotiate among competing interest 
groups about whom to fund, and, not surprisingly, tended to fund projects of those 
groups supporting the party in power. Mortgage subsidies were clearly designed to 
buy support for the Progressive Conservative party, especially when they were 
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announced just prior to an election. This favouritism alienated other interest groups 
that felt less well served, especially urban voters. Finally, conspicuous internal 
investment antagonised other provinces that were less well endowed, very nearly 
precipitating a crisis in the Canadian federal system. Many provinces, especially 
those in Eastern Canada, complained that Alberta was exporting high oil prices, 
and reaping the benefits financed by Eastern Canadian consumers. 
 A further consideration is the performance of internal assets, especially 
when they take the form of capital projects. Many of the Heritage Fund’s capital 
investments produce no income, especially when these investments take the form 
of government subsidies. Capital projects often generate no revenue themselves but 
they can have high maintenance costs—costs that continue beyond construction. 
For example, trust fund money financed the Kananaskis Country provincial 
recreation area in the Rocky Mountains near Calgary, but the province pays 
maintenance costs for the park out of general revenue. It should also be borne in 
mind that investing internally is really a case of putting all of one’s eggs into one 
basket. If Alberta is in recession, most or all of its investments will be in recession 
as well. Thus internal investment may provide social benefits, but it is a risky 
strategy financially. 
 External investment has been the policy choice of trust funds in Alaska, 
Kiribati, and Tonga, and Tuvalu (and to some extent in Nauru). These funds are 
oriented towards savings in a strict ‘trust’ sense. Their purpose is to save resource 
revenues and invest these to generate income, income that is geared towards 
replacing the direct revenues from depleting natural resources. These funds thus 
give financial criteria—high return and low risk—a much greater importance than 
providing local social benefits, as in Alberta. Given that all four of these places are 
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marginal regions with small, open, marginal economies (perhaps less so in the case 
of Alaska), fund trustees have chosen to eschew local investment in favour of 
better returns and lower risk elsewhere. Engaging globalisation through offshore 
investment has been a conscious strategy of these places. 
 To invest externally is also to accept that capital markets generally work, 
and that if local projects were potentially profitable outside capital would move in 
and exploit them. External investment allows for a diversified portfolio, 
incorporating a mix of equity and fixed income securities as well as (non-local) 
real estate. The Alaska Permanent Fund invests largely within the United States (in 
US dollar denominated investments) but has increasingly shown a tendency to 
invest overseas as well. Thus the Alaska fund’s investment portfolio is diversified 
both in type of investment (shares, bonds, real estate) and in location of investment 
(e.g., California, New York, Japan, Korea). Fund capital is relatively liquid and can 
be moved around easily, with an ability to exploit the best investment 
opportunities. As investments are in different currencies, fluctuating exchange 
rates provide both additional income (through arbitrage) and by hedging against 
devaluations. 
 The trust funds in Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu have pursued a 
similar strategy. Nauru’s investments, mostly in the form of real estate, were 
largely outside the country (though recent revelations, discussed in Chapter 6, 
suggest that a substantial amount of investment was in the form of internal loans to 
other Nauruan government agencies), scattered throughout the Pacific. The Nauru 
Phosphate Royalties Trust’s most famous investment, and its most visible, was 
Nauru House in Melbourne. This large office building provided not only rental 
income but also made a statement about Nauru’s economic success, especially to 
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an Australian audience. Other Nauruan real estate investments were in other parts 
of Australia as well as in the US mainland, Hawaii and Fiji. Nauruan financial 
investments were largely in Australian securities, which made sense as Nauru uses 
the Australian dollar and has historical connections to the country.  
 Kiribati and Tuvalu also invest heavily in Australia, for similar reasons. 
Furthermore, the legislation governing their trust funds requires that a high 
proportion of fund investments must be in Australian dollar denominated 
securities. Kiribati and Tuvalu both use the Australian dollar and their funds make 
use of Australian investment advisers and custodians. 
 In three of these cases, fund managers have chosen to make what they 
consider to be the best investment (high return, low risk), wherever it may be. 
Financial returns have therefore been quite high. Alaska’s fund, for example, has 
consistently been one of the best performing investment trusts in the United States, 
outperforming many market indices by a wide margin in most years. Kiribati and 
Tuvalu’s funds have also increased in value since their inception, again due to 
secure but high-performance assets (the cases of Tonga and Nauru are more 
difficult to assess, see Chapter 6). Thus external investment is the ideal choice for 
fund managers who want to generate earnings with relatively low risk. 
 A final consideration with respect to external investment is that it tends to 
be accepted by most if not all interest groups. No group can claim that someone 
else is benefiting, because the investments are beyond the reach of all. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, when the Alaska Permanent Fund was proposed and 
debated, different groups had different ideas about what shape the fund could take. 
Developers, not surprisingly, hoped that the fund would finance capital projects—
projects from which they would directly benefit. Many consumers hoped for tax 
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relief, or more funding for education, or for more state highways. But, once again, 
such investments would only benefit select user groups. Investing outside the state, 
while satisfying no one in the sense of direct benefit, had the advantage of equity, 
while providing a communal benefit for the entire state by generating more state 
assets. The later idea of a dividend distribution, discussed in Chapter 5 as well as 
below, was an egalitarian move to distribute fund revenues to every Alaskan and 
not to particular groups or interests. The dividend distribution was only made 
possible by a fund policy of external investment, which generated significant 
enough revenues on an annual basis to both protect the fund’s real value against 
inflation and provide an excess for distribution. An internal investment policy 
would not have produced enough revenue to make any individual disbursement 
significant. 
 Investing trust fund assets internally or externally is a fundamental 
investment decision, and most funds (with the partial exception of Alberta and 
Nauru) have chosen one or the other. Internal investments have the advantage of 
providing benefits such as new jobs or subsidies for new industries, but they often 
fail to generate any substantial financial return, and, furthermore, entail 
maintenance costs over the long term. External investment, while not as visible to 
beneficiaries, provides a greater financial return at a lower risk, and more equitably 
distributes fund benefits across groups. As will be seen in the following sections, 
internal investment is closely tied to the provision of collective goods and to a trust 
fund whose duration is less than permanent. 
 
4.  BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION: INDIVIDUAL DISBURSEMENT OR COLLECTIVE GOODS 
In addition to the allocation of fund capital, fund trustees must also consider the 
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issue of income distribution. Trust funds—especially if they pursue a financial 
investment strategy, as discussed above—generate earnings. Even in cases where 
trust fund capital cannot be touched by government authorities, the generated 
income is often available for disbursement. Part of this revenue may be redeposited 
into the fund, to increase its capital as well as to protect the real value of the fund 
from decline due to inflation. Earnings may also be available for distribution to the 
fund’s beneficiaries. 
 The two most basic means of distributing fund earnings to beneficiaries are 
individual disbursement and the provision of collective goods (there are also 
intermediate possibilities, such as distribution to communities or groups). 
Individual disbursement refers to paying out an equal share of the fund’s earnings 
to each beneficiary, usually through the form of a dividend. The Alaska Permanent 
Fund is the only one of the five cases under consideration that pays annual 
dividends to its beneficiaries, and has done so every year since 1982. The other 
four funds direct fund earnings to collective goods, which may take the form of 
physical infrastructure, as in Alberta (as discussed previously) or by funding 
government operations, as in the Oceanic countries (at least in Kiribati and 
Tuvalu). 
 The choice of distributing dividends in Alaska was based on several 
factors. These included the desire to avoid interest group conflict, because groups 
could not compete for benefits when they were distributed equally to all. Spending 
on capital goods benefits only a portion of the population, whereas individual 
disbursement reaches everyone. Alaska fund trustees argued that individuals 
should be able to make their own investment decisions, rather than letting the state 
make them. In Alaska, the source of Permanent Fund capital was petroleum 
Chapter 7: Making trust funds work  259 
resources on state land. Trustees also argued that, as each Alaskan owns a share of 
the resource itself, each individual should benefit directly from that share in 
ownership. Finally, trustees suggested that the high cost of living in Alaska, and 
the relatively small population, should be offset by individual disbursement of oil 
revenues. 
 Individual disbursement of Alaska Permanent Fund revenues has numerous 
fiscal, spatial, and temporal effects. The dividends put new money into consumers’ 
hands, and  increased purchasing power. In 2003 dividend payments totalled about 
US$1.2 billion, or about US$1100 to each person (597,000 people). As Goldsmith 
(2001) notes, this accounted for 6.2% of Alaskan personal income, an amount 
larger than the oil industry payroll. In this sense, the Alaska Permanent Fund 
dividend constitutes one of the largest ‘industries’ in the state, but one in which 
each resident shares equally as an ‘owner-resident’.  
 A study of the first dividend payment, made in 1982, of US$1,000 (Knapp 
et al., 1984) notes that dividend distribution did indeed have positive effects in the 
Alaskan economy. The authors of this study note that about 5000 new jobs were 
created as a result of the dividend, that US$360 million of new consumer 
purchasing power was generated, and that the 1982 and 1983 dividends ‘have been 
significant factors in the rapid economic growth of the early 1980s’ (Knapp et al., 
1984, 2). These authors further suggest that individual disbursement of the 1982 
and 1983 dividends resulted in higher growth in employment and purchasing 
power than other means of distribution—such as capital projects or tax 
reductions—would have had. An additional finding of this study was that the 
dividend appeared to have no effect on inflation. This study was conducted 18 
years ago, and unfortunately has never been updated or replicated. However, as 
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Goldsmith (2001) observes, other economic data as well as anecdotal evidence 
gives cause to believe that ‘a large share of the dividend recirculates in the regional 
economy’ and that ‘a significant share goes to fund big-ticket purchases, producing 
jobs and income in trade and services’. 
 Dividend payments have spatial effects as well. The dividend is paid to 
each individual regardless of means, and an equal amount is paid to each person. 
For wealthier families, annual dividends account for only a small percentage of 
total income. But for poorer families, many of which are concentrated in rural 
areas, the dividend accounts for a relatively high percentage of total annual 
income. In some parts of rural Alaska, this percentage has reached 10% of annual 
income. The dividend has hovered under US$2000 for the past several years, and 
there is every reason to believe that the size of the dividend will be about the same 
over the next five years. Rural families can therefore plan for and budget this 
income. Many rural families depend on subsistence activities (hunting, trapping, 
and fishing) for part of their food and income. The annual dividend gives these 
families additional cash income that allows them to purchase, for example, fuels 
and imported foods. Dividends, as a reliable source of cash income, may lower 
rates of urbanisation in Alaska, as rural families have less reason to migrate to 
urban areas in search of wage employment (Huskey et al., 2004; Knapp and 
Huskey, 1988).2 The fact that dividends are paid to all state residents equally 
means that urban voters, who constitute the majority of the state’s population, do 
not view the relatively larger effect that dividends have in rural areas as any 
concession to rural interests. 
                                                     
2 See also Cebula and Belton, 1994; Nelson and Wyzan, 1989; and Shaw, 1986, for comparable 
analysis of the effects of transfer payments in other regions (United States, Canada, and Sweden). 
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 Dividends may also have other spatial effects. For example, as Goldsmith 
(2001) notes, the dividend ‘should reduce the wage differential between Alaska 
and lower cost regions of the US since employers can offer workers a lower wage 
without reducing their economic well being’. Wages are higher in Alaska to offset 
the high costs of importing most materials: dividends in effect subsidise wages. No 
study has been conducted on this issue, but it is theoretically plausible (Goldsmith, 
2001). Likewise, no study has been done on the effect that dividend payments have 
on in-migration to Alaska (except for the Knapp et al. study in 1984). Some 
economists have noted that a larger dividend than that paid presently could result 
in population movement from other states, especially larger families (as each child 
would receive a dividend). However, at the present time, and with dividends under 
US$2000, there has not been much in-migration generated primarily by the desire 
to collect dividends. 
 The Permanent Fund dividend also has temporal effects. The idea behind 
the dividend is that it be paid annually and in perpetuity (unless it is repealed, 
which is unlikely under present political circumstances). The most notable 
temporal effect is on population movement in and out of the state (also a spatial 
effect, but temporally governed), as individuals assess their dividend income when 
timing their move. Thus individuals would be most likely to leave the state after 
receiving their dividend (which is usually paid in October) rather than before 
receiving it. Also, individuals may delay their departure from Alaska by several 
years in order to collect more dividends; in this sense the dividend provides a 
disincentive against out-migration. 
 A final consequence of the dividend program is that it creates a 
constituency for the Permanent Fund. Every Alaskan resident has a personal stake 
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in maintaining and protecting the fund capital, and ensuring that it grows (at least 
enough to offset inflation) every year. Very few Alaskans have called for the 
fund’s abolition, or have suggested that fund capital be invested in other, non-
income generating, ways. The dividend literally buys support for the fund. On the 
other hand, Alberta’s trust fund has come under repeated criticism, with many 
residents suggesting that fund capital be used to fund government services rather 
than having taxes raised. In Alaska, it is more likely that a state income tax would 
be introduced rather than that the dividend should be abolished. The dividend is 
now seen as an entitlement. 
 Financially, dividend disbursement reduces the accumulation of state 
assets, as Alaska literally gives its money away. Some economists (e.g,. Olson and 
O’Brien, 1990) have noted that as oil revenues decline, the state will need to 
husband its assets more carefully. Olson and O’Brien, along with others such as 
Brown and Thomas (1994), warn that the state will have to impose a state income 
tax if it continues to give dividends away. An income tax would presumably be 
progressive, in that lower incomes would be taxed at a lower rate, so higher 
income individuals would benefit least from an income tax. 
 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund has chosen a very different 
course of action with respect to distributing the revenues it generates from 
investments. First, it should be borne in mind that the investment revenues 
accruing to Alberta’s fund are lower, because, as discussed in a previous section, 
much of the Alberta fund’s investments are non- or low-income producing. 
However, the fund does earn an annual income, and the entirety of this is 
transferred to the province’s General Fund. Thus, in this sense, the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund is merely another source of provincial income, such 
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as oil royalties and taxes of various kinds. Distribution of fund income goes to a 
single recipient, the Alberta Treasury. Nevertheless, the fund has a distributive 
effect primarily through its investments. Previous sections have described how 
Alberta’s fund invests largely in capital assets. By not paying dividends, the 
province keeps assets in its own hands and does not privatise them. In doing so, it 
opens itself up to rent-seeking, in which interest groups compete for project 
funding. 
 Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu, like Alberta, transfer their fund earnings (with 
some provisions for redeposit to offset inflation) to their General Funds. Fund 
income is used largely to finance government operations. The argument behind this 
is that, at some prior time, government operations (such things as education, 
health, social services, security, etc.) were financed directly by natural resource 
revenues (in Nauru and Kiribati) or overseas development aid (in Tuvalu). With 
the cessation of that source of income, some other means of financing government 
had to be found. Each of these Pacific countries set up a trust fund as a renewable 
resource, using its investment income to finance government operations. The funds 
are therefore vital as the primary source of government revenues. Any individual 
distribution of fund earnings would reduce government revenue to a point where 
basic services could not be financed. This situation may not be permanent, 
however. For example, both the per capita value and the per capita income of 
Kiribati’s Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF) have been increasing. In 
2000, the per capita value of the RERF stood at A$7152, while the per capita 
income for the same year was A$640. If the Kiribati fund continues to grow at a 
rate that reflects past performance, the RERF may be able to pay out dividends in 
the way that Alaska does. This could have beneficial implications for development 
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policy in Kiribati. 
 Most trust funds were set up as a way of transforming a non-renewable 
natural resource into a renewable fiscal resource, as a way of financing government 
operations when direct resource payments (royalties or taxes) decline with the 
depletion of the resource.  Alaska’s fund differed in that it also has the function of 
transferring state resource revenues into private hands. In doing so, Alaska reduces 
the accumulation of its own assets but stimulates a consumption-driven economy, 
while simultaneously addressing issues of spatial and temporal equity. 
 
5.  GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT: TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY 
Governance issues also affect the performance of a trust fund, its ability to achieve 
social equity, and its popular perception. A key issue of governance is the openness 
or transparency of fund operations. Some trust funds have gone to great lengths to 
make their activities and investment policies visible to fund beneficiaries, while 
others have only released limited information, and, in the cases of Nauru and 
Tonga, have kept most fund investments under wraps. 
 Alaska conceived of its trust fund as a ‘people’s fund’, in which each state 
resident was a kind of shareholder in the fund. The fund was therefore subject to 
great public scrutiny. Political circumstances also dictated this openness. Prior to 
1976, Alaska’s State Constitution prohibited dedicated funds. As described in 
Chapter 5, Governor Jay Hammond, the leading proponent of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, was able to secure a public referendum among Alaskan voters, 
which repealed the prohibition against dedicated funds and established the basis for 
the Permanent Fund. Alaskan voters thus had a crucial role in the formation of 
Alaska’s fund, and naturally could be expected to take an interest in a state entity 
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that would be receiving up to half of the state’s oil revenues. 
 As described in more detail in Chapter 5, the Permanent Fund is 
administered by an Executive Director (a position selected on merit), but governed 
by a Board of Trustees with six members. Two of these are ex officio, and are 
members of the state cabinet. The other four are public figures, often from the 
private sector, who are selected on the basis of their financial or business expertise. 
The Permanent Fund holds an annual meeting, which rotates to different locations 
around the state (usually in Juneau, Anchorage, or Fairbanks) as well as regular 
meetings throughout the year in smaller communities. All of these meetings are 
open to the public, and every member of the public may ask questions of the 
trustees during these meetings. The fund’s financial information is released in 
annual and quarterly reports (which are independently audited) and also through 
other publications directed at a more general audience, as well as on videos 
directed at schoolchildren. The Permanent Fund spends substantial effort on 
educating the public (including within schools) about the purposes and operations 
of the fund.  
 Fund managers are also called to account at annual meetings. The 
Permanent Fund leaves its day-to-day investment operations in the hands of several 
investment banks and stock brokerages. Each year, at the annual meetings, 
representatives from these banks and brokerages present their accounts. Again, the 
public may directly question these investment advisers, who will have a lot of 
explaining to do if, for example, the share of investments under their supervision 
has underperformed market indices. An additional indicator of fund performance, 
most visible in the eyes of the public, is the size of the annual dividend. Over the 
past several years, fund dividends have hovered near US$2000. Many Alaskans 
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expect their dividend to increase every year. Fund dividends did decline slightly 
within the past several years, because of the performance of American and 
international stock and bond markets. The public understands this, but nevertheless 
uses the dividend as a gauge by which to assess fund performance. If the divided 
decreases, or does not increase by much, people want to know why. 
 Alberta’s fund, though originally couched in a ‘house’ metaphor, was 
usually seen by the Albertan public as a ‘rainy day’ fund, the idea being that at 
some future point the fund capital would be expended. This factor perhaps 
accounts for a diminished public interest in the investment activities of the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund. The public assumed that, when the time came, the 
fund would be there.  
 Perhaps the greatest factor in the relative secrecy under which the Heritage 
Fund operates is the nature of the Canadian political system. Canadian provinces 
do not have their own constitutions, in which basic political goals and values are 
lodged and displayed. The Alberta fund, unlike its Alaskan counterpart, was not 
constitutionally protected. Its principal, unlike that of Alaska, could be allocated by 
the political party in power by a majority vote of the provincial Legislative 
Assembly. In effect this meant that the Alberta cabinet, or in practice the 
Provincial Treasurer, had almost complete control of the fund—of its broad policy 
goals as well as of its day-to-day operations. The fund could be dipped into, and 
this generally took place prior to elections, when special projects were announced. 
 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund also publishes annual and 
quarterly reports, but does not hold public meetings. The public is expected to 
express concerns or questions about the fund to members of the Legislative 
Assembly. In practice this means that the public passively receives fund financial 
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reports, but has little influence on fund policy, and is not able to access information 
beyond what is available in annual and quarterly reports. An Oversight Committee 
of the Legislative Assembly exists, but it has done very little to monitor the 
activities of the fund.  
The trust funds of Kiribati and Tuvalu publish their accounts annually, 
though in limited copies which are not widely disseminated. Tuvalu’s fund, 
because it was set up by aid donors, is under the supervision of Australia as well as 
New Zealand and Great Britain. Nauru’s fund, on the other hand, is notorious for 
its secrecy. The last financial reports tabled in the Nauruan Parliament date from 
1998, and do not reveal the details of many fund assets. In particular, they give 
very little information about the internal loans made by the Nauru Phosphate 
Royalties Trust to Nauruan government corporations and agencies. Lack of 
disclosure has prompted a new political party, Naoero Amo, to call for the release 
of fund statistics, a request denied by the government on the grounds that this is 
not public data. As noted in Chapter 6, the secrecy of the Nauru fund is a partial 
legacy of the secrecy under which the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC), 
with their Australian, New Zealand, and British members, operated during the 
mandate era (1920-1968). During that time, the BPC filed only minimal 
information, and much of that only under pressure, with the League of Nations and 
later the United Nations, despite the filing requirements of the mandate. The reason 
for this secrecy was that the BPC and its member countries were profiting 
handsomely from cheap Nauruan phosphate and returning very little of the 
economic rent to the Nauruans. This tradition of secrecy and the lack of financial 
reporting lingers even to today, and Nauru’s fund has been subject to numerous 
allegations of corruption and misuse of resources (and of the concept of ‘trust’), 
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both by Nauruan opposition parties, individual Nauruans, and international 
commentators. Even the details of what was one of its most visible assets, Nauru 
House in Melbourne, are not clearly known. In fact, no academic analysis of Nauru 
in recent times has provided even the most rudimentary discussion and disclosure 
of Nauruan fund assets and investments. 
The lack of transparency and the presence of secrecy can allow corruption 
and mismanagement to flourish. As Adam Smith noted,  
 
The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are 
careless at what price they buy; are careless at what price they sell; are careless at 
what expense they transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents 
frequently live with the profusion of princes (Smith, 1999 [1776], Vol 2, 408-09). 
 
With a lack of transparency, fund managers and others with control over 
fund assets can misappropriate fund capital to their own ends. Some of the 
examples of the kinds of investments of trust fund capital made by the 
governments of Nauru and Tonga illustrate Smith’s remarks, as the agents of the 
fund invested in frivolous and self-serving assets. 
 When fund performance (in both a financial and social equity sense) is 
compared with the degree of transparency and openness there is a strong 
correlation between openness and success. Nauru’s fund, which is extremely 
secretive, is generally thought of by internal and external analysts as absolutely a 
failure, whereas Alaska, with its transparent investments and full disclosure, has 
been economically highly successful. 
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6.  PROTECTION: SECURITY AND APPROPRIATION 
A trust fund’s assets consist of both the investment capital and the earnings that 
this capital generates through investment. Fund trustees must consider how these 
assets are protected from misallocation or misuse, and who retains the legal right to 
expend fund assets. Recall that trust funds are entities held by trustees on behalf of 
beneficiaries, to whom the assets belong. Do trustees have the right to expend fund 
capital if they feel it is in the best interests of the beneficiaries, or must the 
beneficiaries themselves decide? The six funds analysed illustrate two diverging 
approaches to this issue. 
 In three of the cases examined—Alberta, Nauru, and Tonga—no legal 
mechanism exists by which to prevent the expenditure of fund principal by fund 
trustees. In each of these cases, the fund trustees are identical with the legislature. 
Though committees exist to set investment and management guidelines, ultimate 
trusteeship and responsibility lies with the provincial legislature in Alberta, in the 
national parliament of Nauru, and with the king in Tonga. These legislative bodies, 
which represent the voter-beneficiaries, may expend fund capital without direct 
consultation with the beneficiaries.  
 The problems of such a lack of fund protection are clear enough: the fund 
capital is not protected against legislative raids on the capital. No legal condition 
exists to prevent such raids, and the only barrier is public pressure. The example of 
Alberta is instructive. Political commentators have alleged on several occasions 
that the principal of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund has been ‘dipped 
into’ by the provincial legislature, which really means by the political party in 
power. Some Heritage Fund capital was used to support an electoral promise to 
provide mortgage relief and rebates for Alberta residents. As in the case of 
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Kiribati, no legal obstacles exist to prevent such expenditure (which, some would 
argue, achieves a social benefit). The actions of the Alberta legislature on this 
occasion were not only perfectly legal but also in keeping with the spirit of the 
trust fund to provide benefits to Albertans. Nevertheless, such lack of protection 
opens the fund to short-sighted considerations that may detract from long term 
goals such as sustainability. 
 Alaska, Kiribati, and Tuvalu stand in stark contrast to the three other cases, 
as the trust funds in these two states have instituted legal protections against the 
expenditure of fund principal. In Alaska, the fund beneficiaries must be directly 
consulted before capital may be spent. In Tuvalu, an international board of 
trustees, consisting of the representatives of those donor states that provided the 
original capital of the Tuvalu Trust Fund, must give permission for fund capital to 
be expended. In this sense Alaska and Tuvalu illustrate two different methods for 
restraining a fund’s trustees, but which result in broadly similar outcomes. 
 The legal protection of the Alaska Permanent Fund’s capital stems from the 
nature of the American federal system. In the United States, each state has its own 
constitution, often mirroring the national one. Though different states may have 
differing methods for amending their constitutions, in general they require the 
consent of the voters as expressed through a referendum. This is the case in 
Alaska. A majority of the state’s voters – who also constitute the fund’s 
beneficiaries (at least the ones of voting age, 18 and over) – must approve, through 
referendum, any constitutional changes. Because the Alaska Permanent Fund is 
embedded in the constitution, any changes to fund policy, including the 
expenditure of fund capital, must be approved by a majority of the voting 
beneficiaries. As noted in Chapter 5, the Alaska Constitution, prior to 1976, 
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prohibited dedicated funds. In order to create the Permanent Fund, Alaskans voted 
in a referendum to amend the constitution and legally (and constitutionally) 
establish the Permanent Fund. The conditions by which the fund was to be 
governed, including the provision that fund capital was to be left untouched, are 
part of the state’s constitution.  
 Alaska’s embedding of its fund in the state constitution has proven highly 
effective, both in preventing legislative raids on fund capital and in creating a 
sense of stakeholdership among Alaskans. Fund capital has remained intact, the 
constitutionally-mandated provisions to protect the value of the fund against 
inflation by redepositing a portion of fund income have been adhered to, and any 
changes to the most overarching fund policies have been settled by state-wide 
referendum. The constitutional protection given to Alaska’s fund has proven 
successful, though it may not be directly replicable in places, such as Alberta, 
where (in the case of Canadian provinces), provincial constitutions do not exist. 
 Tuvalu exemplifies a different way of protecting fund capital. Tuvalu’s 
fund was set up by foreign aid donors in 1987. The largest donors were Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, with smaller contributions from Tuvalu 
itself as well as from Japan and South Korea. The fund was inscribed in an 
international treaty, the Agreement Concerning an International Trust Fund for 
Tuvalu (1987) signed by Tuvalu and the three major donors (Australia, 1988). This 
treaty established the fund and spells out its legal status, conditions of 
management, provisions for change, and so forth. It also established a Board of 
Directors, consisting of a delegate from each of the four parties, and vests ‘all the 
powers of the fund’ in this board. This international treaty has protected Tuvalu’s 
fund capital, while maintaining Tuvalu sovereignty yet allowing the fund’s donors 
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to monitor fund activities. 
The existence of a protective legal framework is often supplemented by 
cultural values oriented towards saving. For example, Kiribati has not witnessed 
any politically motivated attempts to expend fund capital. This may be partly 
accounted for by the generally homogenous I-Kiribati population, by a cultural 
predisposition towards savings, and by the shared perception that the fund is 
necessary for Kiribati’s well-being.  
 Legal protection of fund principal is an important consideration for any 
trust fund. Though social and cultural practices may prevent fund trustees from 
expending fund capital, they are no guarantee of capital preservation. Ideally, a 
trust fund will take advantage of the nature of the political and constitutional 
system under which it operates to enshrine the protection of fund capital and to 
limit its expenditure to circumstances in which a majority of beneficiaries approve. 
 
7.  SUSTAINABILITY: SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM FUNDS 
A final consideration for trust fund managers is the projected duration of the fund. 
Is it to be a permanent fund, operating in perpetuity, or does it have a limited time 
frame? The five funds analysed here were all set up as permanent funds, yet their 
investment policies and use of capital have, in some cases, limited the funds’ 
expected lifespan. 
 Both permanent and temporary funds fulfil a purpose. Permanent funds, as 
in the five cases discussed in this thesis, are generally seen as a kind of renewable 
resource. Indeed, one of the great benefits of trust funds is that they can effectively 
transform a finite and depletable natural resource into a renewable fiscal resource. 
This new fiscal resource can be managed according to the principles of renewable 
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resources, under which the ‘breeding stock’, in this case the fund capital, is not 
‘over harvested’, and continues to produce an annual return in perpetuity. In this 
sense management of a trust fund is analogous to managing a fishery or a forest. If 
fund capital is ‘over harvested’, or diminishes, it reduces the ability of the fund to 
generate future income, in the same way that over harvesting fish reduces the 
number of fish caught in future years. If trust funds are to be permanent, they must 
be managed as renewable resources. 
 Trust funds may also be temporary, with a set duration and fulfilling a 
specific function. In this sense they are analogous to non-renewable resources, and 
can be managed accordingly. A temporary fund, managed as an annuity, might be 
used to help in economic transition, to diversify an economy (lasting until that 
diversification is reached), or to stabilise the inflow of new wealth into an 
economy during a ‘boom’ period. For example, Papua New Guinea set up a 
Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund, now disbanded, but which functioned 
during the 1980s and 1990s as a way of stabilising state revenue that was subject to 
wild price fluctuations. Mineral economies are subject to rapid change and high 
volatility, depending on world prices and demand for minerals. During some years 
substantial windfall revenues may flow into an economy, but during other years the 
inflow might be very small. How to manage this volatility? A stabilisation fund 
accrues excess revenue in boom years, and then releases this savings into the 
economy (typically into the state’s General Fund) during bust years. A fund of this 
type is only needed when the economy is dependent on a resource with a widely 
fluctuating price. 
 The trust funds of Alaska, Alberta, Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu 
were all set up as permanent funds, and their names often reflect this. Alaska 
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specifically calls its fund the Alaska Permanent Fund, while Alberta’s fund name 
stresses the idea of heritage and savings: the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund. 
Though the names of the Pacific funds are more generic, an examination of their 
founding legislation suggests that these funds were intended to be permanent. 
 Despite the goal of permanence, some funds may deplete themselves 
because of poor investment policy. The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, for 
example, has invested heavily in capital assets, which do not produce a financial 
return. Furthermore, no new money is deposited into the fund. This means that the 
fund’s size is effectively shrinking: though its nominal value remains constant, its 
real value is decreasing due to inflation. Though the Alberta fund may be 
permanent in theory, its diminishing size limits its ability to function in the Alberta 
economy in the same way as it did in the past. Alberta’s neighbouring province of 
Saskatchewan also set up a trust fund, the Saskatchewan Heritage Fund, but this 
fund (which was set up in 1978) was wound down by a repeal of its enabling 
legislation in 1992. Thus the ‘heritage’ of Saskatchewan resource assets was 
preserved for less than two decades. Alberta has decided to restructure its Heritage 
Fund so that it is now increasingly invested in financial and non-local assets—
following a policy similar to that of Alaska. This recent switch in investment 
policy may prevent the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund from going the way 
of its sister fund in Saskatchewan. Nauru and Tonga’s funds have performed so 
poorly that their future existence is in question. 
 One of the key reasons for setting up a trust fund is intergenerational 
equity. The idea is that natural resources and their direct financial benefits belong 
to future generations as well as to present ones. The legislation governing all six 
funds considered here suggests that each had intergenerational equity as one of its 
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major goals. If ‘future generations’ are left unspecified, it suggests that all future 
generations are to be considered beneficiaries of current resource extraction, and 
the fund must therefore exist in perpetuity in order to transfer a share of resource 
income to them. None of the funds under consideration limits its definition of 
‘future generations’ to one or two following generations. 
 Permanence is the desired goal of the six funds considered here, but the 
ability of the funds to reach this goal has varied, largely dependent on their 
investment policies. Funds pursuing a strict financial investment policy, 
husbanding fund capital in high return and low risk investments, have fared best 
with respect to the ability to perpetually support the fund. Given that a major goal 
of each of these funds is to provide a source of government revenue after a non-
renewable resource revenue source is depleted, it would seem necessary that 
financial investment, together with an externally-directed investment practice, and 
openness and transparency of public participation, are necessary conditions for 
fund permanence. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
The six states considered here—Alaska, Alberta, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and 
Tuvalu—have attempted to deal with resource dependence, remoteness, and 
economic ‘underdevelopment’ by saving and investing a portion of the state’s 
share of resource revenues. Each of these six states has created a trust fund with 
this share of resource revenues, in which the revenues are held in trust by the state 
on behalf of the resident beneficiaries. The goals of each of the six funds are 
broadly similar: to save a share of resource revenues, to invest these both to 
maintain the real value of the fund and to provide an additional source of income 
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for the state, to achieve intergenerational equity by transferring a share of the value 
of resources extracted in the present to future generations, and, in some cases, to 
intervene in the economy. In a more general sense, the goal of each fund is to 
increase the welfare and well-being of state residents, and to maintain sustainably 
this increased welfare. This constellation of economic and social goals has been 
termed ‘social equity’. Each of the trust funds under consideration here has 
attempted to increase the social equity of its region. 
 The ability of the funds to meet these goals has varied considerably. The 
reason for this variation lies in the different policies pursued by each of the funds. 
These policies may be subsumed under six general rubrics: investment policy, 
investment location, benefits distribution, governance and management, protection 
of fund capital, and fund permanence, which are summarized in Table 7.1. Table 
7.2 illustrates, in the most general sense, the factors that help maximize the ability 
of a fund to achieve its social equity goals. Only one fund, that of Alaska, meets all 
six of the ‘more successful’ criteria. None of the funds meets all six of the ‘less 
successful’ criteria, though Alberta comes close. These assessments do not indicate 
sufficient criteria for a fund’s success. Rather, they suggest some general pathways 
that fund trustees (and beneficiaries) may want to consider when setting up a new 
fund or re-envisioning an existing one. 
  
Table 7.1.  Summary of Sustainability and Distribution Policies. 
 
Case Criteria 
 Investment Policy Investment Location Distribution of 
Benefits 
Governance and 
Management 
Protection Sustainability 
       
Alaska 
(USA) 
Financial  
(shares, bonds, real 
estate) 
External 
(USA and global) 
Dividends 
(and inflation-
proofing redeposit) 
Open 
(public meetings 
and accounts) 
Protected 
(by constitutional 
amendment) 
Permanent 
(real value 
maintained) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
Capital 
(infrastructure, internal 
loans, some financial) 
Internal 
(Alberta, other Canada) 
General Fund 
(no redeposit) 
Open 
(public accounts) 
Not Protected 
(legislature may 
appropriate) 
Short Term 
(real value not 
maintained) 
Nauru Financial 
(real estate, internal 
loans, other (?)) 
Internal 
(Nauru, Australia, other 
Pacific) 
General Fund 
(no redeposit, 
unknown 
Secret 
(limited release of 
information) 
Not Protected 
(legislature may 
appropriate) 
??? 
(permanent intention, 
short term in 
practice) 
Kiribati Financial 
(shares, bonds) 
External 
(global) 
General Fund 
(some inflation 
protection) 
Open 
(public accounts) 
Protected 
(legislature may not 
appropriate 
Permanent 
(real value 
maintained) 
Tonga Financial 
(bank deposits, 
insurance) 
External 
(USA) 
General Fund 
(no redeposit, 
unknown 
Secret 
(limited release of 
information) 
Not Protected 
(King may 
appropriate) 
Short Term 
(real value not 
maintained) 
Tuvalu Financial 
(shares, bonds) 
External 
(global) 
General Fund 
(some inflation 
protection) 
Open 
(public accounts, 
external oversight) 
Protected  
(by treaty) 
Permanent 
(real value 
maintained) 
Note: italics indicate a distinctive feature. 
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Table 7.2. Summary of Fund Criteria and Performance Outcomes. 
 
 Investment 
Policy 
Investment 
Location 
Benefits 
Distribution 
Governance and 
Management 
Protection Sustainability 
 
More Successful 
 
 
Financial 
Investment 
 
Offshore  
Investment 
 
Individual 
Distribution 
 
Open and 
Transparent 
 
 
Legal Protection 
 
Long-Term 
Goals  
 
Less  
Successful 
 
 
Capital Projects 
Investment 
 
Onshore 
Investment 
 
Collective  
Distribution 
 
Secret 
 
No Legal 
Protection 
 
Short-Term 
Goals 
 
8 
 
Conclusion 
 
1.  REVERSING THE FLOW 
This thesis has explored how capital flows are linked to economic development. 
Adam Smith suggested that capital accumulation was the basis of economic 
development, and that savings were prompted by a desire to better the human 
condition. In Smith’s vision, individual savings leads to societal benefits. In the 
trust fund model proposed here, societal savings leads to individual benefits. 
Reversing the flow of capital also ‘reverses’ the flow of benefits. 
The process of capital accumulation, and the expansion of the capitalist 
economic system, was taking place when Smith was writing, and continues to the 
present. Smith’s early economic insights led to a conception of development that 
was based on capital accumulation followed by investment in new industries. This 
conception was further refined by development scholars into the twentieth century. 
The mainstream of this scholarship created a model in which economic 
development is achieved by a process of economic transformation through 
progressive stages, from agriculture to industry to services. This model has been 
successfully deployed to explain the development trajectories of Europe, North 
America, and East Asia. 
 But what about the development process outside these core regions? How is 
development to be achieved in the peripheral spaces of the global economy? Most 
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development analysts have continued to apply the mainstream model, with its 
European and North American biases, to peripheral regions. A consequence of this 
direct transposition is the limited applicability of the mainstream models to 
stimulate economic development in peripheral regions, as evidenced through the 
failure of many development projects. 
 How, then, can capital accumulation, and economic development, be 
achieved in the marginal and remote spaces of the global economy? I have argued 
in this thesis for reconsidering the directional flow of capital within the global 
economy. In mainstream conceptions of development, capital flows from core to 
periphery, from the more-developed to the less-developed spaces, investing in new 
industries and thus providing economic benefits to the region. In this thesis I have 
suggested that in certain peripheral spaces, capital flow from periphery to core may 
be a more appropriate strategy for economic development.1 In this conception, the 
core becomes a site for investment, rather than a source of capital. Capital is 
instead generated in the periphery, either through natural resources or through 
sovereignty resources. The non-renewable nature of these resources, as windfalls, 
means that only a limited window of opportunity exists for their investment. I have 
suggested here that a trust fund may be the most appropriate mechanism for 
capturing these windfalls, investing them in core regions, and achieving this 
reversed flow of capital. In doing so, the sites of capital generation and capital 
investment are spatially separated. 
                                                     
1 Interestingly, this is analogous to what individuals have been doing with their own savings in 
developing countries where the opportunities for investment are not favourable. In this practice of 
capital flight, the returns on capital may be repatriated to the capital source country, or not. 
Typically, societal benefits are not a result of this capital flight, though some individuals may 
benefit. 
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 This thesis also argues for a more place-based conception of development, 
in which different development models may be appropriate to different regions, 
and that no model can capture and explain the nature of development everywhere. 
Earlier attempts to create place-specific development models include the MIRAB 
model in Oceania and the model of Northern development used by some scholars 
in the Arctic and Subarctic regions of North America. Likewise, the conceptions of 
Small States scholars have indicated how different models of development may 
have greater or lesser applicability depending on the size of the state. My own 
approach suggests that a state’s position within the global economy is an important 
factor in determining how capital flows can best be used to achieve development 
objectives. Other factors, such as the size of the state’s population relative to its 
resource endowment, are also important. 
 
2.  TRUST FUNDS AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
How is this reversal of the flow of investment capital, from periphery to core, to be 
achieved? I argue in this thesis that a trust fund is the most effective mode of 
development finance. Trust funds save a portion of natural or sovereignty resource 
capital and invest this capital to generate earnings while preserving the original 
fund principal. If the trust fund’s earnings (or some portion of them) are reinvested 
into the trust fund, then the fund will continue to grow, even after resource 
revenues have stopped flowing into the fund. The trust fund becomes a renewable 
resource that, if sustainably managed, will continue to generate earnings in 
perpetuity. In this way, non-renewable natural resources are transformed into 
renewable fiscal resources. 
 Trust funds, as an interventionist policy, provide a number of advantages 
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and benefits that passive policies do not provide. Passive investment policies, in 
which resource revenues are deposited into a state’s general fund, can lead to such 
problems as rent-seeking and Dutch Disease. This is especially the case in small, 
undeveloped economies that form the marginal spaces of global capital, such as the 
island states of Oceania and the resource hinterlands of North America. Trust 
funds, on the other hand, can produce the following benefits: 
 
 Savings: Save resource revenues that would otherwise be spent and 
misallocated into immediate direct consumption; 
 Equity: Extend benefits of resource revenues over many generations or in 
perpetuity; 
 Income: Provide an additional source of budgetary income for the state; 
 Investment capital: Provide an additional or alternative source of investment 
capital; 
 Intervention: Be used to intervene in the economy to achieve state objectives, 
such as diversification or stabilisation; 
 Macro management: Externalise windfall effects and prevent distortions arising 
in the economy. 
 
The six cases I considered in this thesis were able to achieve these benefits to a 
greater or lesser extent, depending upon how closely they followed the six criteria 
for success discussed in depth in the previous chapter. These are: 
 
 Investment Policy: whether to invest in capital (infrastructure) assets or in 
financial (portfolio) ones; 
 Investment Location: whether to invest onshore (locally) or offshore (globally); 
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 Benefits Distribution: whether to distribute fund benefits (usually fund 
earnings) directly to individuals (through dividends) or through the provision of 
collective goods (by the government); 
 Governance and Management: whether the fund and its management are open 
and transparent to the beneficiaries, or whether this information is kept secret, 
and the nature and degree of public input into fund decision making; 
 Protection: whether the fund’s assets are protected from misallocation by the 
trustees, and whether legal structures exist to prevent fund asset depletion 
without permission of the beneficiaries; 
 Permanence: whether the fund is intended to last in the long term or 
permanently, or whether it is viewed as a short term device. 
 
Assessed on the basis of these criteria, the performance of the six trust funds varied 
significantly. Alaska, Kiribati, and Tuvalu are examples of trust funds that have 
successfully achieved their objectives. Nauru and Tonga are examples of trusts 
funds that failed to achieve their objectives, while Alberta is a middle case (Alberta 
has shifted its fund policies and is now becoming more like the Alaska, Kiribati, 
and Tuvalu funds). 
 Alberta, a province of Canada, established its Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund in 1976, as a response to increasing provincial oil revenues. Alberta 
historically perceived itself as a hinterland region of Canada, dependent for capital 
and manufactures on the larger and more industrialised provinces of Ontario and 
Québec. The rise in oil revenues gave Alberta a window of opportunity to use these 
revenues to offset this perceived marginal position. Alberta’s trust fund, which 
received a share of the province’s oil revenues, was used by the Alberta 
government in an effort to make the province more core-like. This was done by 
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investing primarily within Alberta and not externally, by making subsidised loans 
to provincial crown corporations, and by attempting to diversify the economy away 
from petroleum dependence. The fund also distributed its benefits in the form of 
collective goods in an attempt to propitiate important local economic sectors and 
class fractions. Alberta’s internally-directed investment policy did not take 
advantage of the benefits of investing globally, and did not re-spatialise Alberta’s 
investment field to include many regions beyond the province’s borders. As such, 
the fund declined, failing to hold its real value and becoming prey to partisan 
politics. Recently Alberta abandoned its attempts to establish itself as a core, and 
has shifted the focus of its trust fund towards globalised investments. 
 The state of Alaska, in the United States, instead chose an investment 
programme more consistent with the conception of peripheral development 
outlined in this thesis. The state’s trust fund was also established in 1976 and 
received its initial capital from state oil royalties. Alaska, through its Alaska 
Permanent Fund, chose to invest externally, in the United States and beyond. This 
investment practice allowed the state to take advantage of the diversity offered by 
global financial markets, so that when Alaska itself was in recession, its offshore 
investments were performing well and generating needed revenues. Alaska is also 
distinctive in choosing to distribute a large portion of the trust fund’s earnings 
individually to each beneficiary, in the form of annual dividends. These dividends 
provide a universal basic income for all Alaskans, and have slowed down the rate 
of migration from rural to urban regions. Dividends also have stimulated new 
businesses and employment in Alaska, including in rural regions. As dividends are 
distributed to all Alaskans equally and are not means-tested, they are not perceived 
as targeted towards special interests. Alaskans have responded favourably to their 
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trust fund and have repeatedly voted to keep it going, despite growing state budget 
deficits. Alaska provides the clearest example of the development strategy 
suggested in this thesis. 
 The four Oceanic states considered in this thesis—Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, 
and Tuvalu—have experienced varying levels of success with their trust funds. 
Kiribati’s trust fund was established in 1956, when the country was part of the 
British Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. The fund was based on phosphate 
revenues, and was designed to support the islands’ economy after the resource was 
depleted. Nauru’s trust fund was established in 1922 for similar reasons, and 
likewise received its capital from phosphate revenues. The two countries began on 
parallel tracks but substantially diverged, based on differing investment 
philosophies and practices. Kiribati, independent since 1979, chose to invest its 
fund externally, and largely in secure fixed income and equity investments. Nauru, 
on the contrary, invested largely within the national territory, in the form of 
subsidised loans to Nauruan government agencies, investments that, given Nauru’s 
profligate spending, are unlikely to be repaid. Thus Nauru has lost the bulk of its 
investments and the fund may possibly be insolvent. Nauru’s practice of extreme 
secrecy prevented external analysts as well as concerned Nauruans from altering 
the fund’s investment trajectory. 
 Tonga and Tuvalu are largely resource-poor Polynesian states. Unlike 
Kiribati and Nauru, they lacked a substantial mineral resource upon which a trust 
fund could be established. Both countries were able to take advantage of 
sovereignty resources, including the sale of passports and postage stamps, as a way 
of building up investment capital. Tonga’s sale of passports was criticised early on 
by members of the Tongan parliament, and the rather shady deals that began with 
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passport sales continued in the investment of trust fund capital, which was 
conducted secretively and in defiance of most standard investment practices. The 
consequence of these actions was the loss of the bulk of the fund’s capital in 
speculative investments. Tuvalu, an even more marginalised state, initially sold 
postage stamps to collectors to raise capital, but was successful in persuading three 
large donor states to contribute capital to its trust fund, thereby avoiding the need 
for annual requests for aid. The involvement of these international donors as well 
as Tuvalu’s own policy of fiscal openness and transparency and conservative 
investment practices allowed the fund to grow. The earnings of Tuvalu’s trust fund 
now finance government activity, and the country no longer needs to ask donors to 
fund its recurrent expenditures. Thus sovereignty resources, another form of 
windfall with a limited window of opportunity, were parlayed into a sustainable 
fiscal resource. 
 The six trust funds examined in this thesis resulted from the visions of six 
individuals. Peter Lougheed, Jay Hammond, Michael Bernacchi, Alwin Dickinson, 
King Taufa‘ahau Tupou IV, and Henry Faati Naisali each understood that natural 
and sovereignty resources do not last forever, and that only a short window of 
opportunity exists in which to capture resource revenues and invest them for the 
future. Each of these six individuals independently proposed a trust fund as a 
mechanism to invest windfall revenues in order to obtain long-range benefits for 
the community. Each trust fund resulted from the persistence of a visionary 
sponsor.2 
                                                     
2 It is also worth noting that both Peter Lougheed, as premier of Alberta, and Jay Hammond, as 
governor of Alaska, were members of conservative political parties that advocated free-market 
approaches to economic development. Both Lougheed and Hammond had sufficient popular and 
party support, as well as a great deal of foresight and economic understanding, to make their visions 
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 The six trust funds considered in this thesis demonstrate differing 
outcomes, which varied according to how well they followed the conception of 
development as a reversal of the flow of capital from periphery to core. Alaska, 
Kiribati, and Tuvalu were successfully able to take advantage of global financial 
markets and used them as fertile fields of investment. 
 
3.  ASSESSMENT OF METHODS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In conducting research for this thesis I have used the comparative method, based 
on the analysis of six case studies. Four of these cases are small Pacific island 
states, each of which has established a national trust fund in order to achieve both 
sustainability and self-reliance in the support of economic livelihoods. The two 
other cases are sub-national entities—one a state of the United States and the other 
a province of Canada—that have set up more regionally-based trust funds with the 
same intentions as in the Pacific cases. The comparative method has allowed me to 
explore the origins and trajectories of trust funds in a variety of contexts, and to 
explore the factors that have distinguished successful funds from unsuccessful 
ones. 
 In analysing these cases, I have been guided by sociologist Michael 
Burawoy’s concepts of ‘scientific research programmes’ and ‘extended case 
method’, in which the researcher explores the unique features that lead each case to 
its outcome, rather than searching for a common pattern among all cases, as in the 
method of induction. Using a scientific research programmes and extended case 
method approach has allowed me to explore the particular features of each of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
come true. Lougheed and Hammond were ‘radical conservatives’. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 289
six cases and to incorporate historical contingency. Each of the six places 
examined here set up a trust fund at different points in time and under different 
circumstances and conditions, yet each trust fund was a response to a similar 
perceived position of economic marginality. Each trust fund was an attempt to 
interact with a larger global economy. 
 My research on each of these six cases involved the analysis of textual 
documents, including historical archival materials and contemporary financial 
statements. These textual sources were supplemented by semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews with key officials in each of the six places. I also 
interviewed a variety of other individuals in order to glean a sense of awareness 
and knowledge of each trust fund, and to place the funds within the context of 
beneficiaries’ understandings of how their livelihoods were linked to state fiscal 
policies. This helped me understand how each trust fund is perceived by its 
beneficiaries. 
 My research was also guided by my own hypothesis concerning the links 
between capital flows and economic development. Contrary to mainstream 
perspectives, I have argued here that capital flows from peripheral economic 
spaces to the core of the global economy can, under certain conditions, be 
beneficial to places on the margins. Textual data sources, interviews, and a guiding 
hypothesis were all triangulated to arrive at an overall understanding of how trust 
funds can contribute to economic development. In doing so, I have explored how 
multiple economic logics underpin the origins and functioning of each of the six 
trust funds examined here. 
 This thesis has demonstrated the value of trust funds as an economic 
development tool for places on the margins of global capital. It also points the way 
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to future studies that might explore particular trust funds in greater depth. In 
particular, a community-based study of a single fund would allow a researcher to 
explore the effects of an individual distribution of fund earnings through dividends 
versus the provision of collective goods by the state. A more detailed study of a 
single fund would also shed light on the intricacies of day-to-day fund 
management and the complex set of issues that fund trustees must balance when 
making investment choices. Other issues, such as the nature and type of fund 
investments, would also bear further examination.  
 
4.  RENEWING THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
This thesis has considered how a different—from the mainstream—development 
practice has been able to enhance the economic performance of the marginal 
spaces of the global economy. The model proposed here may be applicable in 
many other cases, and some other states have already established trust funds with 
similar purposes. Botswana, for example, was one of the world’s poorest countries 
when it received independence in 1966. Its Pula Fund, based largely on revenues 
from diamond sales, cushions the Botswana economy from volatile shifts in 
mineral prices by providing the government with a source of capital to finance 
operations during periods of weak growth. FSM’s Compact Trust Fund and the 
Marshall Islands’ Intergenerational Trust Fund have allowed these two Pacific 
island countries to assume gradual control over their own economic affairs, at a 
time when the United States government is withdrawing its financial support for 
these former trust territories. A portion of the annual American aid grant is saved 
each year in the FSM and Marshall Island trust funds, allowing them to generate a 
source of capital that will eventually replace that derived from American aid. The 
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case of Tuvalu (as well as those of FSM and the Marshall Islands) illustrates how 
trust funds can be used as exit strategies, as donors, usually former colonial 
powers, gradually reduce their financial support for newly-independent states. 
Trust funds can provide an economic base for a sustainable and self-reliant state as 
it undergoes the transition from dependent to independent territory. 
The model described in this thesis may also be applicable in other places, 
for example, in Niue, São Tomé, and Brunei (Anderson, 2002; Tisdell, 1998) and 
in various Native American communities. Each of these are places remote from the 
cores of the global economy, yet possess natural or sovereignty resources that 
could be used as the source of investment capital. The small populations of these 
places also insure that the per capita benefits of any trust fund would be relatively 
large. Niue, in the Pacific, could follow the Tuvalu (and FSM and Marshall 
Islands) model, in which part of New Zealand’s financial assistance to the island is 
saved in a trust fund, eventually making Niue far less reliant on continued New 
Zealand assistance. In the cases of São Tomé off the coast of Africa, and Brunei in 
Southeast Asia, both of which are oil rich states, a portion of oil revenues could be 
invested globally through a trust fund, providing a future capital source after 
petroleum reserves are depleted. 
The world’s newest country, Timor-Leste (East Timor) in Southeast Asia, 
has already implemented a trust fund strategy to manage its revenues from offshore 
petroleum reserves. The Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund, established at the 
suggestion of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, will save a portion of current oil 
revenues for the use of future beneficiaries. Alkatiri noted that ‘equity between this 
generation and those in the future is the central principle underpinning the creation 
of the Fund’ (laohamutuk.org, 2005). Timor-Leste’s fund, modelled on that of 
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Norway, will save a portion of the nation’s oil revenues and invest them in global 
financial markets, while fund earnings will be held in a separate account held at the 
Federal Reserve Bank in New York. Protections on the use of fund earnings and 
capital have been embedded in the country’s new constitution. Timor-Leste has 
thus provided for its future at the very inception of the country’s independence, 
guaranteeing that current windfall benefits will be extended into perpetuity 
 Two sub-themes have emerged through this thesis. The first of these is the 
spatiality of investment. Within the alternative model proposed here, the sites of 
capital generation and capital investment are separated, but local development 
takes place when investments are made globally. This practice is of course not 
new. For example, John Maynard Keynes (1958; 1960) relates the story of the 
windfall revenues acquired on Sir Francis Drake’s first three voyages (1573-1580), 
during which Drake raided Spanish ships and returned with a substantial booty. 
Keynes notes that the value of the gold that Drake brought back to England has 
been estimated as being between £300,000 and £1,500,000. Much of this revenue 
was used to pay off England’s national debt, but the remaining sum of £42,000 was 
invested overseas by Queen Elizabeth I in the Ottoman Empire, through the Levant 
Company. Keynes notes how the profits derived from this investment were used to 
finance the East India Company, and then how that company’s profits were used to 
finance further English economic expansion. According to Keynes, this offshore 
investment of a windfall resource was the basis of English economic expansion 
and prosperity. It was not the treasure itself that was beneficial, but the way of 
investing it in other enterprises that stimulated England’s development (Keynes, 
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1960, 156-158; Webb, 1952, 196-198).3 
 The wise Elizabeth I realized that investing in one of the leading empires of 
the day was a better course of action than investing in England itself, which was in 
the sixteenth century a rather remote and marginal corner of the world. England’s 
Ottoman investments followed the investment policy that I have advocated in this 
thesis, in which windfall capital is invested, not locally, but in the global financial 
markets of the day. The investments of the Alaska, Kiribati, and Tuvalu trust funds 
parallel the strategy that enabled England to achieve a high level of economic 
development. 
 The second sub-theme that has emerged in my analysis is that of 
sustainability. Non-renewable resources, whether natural or sovereignty-based, are 
finite. Their exploitation cannot provide a stream of benefits in perpetuity. But 
non-renewable resources can be transformed, through the mechanism of a trust 
fund, into a renewable fiscal resource. If the trust fund is well managed, it can 
produce a continuing stream of earnings far beyond the time frame of revenues 
from the windfall resource. The key to sustainability is the policy choices made 
during the window of opportunity, when the non-renewable resource is being 
extracted. Will these revenues be directed to current consumption, or will a portion 
of them be saved and accumulated as investment capital? And will this investment 
capital be invested in such a way as to generate annual earnings? If wisely 
managed, a trust fund can transform non-renewable windfall resources into 
renewable fiscal ones. 
 This thesis is a response to Gibson-Graham’s (2004) call ‘to think about 
                                                     
3 Conversely, the Spanish state spent the bulk of its colonial windfalls on the military and on public 
display, precipitating a decline in Spain’s economy (Karl, 1997, 34). 
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and practice development differently’. In this thesis, I ask development 
practitioners to reimagine the economic spaces of marginal economies and the 
relationship between core and periphery. I call for a separation of the sites of 
capital generation and capital investment, and for transforming non-renewable 
windfall resources into renewable fiscal ones. By avoiding the European tradition 
of industrial development, a new pathway is opened that can assist marginal spaces 
in renewing the wealth of nations. 
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